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Abstract 
This thesis includes three independent empirical studies that examine the relationship 
between trade and wages for Chinese manufacturing industries for the period 
immediately following China’s entry into the WTO (2002-2006). Following a brief  
introduction, Chapter 2 uses highly detailed firm-level industrial production data merged 
with product-level trade transaction data to make a direct test of  the model developed by 
Amiti and Davis (2011). Specifically, we investigate how output and input tariff  
reductions following China’s membership of  the WTO affected the wages paid to 
workers in Chinese manufacturing firms, and whether the effect of  tariff  liberalization 
on workers’ wages is dependent on the extent of  firms’ global engagement. Our findings 
are compared to those of  Amiti and Davis (2011) who examined the impact of  tariff  
reductions in Indonesia. The potential endogeneity issue of  tariffs is addressed in several 
ways although our results support the premise that post-WTO period tariff  reductions 
were exogenous. In Chapters 3 and 4 we focus on the unique position that Chinese 
trading firms have in Chinese trade patterns paying close attention to processing trade. 
Chapter 3 reexamines the relationship between tariff  reductions and firm wages taking 
into account the special tariff  treatment given to processing firms. We find that 
processing firms who enjoy tariff  exemptions on imported intermediates pay higher 
wages following a fall in firm-level output tariffs. However, only workers working in the 
more traditional non-processing firms get higher wages after a fall in firm-level input 
tariffs. Finally, Chapter 4 examines the impact of  tariff  reductions on the decision of  
firms to switch between different modes of  exporting and explores how export 
switching affects firm wages through trade liberalization. The results highlight that input 
tariff  reductions at the firm level determine a firm’s decision and direction of  export 
switching, and most importantly, such reductions always encourage exporting firms to 
switch to another export status to upgrade their productivity level. The thesis concludes 
with some discussion of  future research ideas. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
China’s decision to become a member of  the WTO in December 2001 is considered to 
be a momentous event in China, with Chinese President HU Jintao believing that 
“China’s accession to the WTO was a milestone in China’s reform process”. The central 
theme of  this thesis is to study the relationship between trade reforms, the local 
economy and labormarket outcomes in China. 
From Figure 1.1 it is clear that China experienced a substantial reduction in tariffs 
during the period 1992-2011 with tariffs decreasing from more than 40% in 1992 to 
nearly 3% in 2011. There were two large drops, one in 1997 and the other at the end of  
2002. These large reductions in Chinese tariffs reduced the trade barriers between China 
and other countries, which resulted in a major boom in China’s business that targeted 
foreign markets although it also may have hurt the domestic Chinese economy including 
local workers in China’s domestic labormarket. The motivation for this thesis is to 
investigate how trade liberalization affected China’s labormarket with a special focus on 
firm wages.  With wages in China increasing rapidly in the last decade it is more 
important than ever to understand the mechanisms by which firms react to changing 
trade barriers and how this affects wages. 
[Figure 1.1 about here] 
This thesis consists of  three main empirical chapters in addition to a short 
introduction and conclusion.  Following Amiti and Davis (2011), Chapter 2 examines 
whether firm wages vary between different types of  global engagement following a 
period of  tariff  reform, focusing on non-trading firms who source their inputs locally 
and serve domestic consumers, and trading firms who export or import only through the 
ordinary trade channel. To evaluate the impact of  trade reforms in China we use China’s 
2002 Input-Output (IO) table and construct industry-level output and input tariffs.  In 
addition, to capture the net effect of  tariff  reductions on outputs and intermediate inputs 
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we construct a measure of  industry-level effective rate of  protection (ERP) for each firm 
within a given industry. By using several measures of  trade protection, chapter 2 finds 
that the main conclusions hold even when we include additional controls for firm 
characteristics and use an instrumental variable (IV) approach to taken into account 
potential endogeneity concerns. Our results differ in certain dimensions from Amiti and 
Davis (2011) for Indonesia but are consistent with those of  Kamal et al. (2012). Most 
importantly, the results imply that workers in firms that do not engage in international 
trade share part of  the productivity gains from China’s WTO accession documented by 
Brandt et al. (2012), and also highlight the importance of  trade policy in determining the 
outcomes for the home country market. 
Chapter 3 is mainly focused on trading firms paying special attention to processing 
firms who import processing inputs. Trading firms are classified into two groups: 
processing firms and non-processing firms. Firm-level output and input tariffs are 
measured following Yu (2015) and special tariff  treatment is given to firms engaged in 
processing trade when calculating their tariffs since they can enjoy tariff  exemption on 
processing imports. Chapter 3 then investigates the impact of  tariff  liberalization on firm 
wages and whether such an effect is dependent on the extent of  firm’s engagement in 
processing trade. Our findings differ to those of  Yu (2015) for output tariff  reductions 
but are generally consistent with those for input tariff  reductions.  
Finally, Chapter 4 is focuses on providing a description of  how firms move between 
different exporter types (ordinary exporter and trade processor), how firms make the 
decision to switch between different types of  export status and how switching status 
affects firm wages. The results are intuitive in that input tariff  reductions mean that trade 
barriers become weaker and firms are better able to access to high quality imported 
inputs, and hence, firms are more like to switch from a low productivity level exporter to 
a higher productivity exporter. 
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Chapter 2. Trade Liberalization and Wage Differentials 
of  Heterogeneous Firms: An Empirical Study of  
Chinese Firms 
 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we investigate how output and input tariff  reductions following China’s 
membership of  the WTO affected the wages paid to workers in Chinese manufacturing 
firms, and whether the effect of  trade liberalization on workers’ wages is dependent on 
the extent of  firms’ global engagement. Our results indicate that a decrease in both 
output and input tariffs increases the wages of  non-exporting firms and the wages of  
non-importing firms respectively. Additionally, we find that a decrease in output tariffs 
causes a negative wage differential in exporting firms relative to non-exporters but the 
net effect for exporting firms is insignificant different from zero, suggesting wages of  
workers in exporting firms remain unchanged. Generally, the results indicate that a 10% 
decrease in input tariffs leads to a 3.6% increase in wages for non-importing firms, which 
is at least thrice as high as any wage gains from decreasing output tariffs. Our findings are 
in contrast to those of  Amiti and Davis (2011) either theoretically or empirically for 
Indonesia. 
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2.1. Introduction 
Over the last three decades China has experienced spectacular growth in its international 
trade flows. This performance can be attributed to the reforms that China undertook 
through its “open-door” policy from 1978 that culminated with entry into the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) at the end of  2001. As the largest exporter and second 
largest importer of  manufacturing goods in the world (World Trade Organization, 2011), 
China’s changing trade patterns are the focus of  interest from both academics and 
policymakers.  
  Given the importance of  international trade for China, the impact of  trade on the 
economy is determined not only by the export of  final goods, but also through the 
import of  intermediate inputs. In many developing countries, increasing exposure to 
international trade and world markets has been accompanied by various changes, for 
example, increases in productivity, quality upgrading, resources reallocation and rising 
wage inequality. 
  Previous research has shown that globalization directly cause wage inequality and 
widen wage gaps. Globalization covers many aspects it includes, for example, a reduction 
in trade protection or barriers; an increase in foreign direct investment (FDI); and a rise 
in the outsourcing of  production overseas. In this chapter, we aim to examine the impact 
of  falls in trade barriers on wage differentials.  
  Our starting point is to consider the channels through which trade liberalization could 
affect the compensation paid to labour. The contributions of  theoretical and empirical 
studies to understanding how international trade affects labormarkets have focused on 
two main facts. The first is the role of  firm heterogeneity, where the issue is discussed 
within the new-new trade theory literature. The second is the role of  imports of  
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intermediate inputs on domestic wages.  
  Figure 2.1 shows that while both output and input tariffs individually, and as well as 
the composite of  these, the effective rate of  protection (ERP) experience a downward 
trend, the firm’s average wage has trended upwards. In this paper our primary aim is to 
investigate whether there is a causal link between tariff  cuts and the wage increases. 
Current empirical studies based on China rarely discuss the link between a firm’s 
engagement in international trade and the wages paid to workers. Our paper seeks to fill 
this. Amiti and Davis (2011) present a theoretical model, where a key point is that 
following a decline in tariff  rates, the workers’ average wage is determined by firm’s 
different engagement in globalization. the wage consequence following a decline in tariffs 
is dependent on the mode of  global engagement of  the firm where workers are 
employed. In this paper we test the theoretical predictions of  Amiti and Davis (2011) to 
determine whether the results they obtained from Indonesia also hold for China, and 
hence we focus on the influence of  tariffs (including final output tariffs and intermediate 
input tariffs) reductions on wage differentials. Specifically, this is the first paper to 
contrast the roles of  final output and intermediate input tariffs in terms of  mean wages 
for the firms engaged in different modes of  globalization in China. 
[Figure 2.1 about here] 
  Contributions of  the paper are addressed in several ways. First, this empirical study is 
the first to explore the impact of  trade liberalization on firm wages in China concerning 
about firm’s different engagement in globalization. Secondly, using highly detailed 
Chinese manufacturing firm data we test Amiti and Davis (2011) model and find that our 
empirical results do not support their predictions and are in contrast to those found in 
Indonesia. We document that in comparison to exporting or importing firms, in China 
domestic-oriented firms would benefit from trade liberalization and hence pay higher 
wages. Generally, our results demonstrate that a 10% fall in input tariffs leads to a 3.6% 
gain in firm wages for non-importing firms, at least three times as high as any gains from 
decreasing output tariffs, which is consistent with the findings in Kamal et al. (2012). 
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Besides, our results imply that the gains in firm wages share part of  the productivity 
gains from China’s WTO accession documented by Brandt et al. (2012). Hence, our 
results highlight the importance of  trade policy in determining the trade reform 
outcomes, which may affect domestic economy most. 
  We turn next to a brief  overview of  trade liberalization in China. We argue that 
existing evidences support both the views that manufacturing firms in China are 
heterogenous and that wages vary greatly according to firm’s engagement in globalization. 
The remainder of  the paper is organized as follows. In section 3 we briefly review the 
theoretical and empirical literature, also review the theoretical model introduced by Amiti 
and Davis (2011) that we intend to test and illustrate our empirical estimation strategy 
whilst in section 4 we describe the data used for estimation. Section 5 presents and shows 
the empirical results on the impact of  falling tariff  rates (both output and input tariffs) 
on firm wages by firm’s different engagement in globalization. In section 6 we conclude 
the findings and discuss the policy implications. 
2.2 Trade Liberalization in China 
2.2.1 WTO Accession and Tariff Reduction in China 
 
China’s membership of  the WTO in December 2001 was seen as a momentous event in 
China, with Chinese President HU Jintao believing that China’s accession to the WTO 
was a milestone in China’s reform process. According to the commitments to the WTO, 
China would provide a fair environment for investment and trade and gradually remove a 
variety of  trade barriers including tariffs. Prior to China’s entry into the WTO the 
Chinese government had already started to reduce tariffs. As documented by the China’s 
Customs, in 1992, China’s mean tariff  rate was 43.2% (at that time the average tariff  for 
developed and other developing countries was 6.3% and 15.3% respectively). From 1992 
to 1996, China’s average tariff  fell to 23% and was reduced further to 17% by 1999. As a 
member of  the WTO, China also promised to reduce tariffs for agricultural products and 
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industrial manufactured products to a mean rate of  15% and 8.9% respectively by the 
end of  2004. By 2004, China had achieved these targets since the government adjusted 
the tax policies by reducing or exempting import tariffs on 1st January 2004. Compared 
even to the developed countries, China’s average tariff  is considered to be fairly low 
especially compared to other developing countries. As addressed in both Brandt et al. 
(2012) and Kamal et al. (2012), reductions in Chinese tariffs were phased over a decade 
but in most instances the bulk of  the tariff  falls occurred immediately on January 1st, 
2002, after China joining the WTO. From a simple average tariff  rate of  23% in 1996, 
Chinese duties were reduced to an average of  14% in 2001 and 10% by 2010 (Hong, 
2010). The average effectively applied tariff  rate on manufactured goods was lowered 
from about 20 percent in 1998 to about 2 percent by 2007 (Kamal et al., 2012).  
  In addition to removing restrictions on exports and imports, Chinese government 
reduced tariff  rates drastically. Table 1.1 shows that at the three-digit industry level, 
average output tariffs fell from nearly 13 % in 2000 to almost 7% in 2006, and during this 
period the standard deviation of  those tariff  rates fell by almost 45%.1 The structure of  
Chinese tariff  system has been changed at the industry level by the trade reforms. 
Besides, output tariff  rates are higher than input tariff  rates, suggesting that the 
government treats tradable intermediate input and final output differently. Hence, the 
effective rates of  trade protection (ERP) are supposed to be higher, consistent with the 
other empirical findings (Brandt et al., 2012; Kamal et al., 2012). Similarly, industry ERP 
experiences a downward trend during the sample period, as well as output and input 
tariffs. 
 [Table 1.1 about here] 
  Following the study of  Indonesia in Amiti and Konings (2007), we calculate both 
output and input tariff  rates at the Chinese Input-Output (IO) sector level, which is 
                                                             
1 Note that this is the summary statistics based on the industry trade protection data not 
merging with the firm data. The 4-digit industry output tariffs cover 424 manufacturing industries and 
the 3-digit industry output and input tariffs and effective rate of  protection (ERP) cover 122 IO 
sectors. 
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equivalent to 3-digit Chinese Industry Classification (CIC) level. The measurement of  
tariff  rates is explained in detail in section 3.3 and the variation of  output (input) tariff  
rates is wide across Chinese IO sectors. At the IO sector level there is wide variation in 
both output tariffs and input tariffs. Excluding the tobacco industry (CIC: 161, 162, 169), 
in 2000 the highest output tariff  was 52.75% for the alcohol and wine industry (CIC: 151, 
152) and the lowest output tariff  was 3.19% for the ferroalloy smelting industry (CIC: 
324). The highest input tariff  was 21.29% for the catering industry (CIC: 671, 672, 673, 
679) and the lowest input tariff  was 2.71% for the other transportation equipment 
manufacturing industry (CIC: 373, 374, 376, 379). We also estimate 2-digit CIC industry 
output tariffs and input tariff  rates.2 At this more aggregated level the gap between the 
highest and the lowest industry output tariffs is less than 29% in 2000, with the highest 
rate of  35.32% (Manufacture of  Drink Products, CIC: 15) and the lowest rate of  6.57% 
(Manufacture of  Non-ferrous Metal Casting, CIC: 33). For input tariffs in 2000, the gap 
between the highest and the lowest is around 12%, with the highest rate of  17.59% 
(Manufacture of  Agriculture Products, CIC: 13) and the lowest rate of  5.09% 
(Manufacture of  Non-ferrous Metal Casting, CIC: 33). At the highest level of  
aggregation we find a lower variation in tariff  rates. It is necessary to consider the output 
and input tariffs at a more disaggregated level as the data show that inter-industry tariff  
differentials arise significantly at a less aggregated level in both output and input tariffs.  
  In China’s 2002 Input-Output table there are 122 sectors reported. To save space in 
Table 1.2 we present China’s 2-digit industrial output and input tariffs for 2000-2006 and 
the corresponding 6-period change in tariff  rates.3 There are 29 manufacturing industries 
in total.4 Generally, output tariffs are greater than input tariffs; almost one and a half  
times the rate of  the latter. Both types of  tariffs have experienced a reduction over the 
sample period and the fall is around 1% in each year. Specifically, mean output tariffs 
                                                             
2 We use the 4-digit adjusted CIC codes from Brandt et al. (2012) to compute our 2-digit CIC 
codes.  
3 Table 1.2 is based on the industrial tariff  rates that have already been merged with our sample 
data after cleaning. 
4 At the 2-digit level, there are 29 manufacturing industries in our sample involving the 2-digit 
CIC codes: 13-15, 17-37, and 39-41. Using the 4-digit adjusted CIC codes there are 424 manufacturing 
industries covering 26 of  the 122 IO sectors.  
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dropped from 17.29% in 2000 to 9.44% in 2006, while mean input tariffs dropped from 
11.66% in 2000 to 6.41% in 2006. However, on average output and input tariffs 
experienced a sharp cut in 2002 and fell by approximately 30% while in 2006 average 
output and input tariffs only declined by 1.2% and 0.4% respectively. Once again 
providing support for the finding that the sharpest fall in tariffs occurred immediately 
after accession to the WTO. What Table 1.2 reveals is that both output and input tariffs 
have considerable variation across and within 2-digit CIC industries. When we compare 
the tariffs year by year we find the largest tariffs reductions for our sample period 
appeared in 2002 after China joined the WTO on 11th December 2001, a 3.8% decrease 
in output tariffs on average from 2001 to 2002 and a 2.88% decrease in input tariffs on 
average for the same period. After 2002, the magnitude of  tariffs reduction decreased. In 
general, the reduction of  output tariffs fell from 1.03% in 2003 to less than 0.11% in 
2006. Meanwhile, the reduction of  input tariffs fell from 0.57% in 2003 to 0.02% in 2006. 
Excluding the tobacco industry, the furniture manufacturing industry experienced the 
largest output tariff  change with a drop of  18.75% and the manufacturing industry of  
apparel and footwear had the biggest input tariff  change with a cut of  8.49%. 
[Table 1.2 about here] 
  Figures 2.2 and 2.3 describe the trends in output and input tariff  rate movements for 
2000 to 2006 based on the 2-digit industrial level classification.5 From these two figures 
we observe that all manufacturing industries in China had their highest output and input 
tariff  rates in 2000 after which tariff  rates began to fall. After the accession to the WTO 
in 2001 industries reduced their tariffs sharply in 2002 but the reduction weakened after 
2002. However, there are three industries that saw little change in their output and input 
tariffs during our sample period.6 What is clear is that, China joining the WTO led to a 
substantial reduction in tariff  rates for the majority of  manufacturing industries. Besides, 
Figure 2.4 describes the trends in 2-digit industrial ERP movements for 2000 to 2006 and 
                                                             
5 The names and codes of  2-digit industry are listed in Table 1A.24. 
6  Those three industries are Processing crude oil, nuclear fuel (2-digit CIC code: 25), 
Manufacture of  ferrous metal casting (2-digit CIC code: 32), Manufacture of  non-ferrous metal 
casting (2-digit CIC code: 33). 
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such trends are similar to those found in output and input tariffs. 
[Figure 2.2 about here] 
[Figure 2.3 about here] 
[Figure 2.4 about here] 
  Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show that in a specific year output and input tariffs can vary 
considerably between 3-digit industries. In addition, both tariffs mean values tend to 
decrease over time. Our mean values for both input and output tariffs are comparable to 
Brandt et al. (2012). Both rates fell rapidly in 2002 but after 2002 the mean value of  both 
output and input tariffs tended to decline but much more slowly. It is useful to point out 
the differences between our measures and the work of  others. For example, we find that 
our mean values tend to be larger than those calculated by Hu and Liu (2014) at the 
2-digit industrial level, especially for input tariffs. This variation may be due to different 
choices of  coding system, as our measurement is based on Chinese Industrial Coding 
System (CIC) while theirs is based on International Standard Industrial Classification 
(ISIC). Yu (2014) uses the same CIC coding system, however our mean input tariffs are 
generally higher and our mean output tariffs are a little lower. We believe this is because 
we use industrial output tariffs to calculate industrial input tariffs whilst Yu (2015) may 
have used inputs’ import tariffs for his calculation. Despite these small discrepancies, the 
trends in output and input tariffs shown in our work are broadly consistent with Brandt 
et al., 2012; Hu and Liu, 2014; and Yu, 2015. Moreover, Figure 2.7 shows that in a specific 
year industry ERP can vary considerably between 3-digit industries and industry ERP is 
heterogenous across industries in each particular year. 
[Figure 2.5 about here] 
[Figure 2.6 about here] 
[Figure 2.7 about here] 
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  The correlations between output tariffs and input tariffs are around 0.80 over the time 
period. As shown in Figure 2.8 the highest correlation is 0.84 in 2000. The correlation 
then declines and reaches 0.77 in 2006. Hence at the 3-digit CIC industry level, tariffs 
levels for outputs and inputs are highly correlated.  
[Figure 2.8 about here] 
  Finally, Table 1.3 reports the correlations of  output and input tariffs of  different levels 
of  aggregation and the correlations between their one-year lag values. It shows that there 
are high correlations between output and input tariff  rates at the three-digit industry level, 
whether in levels or in one-year lag values, and all correlations are equal to 0.79.7 Yu 
(2015) also finds a strong positive but slight lower correlation between the three-digit 
industry output and input tariffs, with the correlation equal to 0.578. However, it shows 
that the four-digit output tariffs are weakly correlated with the three-digit input tariffs 
with correlation around 0.5, both in levels and in one-year lag values.  
[Table 1.3 about here] 
2.2.2 Firm Heterogeneity 
 
Similar to the findings in Amiti and Davis (2011) for Indonesia, less than one fifth of  
manufacturing firms in China are global engaged. As described in Figures 2.9, only 10% 
of  all manufacturing firms both export and import, firms that export some of  their 
outputs but do not import only account for one half  of  the former fraction, 2% of  firms 
that source imported intermediate inputs only, and the majority of  manufacturing firms 
in China only source intermediate inputs domestically and sell final products in the 
domestic market. Compared with domestic only firms, globally engaged firms are playing 
an important role in China’s economy as they are larger and higher productivity firms. As 
shown in Figures 2.10 and 2.11, in our sample internationally oriented firms account for 
                                                             
7 This correlation is based on our firm-level panel that has merged with industry-level tariffs. 
The correlation between industry-level tariffs before merging is much smaller, at 0.71 for level and at 
0.70 for lagged values. 
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17% of  all firms but account for over 30% of  total employment and almost 40% of  total 
added-value, while over 80% of  all firms are domestic oriented firms, which account for 
approximately 70% and 60% of  total employment and added-value respectively. 
Moreover, as shown in Table 1.4, over the period we examine, 11% of  China’s 
manufacturing output was sold to overseas markets, which means less than 90% of  
manufacturing output was sold directly to the domestic market. Our finding is consistent 
with that in Brandt et al. (2012) as they point out that nearly 80% of  China’s 
manufacturing output was sold domestically during 1995-2007. Those 17% of  trading 
firms also import slightly more than 9% of  intermediate inputs from aboard and during 
the time period, their propensity of  exporting and importing continued to grow.  
[Figure 2.9 about here] 
[Figure 2.10 about here] 
[Figure 2.11 about here] 
[Table 1.4 about here] 
  Hence, global engaged firms play an important role to China’s economy, but attracting 
more attention is manufacturing activity directed to the local market, including sourcing 
intermediates and selling final products, and domestic-oriented firms are dominant in 
China. This pattern is different from that in Indonesia as documented by Amiti and 
Davis (2011). In Indonesia, less than one third of  manufacturing firms are global 
engaged, but they hire over two thirds of  total employment and create approximately 80% 
of  total added-value. Additionally, similar patterns are also found in developed countries 
(Bernard et al., (2007) for the United States and Eaton et al., (2008) for France) and other 
developing countries (Verhoogen, (2008) for Mexico). One potential explanation for such 
difference may be the huge demand of  consumption in China’s domestic market.   
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2.2.3 Wage Heterogeneity 
 
Over the sample period, within the same industry there is small variation in firm wages. 
Considering firm-level mean wage relative to industry-level mean wage around 2000-2006, 
a standard deviation of  1.18 shows that wage is greatly heterogeneous across firms. In 
our sample, only 11.43% (15.52%) of  firms pay wages higher (lower) than one half  of  
mean wages at the industry level, which is similar to the findings in Indonesia that about 
14% (16%) of  firms pay wages higher (lower) than one half  of  mean wages at the 
industry level (Amiti and Davis, 2011). We also check the relative wage in 2000 (before 
WTO accession) and in 2002 (after WTO accession) separately. In 2000, firms paying 
wages higher than half  of  industrial mean wages account for 13.36% and firm paying 
wages lower than half  of  industrial mean wages account for 18.22%; while in 2002, firms 
paying wages higher than half  of  industrial mean wages account for 12.52% and firms 
paying wages lower than half  of  industrial mean wages account for 17.37%. China’s 
accession to WTO did not appear to result in greater wage heterogeneity across firms 
within the same industry, even though it helped Chinese firms to enter the global market. 
However, the percentage of  firms that pay wages greater than the industry mean is 
decreasing during the period. 
  As discussed in section 2.2, our sample data perfectly fits one of  the key elements in 
Amiti and Davis (2011), which addresses that firms are heterogenous and hence our 
Chinese data is ideally supportive to conduct an empirical study on testing the Amiti and 
Davis (2011) model. Thus, we first review the literature related to our empirical study as 
well as the theoretical foundation of  our estimations and then introduce our empirical 
estimation strategy in the following section. 
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2.3. Related Literature, Theoretical Model and Empirical 
Strategy 
2.3.1 Literature 
 
There is a vast literature on exploring or examining the effect of  trade liberalization on 
local economy. Early literature states one key channel, a home country’s exposure to 
foreign trade, and the breadth and depth of  such an exposure may in turn have a 
considerable impact on resources reallocation across industries in the home country.  
  First, we only focus on the studies that investigate the relationship between 
labormarket and the power of  trade protection. One inference of  Bernard et al. (2007) is 
that workers in different types of  firm will experience different pay and conditions and it 
is also one of  the first papers to highlight the difference in behavior of  importers and 
exporters and demonstrating that trading activity is concentrated in large and 
high-productive firms which pay relative high wages to workers but only account for 
quite a small proportion of  total firms.   
  More recently, a number of  within-sector explanations for different wages have 
emerged. Using Mexican plant level data for 1993-2001, Verhoogen (2008) shows a link 
between trade and inequality and finds that initially larger, more productive firms had a 
higher export propensity and higher wages. Most interestingly, when a depreciation of  
peso came in the late-1994, those firms were more willing to export more and pay wages. 
  In addition, combining three data sources: the Encuesta Industrial Annual (EIA) 
dataset, Mexican employer-employee dataset and the Instituto Mexicano del Seguro 
Social (IMSS) dataset, Frías et al. (2009, 2012) investigates the mechanisms linking trade 
and within plant wage distributions. The results are consistent with the interpretation that 
firms initially raise the wages of  technical workers and the workers with high skills 
following an export shock. However, wages at the lower end of  the distribution should 
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catch up over the medium run and explore the dynamic adjustment of  the within-plant 
wage distributions. 
  As documented by Yi (2003), the impact of  intermediate inputs also plays an 
important role. Given the relationship between export and import tariffs it is important 
to consider them together. The majority of  the existing literature concentrates on 
exporting often ignoring the import effect. 
  Returning to the determinants of  wages, Melitz (2003) and Kasahara and Lapham 
(2007) present models based on two assumptions, one is worker homogeneity and the 
other is that a labor market is perfect and completely competitive. In this case, workers’ 
wages at the firm level do not rely on firm performance, which means that the total 
amount of  wages paid to employees is not connected to firm profits. Then the concept 
of  fair wage was introduced by Grossman and Helpman (2007). In their model they 
model the relationship between fair wages and outsourcing.8 This approach is extended 
by Amiti and Davis (2011), whose general equilibrium model is developed by introducing 
three key factors: heterogeneous firms, tradable intermediate inputs and final outputs, 
and specific firm wages. Although the authors pay close attention to homogeneous labor, 
a variant form in fair wages is used to improve the model. Using the firm-level 
comprehensive Indonesian census data for manufacturing industries in 1991-2000, Amiti 
and Davis test their theoretical model. The empirical results support their hypotheses 
that a reduction in either final product tariffs or intermediate input tariffs increase wages 
for firms involved in international trade, either exporting or importing. However, such 
tariff  reductions should also lead to a fall in wages for domestic non-trading firms. The 
paper is the first attempt to investigate how decreasing tariffs (output tariffs and input 
tariffs) affects workers’ wages at firms with different modes of  globalization by using 
both theoretical and empirical ways. Consistent with their work, using Indian firm-level 
                                                             
8 The concept of  fair wage means that all workers have a fair-wage demand and in specific, 
workers who are employed in zero operating profits firms should be paid the same wage, no matter if  
they are in either intermediate input sector or final output sector. Moreover, wage payment is 
dependent on firm profits and is positively correlated to firm profits. So workers worked in 
high-profit firms demand relative high wages and hence require wage premia. (Akerlof, 1982).  
  29 / 256 
 
data Ahsan and Mitra (2014) document that on average, small and more labor-intensive 
firms enjoy a growth in the share of  total wages over total revenue, however, large and 
less labor-intensive firms experience a decline in that share following trade liberalization. 
  The Amiti and Davis (2011) results are, however, in contrast to the results of  previous 
studies. Goldberg and Pavanik (2005) use Colombian industry-level data and find that 
cutting output tariff  rates leads to lower industry wages. Similarly, Revenga (1997) finds 
the same result at the firm-level using plant-level Mexican data. There also exist some 
studies that find tariff  liberalization is not related to firm wages. In an industry-level 
study using Brazilian data Pavcnik et al. (2004) did not find significant effects of  final 
output tariffs cut on wages. Using firm-level data to test the impact of  NAFTA, Trefler 
(2004) did not find relationship between output tariff  changes and changes in wages, 
which means that even though the government reduced final output tariffs in order to 
stimulate exporting, there was no impact on workers’ wages at the firm level.   
  We then focus on the studies that investigate the relationship between trade 
liberalization and Chinese economy. First of  all, some researchers find a positive impact 
of  trade liberalization on productivity. Brandt et al. (2012) argue that trade liberalization 
can boost local economy. They explore how tougher import competition induced by 
lower trade barriers affects firm performance by exploiting Chinese tariff  variations at 
the Input-Output (IO) sector level and argue that such variations in tariff  reductions 
make a great contribution to increasing firm productivity in 1995-2007. Hu and Liu 
(2014) address that in 2002- 2006 Chinese manufacturers make an annual growth of  0.94% 
in productivity after China’s entry into WTO, and such a gain is the net effect of  a 
negative effect caused by decreasing output tariffs and a positive effect caused by 
decreasing input tariffs. Yu (2015) finds that decreasing both output and input tariffs can 
increase productivity for firms engaged in global trade, but those positive impacts 
induced by tariff  reductions become smaller by increasing a firm’s share in processing 
trade. Most importantly, reductions on both output and input tariffs contribute to more 
than 14.5% gain in overall productivity.  
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  Moreover, some empirical studies try to investigate the connection between tariff  
reductions and the ability of  firm production. As in Qiu and Yu (2014), they predict that 
cutting tariff  rates of  the home country reduces the export scopes of  the home country 
and their empirical analysis confirms the predictions and shows that both Chinese tariff  
cut and foreign countries’ tariff  cut result in the Chinese firm reducing their export 
product scope. Cheng (2012) finds that falls in output tariff  rates decrease real outputs 
while falls in input tariff  rats increase real output, and such effects are smaller in 
prefectures with policy zones.  
  Finally, to examine the impact of  trade liberalization on labor market, Kamal et al. 
(2012) use firm-level Chinese manufacturing data and find support for a significantly 
positive effect of  liberalization on the wage share of  sales and on the wage share of  value 
added, operating both through input choices and through rent sharing, whilst Cheng 
(2012) demonstrates that cuts in output tariff  rates increase economic zones’ 
employment while cuts in input tariff  rates decrease that employment, but in 
non-economic zones they find an opposite conclusion. 
  In conclusion, the empirical results are vast and mixed. Nonetheless, the current 
empirical studies based on China rarely discuss the linkage between a firm’s global 
engagement and firm wages and our study seeks to fill this by using Chinese 
manufacturing firm data to test the theoretical model of  Amiti and Davis (2011). Hence, 
we introduce their model in the following section.  
2.3.2 Theoretical Model 
 
The theoretical foundation of  our paper is from Amiti and Davis (2011), which in turn is 
based on Grossman and Helpman (2007). We describe the Amiti and Davis (2011) 
general equilibrium model below. 
The Amiti and Davis model consists of  three key elements:  
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(1) Heterogeneous firms following Melitz (2003). 
(2) Tradable intermediate inputs for manufacturing production following Kasahara 
and Lapham (2007). 
(3) Imperfect factor markets, of which the key point is featuring firm-worker rent 
sharing, following Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2010).  
2.3.2.1 Final goods consumption 
 
The demand function comes from Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). In this framework, the 
expenditures E are allocated by consumers across a variety of  final goods that is available 
and continuum: 
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝐸 = ∫𝑝(𝑣)𝑞(𝑣)𝑑𝑣       𝑠. 𝑡. [∫ 𝑞(𝑣)
𝜎−1
𝜎
𝑑𝑣]
𝜎
𝜎−1
= 𝑈  
  Here, σ is the elasticity of  one consumed goods that can be substituted by other goods, 
and σ > 1. Therefore, consumers demanding final goods 𝑣  can be expressed as 
𝑞(𝑣) = [
𝑃(𝑣)
𝑃
]
−𝜎
𝑄 and product revenue can be expressed as  𝑟(𝑣) = 𝑅 [
𝑃(𝑣)
𝑃
]
1−𝜎
, where 
𝑄 ≡ 𝑈. The price index 𝑃 is aggregated and measured as 𝑃 = [∫𝑝(𝑣)1−𝜎 𝑑𝑣]
1
1−𝜎  
with 𝑃𝑄 = 𝑅. 
2.3.2.2 The Constraint under Fair Wage Assumption and the Labor Market 
 
There are two elements which induce workers’ wage differentials at the firm-level. One is 
that firms are heterogeneous, with their specific trade costs and productivity levels and 
the other is firm performance. These two factors are modeled using the concept of  “fair 
wage”. 
  Amiti and Davis (2011) include firms with zero and positive operating profits. In 
particular, zero-profit firms are located in either the intermediate input sector with 
complete competition or the final output sector with imperfect competition, and in the 
latter sector, firms are marginal firms and other firms have profits greater than zero. All 
workers have the same demand of  fair wages. Specifically, workers who are employed in 
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zero operating profits firms should be paid the same wage, no matter if  they are in the 
intermediate goods sector or the final goods sector. Workers’ wages for zero-profit firms 
are hence taken as the numéraire.  
  Compared to zero-profit firms, the wage of  any other firm v is given by Wv. It is 
assumed that Wv is determined by firm performance, which means that an increase in 
profit will lead to an increase in wage. Because the concept of  “fair wage” is considered 
that zero-profit firms pay the same wages and firms with higher profits pay higher wages 
(Akerlof, 1982). Therefore, in a condition of  exerting effort workers employed by more 
profitable firms requires higher wages and hence requires a wage premia. Moreover, 
positive-profit firms would like to pay a wage premia since it can encourage workers. In 
addition, the wages will not be bid down once they have been set because of  all workers’ 
demand to be treated fairly. Still, Amiti and Davis (2011) assume that workers are hired 
freely and are not queuing for these jobs. However, the workers will accept any job offers 
if  they pay the same amount of  wages that the current employment provides. In sum, the 
situation could be expressed as: 
W (0) = 1, Wν = W (πν), 0 < W’ (πν) <∞, Wν ≤𝑊. 
  Under the fair-wage constraint, the nominal wage of  zero-profit firms is determined 
to be the same and it is unity. However, the wage of  any positive-profit firm ν is given as 
an increasing function depending on firm profits, and represented by Wν = W(πν ). The 
condition of  0 < W’ (π) <∞ indicates that a stable behavioural relation exists. Since the 
demands of  fairness are limited, the wage curve has an upper bound but finite. 
2.3.2.2a Firm Production and Profits by Modes of Global Engagement 
  
As discussed above, wages should be set according to profits subject to the fair-wage 
assumption. Similarly, firms’ profits are a result of  the choices of  wages paid as they are 
included n firm costs. What’s more, if  the firm’s global engagement is different, then the 
relationship between wages and profits will also differ. The assumption is that firms will 
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always choose the specific mode to maximize its profits. 
  Assume that manufacturing production contains 2 sectors, the intermediate input 
sector and the final output sector, .each produced with one homogeneous labor. In each 
country a variety of  intermediate goods are available to access and they are measured in 
the fixed interval of  unity, m (j) for j Є [0, 1]. The production of  intermediate goods is in a 
condition of  constant returns to scale and free entry and their price are equal to their 
marginal costs. One unit of  labor produces one unit intermediate while the price of  
intermediate inputs in the home country market is assumed to be unity because of  the 
numéraire labor and the unity wage in this sector. Based on the unity price, suppliers of  
intermediate inputs can catch any increases in demand coming from the final output 
sector.9 
  In the final output sector, the decision sequence follows Melitz (2003). From an 
unbounded mass of  potential firms, a mass Me pays a fixed cost fe in units of  labor. Since 
a firm has paid such a fixed cost, it obtains a triplet of  information λν = (φν, tMν, tXν). The 
distribution of  the information λν is following the density function g (λν) of  joint 
probability and the information includes firm productivity φν , marginal export costs tXν 
and marginal import costs tMν. 
  Amiti and Davis extend the model by adding marginal export and import costs, where 
the Melitz model only took the marginal physical productivity parameter ϕ to capture 
firm heterogeneity. As a result, firm categories can be enlarged in the model. The 
assumption is that variation in trading shares is considerable large for all firms; otherwise, 
as in Melitz, either exporting firms or importing firms export/import the same 
proportion of  their outputs/intermediate inputs, which not fits the reality well. The 
Amiti and Davis (2011) characterize tXν and tMν as export costs and import costs, which 
also can be used to measure how efficient a firm serves foreign markets or sources 
imported intermediates respectively. In this model only export costs τX and import costs 
                                                             
9 The model allows for love of  variety in intermediate goods but take the measure of  varieties in 
each market exogenously.  
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τM can be varied. 
  The marginal probability density function 𝑔𝜑(∅) ≡ ∬𝑔(𝜆)𝑑𝑡𝑋 𝑑𝑡𝑀  and the 
associated cumulative density function 𝐺𝜑(∅) ≡ ∫ 𝑔𝜑 
𝜑
0
(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 are introduced in Amiti 
and Davis (2011). After learning, some firms cannot survive from the market and exit, 
those survived firms M will decide the elements (labor, inputs and outputs) for 
production to get maximum profits. δ describes the rate of  firm death and it is constant 
to satisfy the steady requirement. 
  At any point in time, each final output producer obeys the given demand curve for 
maximizing its own profits. It is assumed that the wage of  activities with fixed costs is 
proportional to unity.10 But the model is developed firm wages Wν of  activities with 
varying costs. For the purpose of  producing in any period, each final output producer 
pay fixed costs to hire f  units labor and follow the Cobb–Douglas production function.  
  For profit maximization, a firm can choose its engagement in globalization and further 
determine its profits and so on wages. Hence, assumed that the marginal cost is constant, 
the isoelastic profits are expressed as: 
𝜋𝑣 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥[0,
𝑟𝑣
𝜎
− 𝐹𝑣] 
  The function Fν is used to describe the fixed costs induced by firm’s different 
engagements in globalization. Let n denote the quantity of  oversea markets and fixed 
export and import costs are fX and fM respectively, and hence: 
𝐹𝑣 =
{
 
 
𝑓                                  (𝑎) 
𝑓 + 𝑛𝑓𝑀                          (𝑏) 
𝑓 + 𝑛𝑓𝑋                              (𝑐) 
𝑓 + 𝑛(𝑓𝑀 + 𝑓𝑋)       (𝑑) 
 
Equation (a) is for firms that only serve domestic market, neither importing nor 
                                                             
10 For simplicity, the fixed costs can only change in wages with the concern of  varying labor 
cost. 
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exporting; equation (b) is for firms that use imported intermediate inputs; equation (c) is 
for firms that export final outputs and equation (d) is for both exporting and importing 
firms. 
  The cost of  using any domestic intermediate is equal to 1, the same as the free on 
board (FOB) price of  exporting any intermediate input, but the common landing, 
insurance and freight (CIF) price for importing any intermediate input is greater than 1 
and we use τM to represent. Firm-specific iceberg transport costs are assumed to defined 
as tMν Є [1, 𝑡𝑀̅̅ ̅]. Finally, we set the total effective price τMν equal to τM tMν with the value 
greater than 1, allowing the trade liberalization is assumed to only affect the τM term. The 
fixed Relative to other firms, firms with low-idiosyncratic import costs can start to 
import at a relative low productivity level since it is much easier for them to pay the fixed 
costs of  importing, and they can obtain high profits and thus pay high wages because 
they can import intermediates at a lower price. 
  The cost for the producers of  final goods varies according to their decision on 
whether to import intermediate inputs. Marginal costs cν are Cobb–Douglas in the input 
prices: 
𝑐𝑣 =
1
𝜑𝑣
 (
𝑊𝑣
𝛼
)𝛼 (
𝑃𝑀𝑣
1−𝛼
)1−𝛼 =
𝐾𝑊𝑣
𝛼𝑃𝑀𝑣
1−𝛼
𝜑𝑣
         where  𝐾 ≡  𝛼−𝛼 (1 − 𝛼)𝛼−1 
  Note that the costs involve two endogenous variables, workers’ wages paid by 
producers and the price of  the composite intermediate. The former as a condition of  
determining firm costs and revenues which further affect profits, whilst the firm wage 
itself  is not determined at this early stage; the latter is dependent on the extent of  
importing intermediate inputs upon love of  intermediate variety. If  an importing firm 
wants to additionally source one unit interval of  domestic inputs, it has to additionally 
source n unit intervals of  imported inputs. Here γ is the elasticity of  one variety of  
intermediate inputs can be substituted by another variety and its value is greater than 1. 
The intermediates price PMν is dependent on firm’s input choice. If  a firm sources 
intermediate inputs domestically, it is assumed that PMν = 1, while a firm using imported 
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intermediate inputs, it will pay PMν=[1 + 𝑛𝜏𝑀𝑣
1−𝛾]
1
1−𝑟, where PMv <1.
11 
  As a result, the choice of  globalization determines marginal costs, also affects PMν and 
the equilibrium wage 𝑊𝑣 , which is determined below. If  a firm uses no imported 
intermediate inputs, then the marginal cost cv is equal to ( 
𝐾𝑊𝑣
𝛼
𝜑𝑣
). If  a firm uses imported 
intermediate inputs, cv is now lower than before and is equal to 
𝐾𝑊𝑣
𝛼
𝜑𝑣
(1 + 𝑛𝜏𝑀𝑣
1−𝛾)
1−𝛼
1−𝛾. 
Given isoelastic demand and monopolistic competition, the domestic price of  a variety 
of  final goods is the standard mark-up on marginal costs, where 𝑃𝑣𝑑 =
𝜎
𝜎−1
 𝑐𝑣.
12 
  In terms of  revenue, domestic revenue is set as 𝑟𝑣𝑑 = 𝑅𝑃
𝜎−1 𝑝𝑣𝑑
1−𝜎, which depends 
on the price. Since importing action affects costs, it also affects the final goods price, and 
hence revenues will be affected. The revenue of  non-importing firms is described as 
𝑟𝑣𝑑 = 𝑅𝑃
𝜎−1 (
𝐾𝑊𝑣
𝛼
𝜌𝜑𝑣
)1−𝜎 , while the revenue of  intermediate importing firms is 
𝑟𝑣𝑑 = Γ𝑀𝑣 𝑅𝑃
𝜎−1(
𝐾𝑊𝑣
𝛼
𝜌𝜑𝑣
)1−𝜎 , where the Γ𝑀𝑣 ≡ (1 + 𝑛𝜏𝑀𝑣
1−𝛾)
(1−𝛼)(1−𝛾)
1−𝛾 > 1  is an 
“import globalization” indicator and reflects the marginal import costs because the 
decreased prices or costs is induced by importing intermediate inputs and hence lead to 
higher revenues. The markup is 
1
𝜌
 , where 𝜎 =
1
1−𝜌
 . 
  Total revenues 𝑟𝑣 are dependent not only on the depth of  the firm’s entry into each 
market but also on the market breadth that the firm can effectively and efficiently serve. 
A firm who serves an oversea market is supposed to have idiosyncratic iceberg costs, 
given by 𝜏𝑋𝑣, which can be decomposed into an idiosyncratic component tXν Є [1, 𝑡𝑋𝑣̅̅ ̅̅ ], 
where 𝜏𝑋𝑣 = 𝜏𝑋𝑡𝑋𝑣 and a common exporting cost 𝜏𝑋 > 1. Firm revenues from any 
foreign country are proportionally decreased in comparison to the revenues from home 
country, considering that final products export to those foreign markets are sold at higher 
                                                             
11 Here Amiti and Davis (2011) combine the issues of  whether extensive and intensive margins 
can increase firm imports.  
12 In the electronic appendix of  Amiti and Davis (2011), they point out that constant markup 
pricing is still optimal for firms that know their global engagement can affect their wages. Because 
firm wages are positively correlated with firm profits and hence, at the equilibrium level treat is as 
parametric.  
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prices after including iceberg costs 𝜏𝑋𝑣 for exported final products. All else equal, a firm 
who exports final outputs with relative low-idiosyncratic costs will begin to export at a 
lower idiosyncratic productivity level and will export a larger proportion of  final outputs. 
  Let rνd be the revenues of  a firm who only sells final outputs domestically, an exporting 
firm will have revenues of  Γ𝑋𝑣  𝑟𝑣𝑑 . Here Γ𝑋𝑣 ≡ (1 + 𝑛𝜏𝑋𝑣
1−𝜎) > 1 is an “export 
globalization” indicator, considering that a firm can efficiently serve n additional foreign 
markets and export its final outputs to those markets. Hence, the revenue from each 
foreign market is indicator 𝑛𝜏𝑋𝑣
1−𝜎multiplies the revenue from domestic market where 
𝑛𝜏𝑋𝑣
1−𝜎 < 1. 
  We now have the full dimensions to describe the firms’ global engagement, which are 
dependent on whether they import intermediate inputs or export final products. Since 
firm profits are defined as firms revenues less total costs and are non-negative, then 
profits can be expressed as 𝜋𝑣  =
𝑟𝑣
𝜎
− 𝐹𝑣. Setting variable profits for domestic oriented 
firms to be 𝜋𝑣𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑟 = (
𝑅𝑃𝜎−1
𝜎
) (
𝐾𝑊𝑣
𝛼
𝜌𝜑𝑣
)1−𝜎, then firm profits, conditional on firm wages, 
are as follows: 
𝜋𝑣(𝑊𝑣) =
{
 
 
 
 
0                                                                    (𝑎)              
𝜋𝑣𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑟 − 𝑓                                                   (𝑏)               
Γ𝑀𝑣 𝜋𝑣𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑟 − (𝑓 + 𝑛𝑓𝑀 )                         (𝑐)               
Γ𝑋𝑣 𝜋𝑣𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑟 − (𝑓 + 𝑛𝑓𝑋 )                          (𝑑)               
Γ𝑋𝑣 Γ𝑀𝑣 𝜋𝑣𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑟 − [𝑓 + 𝑛(𝑓𝑋 + 𝑓𝑀 )]    (𝑒)               
 
Equation (a) represents firms that do not produce; equation (b) represents firms that still 
produce but only operate domestically and neither import nor export; equation (c) 
represents firms that use imported foreign intermediates; equation (d) represents firms 
that export final goods and equation (e) represents firms that import intermediates and 
export final goods. 
  In addition, Amiti and Davis (2011) emphasize the dependence of  profits on wages 
for each mode of  globalization, and as 𝜋𝑣
′ (𝑊𝑣) < 0, the negative first conditional 
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differences means that the revenue curve is downward sloping, which identifies that 
higher wage setting will result in lower profits.  
  Firm wages are determined at this stage. Remember that the assumption of  fair-wage 
is that wages are positively related to firm profits. However, according to the type of  
mode of  globalization, there is a second relationship between wages and profits, in which 
they are negatively related. As a result of  combining such two relations, firms will always 
choose the best mode of  globalization for them with the purpose of  maximizing profits 
and so determine the wages, or they exist if  this maximum is negative. The same 
mechanism works on firms’ equilibrium wages. Hence, based on the assumptions 
previously discussed, Amiti and Davis (2011) outline how to determine profits and wages 
as well as other variables at the firm level with condition of  macro variables. 
2.3.2.3 General Equilibrium 
 
In Amiti and Davis (2011) model there are two simple assumptions are introduced in 
determining the market equilibrium.   
Assumptions: 
𝒇𝑿 ≥ 𝒇. 
  Condition A ensures that firms with zero profits are not willing to export within 
strictly positive exporting costs τ𝑋 >1, the profit from any one foreign market is always 
lower than that from the home market since the foreign revenue is proportional to 
domestic revenue, and hence, they cannot cover the common exporting costs. 
  If  a firm earns zero-profit, then 𝜋𝑣𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑟 − 𝑓 = 0, therefore 𝑓 = 𝜋𝑣𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑟 . As the 
revenue earned in each foreign market is proportionally decreased relative to that from 
local markst, then the profits obtained from each foreign market can be expressed as 
(𝜏𝑥𝑣
1−𝜎𝜋𝑣𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑟 − 𝑓𝑋 ), where 𝜏𝑥𝑣
1−𝜎 < 1. Assumed that the foreign variable profits are 
lower than the domestic one, suggesting that if  a zero-profit firm intends to export it will 
  39 / 256 
 
earn negative profits in a foreign market, then the expression turns to be 𝜏𝑥𝑣
1−𝜎𝜋𝑣𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑟 −
𝑓𝑋 < 0 and combine the condition that 𝑓 = 𝜋𝑣𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑟 , it can be derived as 𝜏𝑥𝑣
1−𝜎𝑓 −
𝑓𝑋 < 0⇒ 𝑓 <
𝑓𝑋
𝜏𝑥𝑣
1−𝜎 . In the condition of  𝜏𝑥𝑣
1−𝜎 < 1, then 
𝑓𝑋
𝜏𝑥𝑣
1−𝜎 < 𝑓𝑋 and hence 𝑓 ≤ 𝑓𝑋.  
B. 𝒇𝑴 >
𝒇
𝒏
(𝚪𝑴𝒎𝒂𝒙 − 𝟏), where 𝚪𝐌𝐦𝐚𝐱 ≡ (𝟏 + 𝐧𝛕𝐌
𝟏−𝛄)
(𝟏−𝛂)(𝟏−𝛔)
𝟏−𝛄 , i.e. 𝒕𝑴𝒗 = 𝟏. 
  Condition B ensures that zero-profit firms have no advantages of  importing 
intermediate inputs when it fails to import. To address this, it is noted that the net gains 
due to imported inputs are equal to (Γ
𝑀𝑣 
− 1)𝜋𝑣𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑟 − 𝑛𝑓𝑀 ; for a firm with zero 
profits, it is clear that 𝜋𝑣𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑟 = 𝑓 and when setting 𝑡𝑀𝑉 = 1 to maximize Γ𝑀𝑣 , then 
the condition that firms who import intermediate inputs have negative net gain is 
imposed, where (Γ𝑀𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 1)𝑓 − 𝑛 𝑓𝑀 < 0 . As a zero-profit firm find the net gains 
from imported inputs is negative, then it can derived that 𝑛 𝑓𝑀 > 𝑓(Γ𝑀𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 1)
⇒ 𝑓𝑀 >
𝑓
𝑛
(Γ𝑀𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 1) . Moreover, as Γ𝑀𝑣 ≡ (1 + 𝑛𝜏𝑀𝑣
1−𝛾)
(1−𝛼)(1−𝛾)
1−𝛾  and 𝜏𝑀𝑣 =
τMt𝑀𝑣 , with setting 𝑡𝑀𝑣 = 1  to achieve maximum value of  Γ𝑀𝑣 , and hence 
𝜏𝑀𝑣 = τM and so ΓMmax ≡ (1 + nτM
1−γ
)
(1−α)(1−σ)
1−γ . 
  Combining the two assumptions above ensures that firms with zero profits do not 
engage in international trade and also suggest that the general equilibrium cut-off  will 
satisfy a condition that a firm can survive if  and only if ∅ ≥  ∅ ∗ . 
  Based on such assumptions and the cut-off  condition, the firm profits can be 
expressed as 𝜋𝑣 = 𝜋(𝜆𝑣 , ∅̂
∗ ) where ∅̂∗ is the notional cut-off  level of  productivity. 
Given within the fair-wage constraint, the wage of  zero-profit firms is equal to 1. Hence: 
𝜋(∅̂∗ ,𝑊(0) ) = (
𝑅𝑃𝜎−1
𝜎
) (
𝐾
𝜌∅̂∗
)
1−𝜎
− 𝑓 = 0  
  This yields precisely the macro values consistent with the notional cut-off  level of  
productivity  ∅̂∗ . 
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𝑅𝑃𝜎−1 = 𝜎𝑓 (
𝐾
𝜌∅̂∗
)
𝜎−1
 
  Hence, there is no need to determine the profits 𝜋𝑣 = 𝜋(𝜆𝑣 , ∅̂
∗ )  which are 
consistent with the notional cut-off  level of  productivity ∅̂∗. As a result, Amiti and 
Davis (2011) announce five propositions given as follows and the proofs for such 
propositions are stated in their electronic appendix. 
Proposition 1:  Unique autarky equilibrium exists under the constraint of  fair wage.  
Proposition 2: Unique equilibrium with export and import exists under the constraint 
of  fair wage. 
Proposition 3: A shift from autarky to either export or import increases the equilibrium 
cut-off, i.e.  ∅ ∗ ≥ ∅ ∗ 𝐀. 
Proposition 4: A shift from autarky to export or import will lead to: 
A. Exit of  firms with the least productivity level, ∅𝐯 ∈ (∅ 
∗ 𝐀, ∅ ∗ ). 
B. A decrease in firm wages for all domestic firms. 
C. A decrease in firm wages for marginal exporting firms and marginal importing firms. 
D. An increase in firm wages for sufficiently large exporters or importers. 
Proposition 5: Holding all else equal, firms with a greater proportion of  exported final 
outputs (imported intermediate inputs) will make higher firm profits and hence pay 
higher firm wages. 
  For the purpose of  testing Amiti and Davis (2011) model by using the Chinese 
manufacturing industry data, we introduce our various measures of  trade protection and 
empirical strategies in the following sections. Most importantly, we address the potential 
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endogeneity concern of  tariff  reductions that a researcher might face when conducting 
an empirical study in a real-world setting. 
2.3.3 Measures of Trade Protection in China 
2.3.3.1 Industry Output and Input Tariffs  
 
To measure average tariff  rate for China we follow the methodology of  Amiti and 
Konings (2007). To do this we construct output and input tariffs in China using IO 
(Input/Output) sector categories, which are equivalent to the 3-digit Chinese Industry 
Classification (CIC) level. We use the same weight to average Harmonized System (HS) 
6-digit product tariffs to construct output tariffs within each IO sector. As the Amiti and 
Davis (2011) model attempts to identify the impact of  decreasing output tariff  rates on 
firm wages from that of  decreasing input tariff  rates, in our analysis we construct input 
tariffs as well. For each IO sector, the input tariff  is measured by using an input-cost 
share as the weight to aggregate those IO sector output tariffs. The measurement is as 
follows: 
)1(
2002, tariffoutputstariffinput jt
j
ijjt
  
 


kj
kij
k kij
ij
input
input
swhere 2002
2002
2002,  
  We use the input-output shares from China’s 2002 IO table as the weights s ij 2002, , 
which are the proportions of  total inputs from industry i over total outputs of  industry j, 
summed up from 2002 firm data into 3-digit industrial cost-shares (IO sector-level) by 
National Bureau of  Statistics of  China (NBSC).13 Here, i or j denotes an industry, t 
denotes a different year and k denotes a firm. The measurement of  input tariffs is such 
                                                             
13 Firm’s inputs/outputs and compilation of  the input-output tables for China is conducted by 
NBSC every five years. There are five IO tables for China, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007. Since our 
sample period is 2000 to 2006, we choose the 2002 IO table and use its input-cost shares as the 
weights to calculate our 3-digit industry input tariffs during the sample period.  
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that if  for industry j, cotton accounts for 80% of  its total costs and wool accounts for 
20%, then the measurement weight on cotton tariff  rate is 80% and the measurement 
weight on wool tariff  rate is 20%, and the input tariff  of  industry j is calculated as the 
sum of  those output tariff  rates on both cotton and wool, with a 80% weight giving to 
the former and a 20% weight giving to the latter. 
  To measure the IO sector output tariff  rates, we first need to know the product line 
for each sector. However, the direct connection between IO sectors and HS codes is not 
readily available. There are two possible methods to address this problem: one is to rely 
on the linkage between the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) coding 
system and CIC coding system and to utilize multiple concordance tables to indirectly 
obtain an IO-HS concordance table.14 The other possible solution is to rely on the 2007 
IO-HS concordance table as China Customs reports the product line within each IO 
sector directly. However, both products and sectors are based on the China’s new coding 
system, HS2007 and IO2007. For our sample period, some additional adjustment is 
needed.15 Our strategy is to combine both approaches to drop the repeated products of  
each sector to derive our comprehensive IO-HS concordance table, which is based on 
the HS 6-digit product level. 
  As a first step for method 1, we adjust the IO sectors with the 4-digit CIC industry 
codes. Specifically, we match 122 IO sectors with 861 CIC industries (2000-2002) and 
with 913 CIC industries (2003-2006) separately.16 Secondly, we convert the CIC coding 
system into the ISIC coding system and further connect our IO sectors with ISIC 
                                                             
14 These multiple concordance tables we utilized are: ISIC/Rev.3-HS1996, ISIC/Rev.3-HS2002, 
GB/T4754-2002-ISIC/Rev.3, GB/T4754-2002-IO2002 and GB/T-4754-2002- GB/T4754-1994. 
15 Here we need concordance tables HS1996-HS2007, HS2002-HS2007 and IO2002-IO2007. 
16 During the sample period there are two versions of  industry classification, so we adjust the 
IO sectors with both of  them separately. In 2000-2002 the industry classification is based on old 
coding system, GB/T4754-1994, therefore there are 861 industries in total. After 2002 the new coding 
system, GB/T4754-2002, is introduced to classify industry, hence there are 913 industries in total. As 
in Brandt et al. (2012), they only concordance the manufacturing industries with the IO sectors 
therefore 71 IO sectors are reported in their IO-CIC concordance table. Based on their work, we 
extend the adjustment as our IO-CIC concordance table including all 122 sectors appeared in 2002 
input-output table, which includes all the industries not only manufacturing industries. 
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industries.17 Then using the ISIC/Rev.3-HS concordance tables we link the ISIC industry 
codes with China’s HS 6-digit products.18 Finally we find the correspondence between 
the IO sectors and the HS 6-digit products according to method 1. Later we convert the 
2007 IO-HS concordance table into a new version to correspond to our time period as 
outlined in method 2. Eventually, by integrating the results from methods 1 and 2, we 
acquire our own IO-HS concordance tables, which cover almost 7,000 HS 6-digit 
products within 122 IO sectors.19 
  With our own IO-HS table, we use China’s HS 6-digit effectively applied tariffs and 
take a simple average to obtain IO sector output tariff  rates.20 Based on IO sector 
output tariffs, we turn to calculating IO sector input tariff  rates. To measure IO sector 
input tariffs we use the input-cost shares from the 2002 IO table as a weight to average 
the IO sector output tariffs as calculated previously. Since we assume in our sample 
period each IO sector does not change its cost distribution for each production line, we 
fix the input-cost shares. That is, we implicitly assume that technology remains constant. 
Further, since we use industry input-shares for input tariff  rate calculations, which is at a 
more aggregated level, our measurement for input tariffs would not be biased by a single 
firm’s own input choices. To save space we only report China’s 2-digit manufacturing 
industrial output and input tariffs for 2000-2006 in Table 1.2 as discussed before and 
there are 29 manufacturing industries in total. 
                                                             
17 NBSC report the concordance table between GB/T4754-2002 and ISIC/Rev.3. In practice a 
CIC code may correspond to three ISIC codes. For example, Manufacture of  Stationery (CIC: 2411) 
is concorded with Manufacture of  Plastic Products (ISIC: 2520), Manufacture of  Other Metal 
Products (ISIC: 2899) and Manufacture of  Others (ISIC: 3699). In this case we give a 1/3 weight to 
each ISIC industry and sum up those 3 ISIC output tariffs if  we would like to get the CIC output 
tariff  in Manufacture of  Stationery. Later when we calculate the IO sector output tariffs, we treat each 
product’s tariff  under each ISIC industry equally. 
18 The tariffs of  6-digit products obtained from the WITS around our sample are based on 
different HS versions. Tariffs in 2000 and 2001 use the HS1996 coding system while tariffs in 
2002-2006 use the HS2002 coding system. So we use two concordance tables: ISIC/Rev.3-HS1996 
and ISIC/Rev.3-HS2002. 
19 We generate two concordance tables, IO2002-HS1996 and IO2002-HS2002. The former 
covers 6,886 HS 6-digit products within 122 sectors and the latter covers 7,031 HS 6-digit products 
within 122 sectors.  
20 Some IO sectors do not report the HS 6-digit outputs and hence their output tariff  rates are 
missing. This is because that those 122 IO sectors include all the industries, not only manufacturing 
industries but also service industries, such service industries do not produce products and hence they 
would not induce tariffs. Therefore, it is reasonable that we treat those missing ISIC output tariffs as 
zero.    
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2.3.3.2 Effective Rate of Protection (ERP) 
We further also construct effective rate of  protection (ERP) to evaluate the trade reform 
in China. Two forces drive this additional measurement. First, At the industry level, the 
disciplining effect of  decreasing output tariff  rates might be balanced by decreasing input 
tariff  rates. Second, given the high correlation between output and input tariff  rates at 
the 3-digit industry level (as seen in Table 1.2 of  section 2.1), rather than include both 
measures in the same equation, we use the 3-digit industry level ERP to account for both 
types of  protection.  
  Following Corden (1966), we therefore measure industrial ERP to capture the net 
effect of  both types of  protection on outputs and intermediates, 
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where  2002,ij  are the input-value proportion of  industry i for producing the total 
outputs of  industry j, also derived from the input-output table of  China in 2002. It is 
noted that the weights  2002,ij  to measure ERP are different from the weights sij 2002,  
to measure input tariffs. The former is the proportion of  inputs from industry i in the 
total input costs occurred in the production of  total outputs in industry j, and the latter is 
the proportion of  inputs from industry i in the total value of  outputs in industry j. Hence, 
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which is equivalent to the proportion of  value-added in the value of  outputs in industry j. 
As seen in section 2.1, Table 1.1 gives the summary statistics of  trade barriers measured 
in different ways in 2000-2006, including output and input tariffs and ERP as well. 
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2.3.4 Empirical Strategy 
 
Based on the predictions of  Amiti and Davis (2011) outlined in Section 3.2, we 
investigate the impact of  cutting output and input tariff  rates on firm average wage by 
estimating the following: 
ln(wage)𝑘𝑗𝑡 = α1OT𝑗𝑡−1 + α2OT𝑗𝑡−1 × FX𝑘𝑗𝑡 + α3ITjt−1 + α4IT𝑗𝑡−1 × FM𝑘𝑗𝑡 + θX𝑘𝑗𝑡 + θ𝑘 + θ𝑙𝑡
+ ε𝑘𝑗𝑡 .                                                                                                                (3) 
  The dependent variable ln(wage)𝑘𝑗𝑡 is the logarithm of  firm k’s average wage per 
worker in industry j in year t, and firm average wage is the total wage payment averaged 
by the total employment. 21  OT𝑗𝑡−1  and IT𝑗𝑡−1  describe the one-year lagged of  
industry-level output and input tariffs respectively, where the former is at the four-digit 
industry level and the latter is at the three-digit industry level.22 As the model predicts 
that tariff  reductions will induce differential effects on the firm’s wage payment as a 
result of  a firm’s different types of  engagement in the globalization process, the 
interaction terms between the industrial tariffs and the firm’s global status are also 
included. To capture the differential effect we include an interaction term of  the lagged 
output (input) tariff  rates and an exporter (importer) dummy. FX𝑘𝑗𝑡 is an exporter 
dummy that is equal to one if  the total exports of  a firm k is non-zero in year t, and zero 
otherwise; FM𝑘𝑗𝑡 is an importer dummy that is equal to one if  the total imports of  a 
firm k is non-zero in year t, and zero otherwise.23  
                                                             
21 Here the total wage bill only includes the standard payment to workers and does not include 
the welfare and unemployment insurance. For robustness, we add-in those extra payment components 
to construct a variable of  total compensation payment, and the average of  which is used as a 
dependent variable. The results are quantitatively similar but not reported here for reasons of  space.  
22  To identify how output and input tariffs affect wages separately, we require that the 
movement between those two tariffs should be independent. As we show in Table B2, lagged 4-digit 
industrial output tariffs are weakly correlated with lagged 3-digit industrial input tariffs. Note that 
lagged 3-digit industrial output tariffs are highly correlated with lagged 3-digit industrial input tariffs 
and hence including both of  them in regressions may induce a collinearity problem.  
23 Since the change in output and input tariffs affect the two sectors, intermediate sector and 
final goods sector, of  production respectively, to detect either of  such two effects, it is enough to 
group firms into importer (exporter) and non-importer (non-exporters) according to a firm’s activity 
in the intermediate (final goods) sector, and hence we only include two dummy variables to denote 
firm’s global engagement. For those firms that only export (import), we can combine the effect of  
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  The vector X𝑘𝑗𝑡 includes the firm’s global status and other firm level characteristics 
as controls. Thus it contains the dummy variables FX𝑘𝑗𝑡 and FM𝑘𝑗𝑡 to indicate the 
firm’s global status and other characteristics such as the firm size, the firm performance 
(total factor productivity, TFP), skill intensity (the share of  workers with professional 
qualifications in total employment) and ownership variables. 24 25 Following Yu (2015), 
we use the variable ln K𝑘𝑗𝑡 , the logarithm of  firm k’s capital, instead of  the logarithm 
of  firm k’s total employment to control for firm size.26 There are three dummy variables 
to describe the firm’s ownership structure: state-owned enterprise (SOE), foreign-owned, 
Hong Kong/Macao/Taiwan owned (HMT), and a dummy for other types of  firms is 
omitted.27 The SOE dummy is equal to one if  a firm k’s government share is no less 
                                                                                                                                                                              
falling output (input) tariff  rates on exporters (importers) and the effect of  falling input (output) 
tariff  rates on non-importers (non-exporters). Moreover, for those firms that both export and import, 
we can combine the effect of  falling output tariff  rates on exporters and the effect of  falling input 
tariff  rates on importers. 
24 Skill intensity is defined following Upward et al. (2013), and is 4-digit industry-specific 
intensity not firm-specific intensity. During our sample period, the workers’ education and 
professional qualification information are only available for 2004 from the China Economic Census. 
Even though the census reports the firm-level information, due to different sampling, we cannot 
merge the firms in the census with the firms in our sample. So using the data in the census we 
construct the industrial skill intensity at a more aggregated level, based on the sampling rule in CASIF 
that only includes SOEs and non-SOEs with annual turnover exceeding 5 million RMB. We merge 
this 2004 industrial skill intensity with the observations in our sample to roughly control for a firm’s 
skill propensity as a robustness check.     
25 Our TFP is estimated by following the De Loecker (2007) approach and the modification 
conducted by Elliott et al. (2015) and present our measurement in Appendix 1B. As a supplementary, 
we also use ln(value added per worker)𝑘𝑗𝑡 to control for the firm performance, which is following 
Amiti and Davis (2011) that they use the log of  value-added per worker as the indicator to control for 
firm productivity, and report the results in Table 1A.16 of  Appendix Tables.  
26 In our estimates the dependent variable is the logarithm of  firm k’s average wage, which 
could be written as: ln(wage)𝑘𝑗𝑡 = ln(total wage bill/labor)𝑘𝑗𝑡 = ln(total wage bill)𝑘𝑗𝑡 − ln(labor)𝑘𝑗𝑡 . 
Since the logarithm of  firm labor is used as the denominator of  the dependent variable, in equation (3) 
still using it as a proxy to control for firm size is inappropriate. Hence, we use ln(K)𝑘𝑗𝑡 to control for 
firm size. However, in our empirical estimates we also report the result by using ln(labor)𝑘𝑗𝑡 as a 
supplementary in Table 1A.16 of  Appendix Tables. 
27 Other ownership variables are used as robustness checks. One proxy we used includes 
government share, foreign share and HMT share as one proxy, which represent the capital owned by 
local or central government, foreigners, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan respectively, and the other 
proxy includes two indicators, SOEs and foreign-invested firms (FIEs). Following Yu (2014), we 
construct the indicators based on firm registration status (qiye dengji zhuce leixing). A FIE is identified as 
a firm invested by other foreign countries. In particular, quite a lot of  the Chinese firms are invested 
by Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan and we also treat those firms as the FIEs. Specifically, FIEs 
include: HMT joint-stock corporations (code: 210), HMT joint venture enterprises (220), fully 
HMT-invested enterprises (230), HMT-invested limited corporations (240), foreign-invested 
joint-stock corporations (310), foreign-invested joint ventures (320), wholly-owned FIEs (330) and 
foreign-invested limited corporations (340). Additionally, Brant et al. (2012) also addressed that they 
utilize firm registration type to construct firm’s ownership categories, but they have four categories: 
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than 0.5, and zero otherwise; the foreign-owned dummy is equal to one if  a firm k’s 
foreign share is greater than 0.5, and zero otherwise; and the HMT dummy is defined as 
well as the foreign-owned dummy, equal to one if  a firm k’s HMT share is greater than 
0.5, and zero otherwise 
  Finally, we control for firm fixed effects, θ𝑘 and firm-invariant location-year fixed 
effects, θ𝑙𝑡 , that the shocks over time may differ across different regions in China.
28 
ε𝑘𝑗𝑡 is the error term.  
  According to the theoretical predictions of  Amiti and Davis (2011), the coefficients on 
our tariff  variables in equation (3) should have the signs: 
{
 
 
 
 
(i) α1 > 0, denotes that if OTjt-1 ↓, wages for non-exporters will ↓;                                         
(ii) α2 < 0, denotes that if OTjt-1 ↓, relative to non-exporters, wages for exporters will ↑;
(iii) α3 > 0, denotes that if ITjt-1 ↓, wages for non-importers will ↓;                                          
(iv) α4 < 0, denotes that if ITjt-1 ↓, relative to non-importers, wages for importers will ↑. 
  
  In our estimation the interaction coefficient of  lagged output (input) tariff  rates and 
an exporter (importer) dummy indicates the differential effect between exporting 
(importing) firms and non-exporting (non-importing) firms. As a result, the net effect of  
output (input) tariff  reductions on exporters (importers) is the sum of  α1 and 
α2 (α3 and α4). 
  Since Amiti and Davis (2011) predicts that some marginal firms that shift from 
sourcing and serving the local market to exporting (importing) after falls in output (input) 
tariff  rates will suffer decreases in both firm profits and wages if  the profit loss induced 
                                                                                                                                                                              
SOEs, foreign firms, private firms and hybrid firms (local government owned, town-owned, 
village-owned, etc.). The results for such proxies are reported in Table 1A.16 of  Appendix Tables. 
28 Following Kamal et al. (2012), we utilize information on a firm’s region code to construct 
firm’s location categories. Based on two-digit region code, which is equivalent to the province level, 
we group Chinese regions into five categories – (1) Costal: Beijing (code: 11), Tianjin (12), Hebei (13), 
Shanghai (31), Jiangsu (32), Zhejiang (33), Fujian (35), Shandong (37), Guangdong (44) and Hainan 
(46); (2)Inland: Shanxi (14), Anhui (34), Jiangxi (36), Henan (41); (3)Northeast: Hubei (42), Hunan 
(43); (4)Southwest: Liaoning (21), Jilin (22), Heilongjiang (23), Guangxi (45), Chongqing (50), Sichuan 
(51), Guizhou (52) and Yunnan (53); (5)Northwest: Inner Mongolia (15), Tibet (54), Shanxi (61), 
Gansu (62), Qinghai (63), Ningxia (64) and Xingjiang (65). So there are four location dummies: Costal, 
Inland, Northeast and Southwest. Thus, a Northwest dummy is omitted. 
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by stronger import competition cannot be balanced by profit gains from exporting 
(importing), and hence, these marginal firms need to make a great amount of  exports 
(imports) for the benefit effects. To capture such effects, we further add-in the 
interaction term of  lagged output (input) tariff  rates and firm export (import) share 
instead of  an exporter (importer) dummy, which may enable us to obtain the critical 
share of  exporting (importing) to make the sum of  coefficients on lagged output (input) 
tariffs and their interaction terms negative, implying a rise in wages by decreasing output 
(input) tariff  rates.29      
  Alternatively, we exploit another approach to investigate the effects of  trade reform on 
firm average wage by combining the impacts of  output and input tariffs and use 3-digit 
industry ERP to estimate the following: 
ln(wage)𝑘𝑗𝑡 = β1ERP𝑗𝑡−1 + β2ERP𝑗𝑡−1 × FXX𝑘𝑗𝑡 + β3ERP𝑗𝑡−1 × FMM𝑘𝑗𝑡 + β4ERP𝑗𝑡−1 × FXM𝑘𝑗𝑡
+ γZ𝑘𝑗𝑡 + γ𝑘 + γ𝑙𝑡 + ω𝑘𝑗𝑡 .                                                                                       (4) 
  Here ERP𝑗𝑡−1  describes the one-year lagged industry ERP at the 3-digit level and the 
interaction terms between the industry ERP and the firm’s global status are also included. 
To capture the differential effect we interact the lagged industry ERP with three dummy 
variables. FXX𝑘𝑗𝑡 is a pure exporter dummy that is equal to one if  a firm k only has 
exports in year t, and zero otherwise; FMM𝑘𝑗𝑡 is a pure importer dummy that is equal to 
one if  a firm k only has imports in year t, and zero otherwise; and FXM𝑘𝑗𝑡 is a both 
exporter-importer dummy that is equal to one if  a firm k has non-zero exports and 
                                                             
29 Note that the export share is defined as the total exports over total outputs and the import 
share is defined as the total imports over total inputs. In particular, Manova and Zhang (2012) 
document that the Chinese Customs records discriminate between “ordinary” trade and trade under 
the “processing-and-assembly” regime and they exploit information only on firm’s imports in the 
latter category to ensure that they can correctly interpret such imports as inputs to the goods firms 
sell abroad. However, all of  their results hold if  they instead use data on all imported inputs and not 
only those under the processing-and-assembly regime. It seems that using all imports (both under the 
ordinary trade and the processing-and-assembly regimes) as inputs would not bias the results. Hence, 
following this we take all the imports as intermediate inputs used for production since our sample 
excludes processing firms (firms that with non-zero value of  processing export or processing import) 
and all imports are under the ordinary trade.  
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non-zero imports in year t, and zero otherwise.30 
  The vector Z𝑘𝑗𝑡 includes the firm’s global status and other firm level characteristics as 
controls. Thus it contains the dummy variables FXX𝑘𝑗𝑡 , FMM𝑘𝑗𝑡  and FXM𝑘𝑗𝑡  to 
indicate the firm’s global status and other characteristics (firm size, firm performance, 
skill intensity and ownership variables). Finally, we include γ
𝑘
 to control for 
un-observed and time-invariant firm fixed effects. γ
𝑙𝑡
 is included to control for 
firm-invariant location-year fixed effects and ω𝑘𝑗𝑡 is the error term.  
  Based on the Amiti and Davis (2011) model, we predict the coefficient on lagged 
industry ERP in equation (4), β
1
> 0, which captures the joint effects of  decreasing 
output and input tariff  rates on firms serving only the domestic market, suggesting that a 
fall in ERP will decrease wages for domestic-oriented firms. Interaction terms of  lagged 
industry ERP indicate the differential effects between globally engaged firms and 
domestic-oriented firms and these coefficients before interaction terms should be 
positive as predicted, suggesting that a fall in ERP will increase wages for globally 
engaged firms relative to domestic-oriented firms. Moreover, as firms that both export 
and import will benefit from the reductions of  both output and input tariffs, therefore, 
β
4
 should be greater than either β
2
 or β
3
. Thus, the net effects of  industry ERP 
reductions on pure exporters, pure importers, and both exporters and importers are the 
value of  (β
1
 +β
2
), (β
1
 +β
3
), and (β
1
 +β
4
) respectively. 
  Similarly, we then interact lagged industry ERP with the trade shares rather than trade 
orientation dummy variables (FXX𝑘𝑗𝑡 ,FMM𝑘𝑗𝑡  and FXM𝑘𝑗𝑡 ) in some specifications, 
which may enable us to get the critical trade shares to make the sum of  coefficients on 
                                                             
30 Since ERP combines the impacts of  both output and input tariffs, we need to classify firms 
according to their activities in both intermediate and final goods sectors of  production. In each sector, 
there are 2 possibilities to choose, either exporter (importer) or non-exporter (non-importer), and 
hence, we have 4 (2×2=4) various combination for firm global engagement in total and they are 
firms that only export, firms that only import, firms that export and import and firms that neither 
export nor import. Therefore, there are three dummy variables to denote a firm’s trade orientation 
and a dummy of  non-exporter and non-importer is omitted.  
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lagged industry ERP and their interaction terms negative, implying a rise in wages 
following a cut in industry ERP.  
2.3.5 Endogeneity of Tariff Reduction 
 
Before proceeding to the estimation of  equation (3) and (4), one concern that we want to 
address is a possible endogeneity possible which may be caused by potential reverse 
causality between tariff  reductions and firm income. However, quite a lot of  researchers 
believe that tariff  reductions are exogenous when considering the connection between 
tariff  liberalization and firm performances. Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) argue that 
the narrow dispersion and the drastic reduction in tariffs after the 1991 trade reforms in 
India are exogenous as the reform was imposed externally, it can be assumed that lower 
trade protections cannot affect firm productivity or industry productivity. Hence, they 
treat the tariffs across industries between 1991 and 1997 as exogenous to the Indian 
firm-level productivity. Brandt et al. (2012) argue that in China the uniform import tariffs 
after trade reforms cannot be explained by policy endogeneity. It seems that changes in 
trade policy result in all tariffs shifting to a relative low or nearly the same level, which 
supports the argument that tariff  endogeneity is not a big issue in China. As a result, they 
believe that tariff  reductions are exogenous when exploiting the causality between trade 
reforms and productivity changes. Similarly, Kamal et al. (2012) take tariff  reform as 
exogenous in their study of  estimating the alteration of  China’s labor share in response 
to output and input reductions. Hence, we do not take the potential endogeneity of  tariff  
reductions as a big concern in our study since the tariff  reduction conducted in 2002 was 
negotiated with the WTO and such reduction under the external pressure is quite 
expected.  
  Note that although the reductions of  tariff  rates are under regulation, firms within 
low-income industries would still lobby or seek trade protection from the government 
(Grossman and Helpman, 1994), which could lead to the maintenance of  tariffs at 
relatively high levels and protect the lower-profit firms from tougher import-competition. 
  51 / 256 
 
This in turn causes a negative bias on the tariff  coefficients. Thus, we address this 
potential endogeneity concern of  tariffs in several ways. First, we examine to what extent 
tariff  rates moved together following Topalova and Khandelwal (2011). The analysis of  
changing tariff  rates of  4902 HS 6-digit products for 2000 to 2006 is reported in Figure 
2.12. According to the difference between current tariff  rate and the one-year lagged 
tariff  rate, we group products into three categories: Lower Tariffs, if  one-year change in 
tariffs are negative; Same Tariffs, if  one-year change in tariffs is zero; and Higher Tariffs, 
if  one-year change in tariffs in positive. Each bar in Figure 2.12 describes the percentage 
of  each group in total HS products for each year and it reveals that movements in 6-digit 
product tariffs were remarkably uniform, with more than half  of  the products remaining 
the same tariff  levels around the sample except in 2001 and 2002.31 In 2001 and 2002, as 
before and immediately after China joining WTO, the majority of  products experience a 
fall in tariffs.32 It is noted that the majority of  product tariff  rates share a similar pattern 
of  movement and they move down or remain constant each year. Hence, the power of  
policy-makers to set or control product-level tariff  rates is restricted or limited in 
2000-2006, and the potential endogeneity problem of  tariff  reductions becomes less 
pronounced.  
[Figure 2.12 about here] 
 Alternatively, we plot the change in tariffs against the initial tariff  levels. Following 
Brandt et al. (2012), we plot the change in 3-digit industry output tariffs in different 
                                                             
31 Tariffs in 1999-2001 are based on HS1996 coding system whilst in 2002-2006 are based on 
HS2002 coding system. Before our analysis, we drop all products with missing tariff  rates. We then 
map such products before 2002 with HS1996 codes into HS2002 codes and combine all the products 
with HS2002 codes by keeping only those appeared in the full sample, and finally we obtain a dataset 
full of  yearly 6-digit product tariff  rates for 2000-2006 with 4902 products in each year. As a 
robustness check, we also make an analysis of  the tariff  changes for 2000 to 2001 and for 2002 to 
2006 as either of  them based on the same coding system and report them in Figures 2A.1 and 2A.2 
respectively. Here we do not require that the number of  products appeared in each year of  either 
sub-sample is the same and the HS product number in each year is different (for 1999-2001 using 
HS1996: 1999: 5090, 2000: 5090, 2001: 5089; for 2001-2006 using HS2002: 2001: 5201, 2002: 5201, 
2003: 5224, 2004: 5224, 2005: 5225, 2006: 5205, and there is one additional year included for each 
sub-sample for first difference measurement). And hence if  a product does not appear in last period 
making the change value of  tariff  is missing, we treat is as in the “same tariffs” group. Similarly, 
Figures 2A.1 and 2A.2 show the same pattern that the majority of  product tariffs move together.  
32 The exact date of  China to join WTO is 11th December 2001. As it is at the end of  2001, we 
treat 2001 as the year of  pre-WTO and treat 2002 as the year of  immediately post-WTO. 
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sample period, as a function of  initial output tariff  level in Figures 2.13-2.15.33 34 First, 
Figure 2.13 shows tariff  changes in 2000-2006, which spans our full sample period, and 
demonstrates that almost all industries experienced a considerable reduction with a 
change in value between 0 to -30% and the industry with the highest initial output tariff  
tended to experience the largest reduction.35 The alcohol industry experienced the largest 
cut in its output tariff, followed by the tobacco industry. Further, Figure 2.13 suggests a 
linear relationship between initial tariff  rates and reductions in industry tariffs and from 
Figure 2.13 we observe that around the full sample period output tariffs decrease almost 
half  of  their initial protection levels, with a slope of  -0.49 obtaining from simple 
regressing tariff  changes on initial tariff  rates. The dispersion of  sector trade protection 
is not broad in 2000, with most of  the sector protections ranging between zero 
percentage point and twenty percentage points, and only four sectors have protection of  
more than forty percentage points. Moreover, only three observations above the fitted 
line (slope=-0.49) on the right-hand side of  Figure 2.13 are relative high protection 
sectors at the initial level that experience below average tariff  reductions and only three 
observations below that fitted line on the right-hand side of  the figure are relative high 
protection sectors at the initial level that experience above average tariff  reductions. This 
figure implies that the trade reform decreased product-line tariff  rates and their 
dispersion, also abandon tariff  concessions and uniform the system. From the results in 
Figure 2.13, we conclude that over the sample period, tariff  reductions are lack of  
heterogeneity, which is consistent with the findings in Brandt et al. (2012), as they argue 
that between 1992 and 2007 policy discretion is rarely concerned in tariff  liberalization 
across sectors. 
 [Figure 2.13 about here] 
  In addition, we create sub-samples of  “pre-WTO period” (2000-2001) and 
                                                             
33 There are 117 industries in total at the 3-digit industry level. 
34 For robustness, we plot the relationship between output tariff  changes and initial output tariff  
level at the adjusted 4-digit industry level in Figures 2A.4-2A.7 as well, and the results are robust to 
the conclusions made at the 3-digit industry level.  
35 The only one industry to experience an increase in its output tariffs was the fertilizer 
manufacturing industry (CIC: 262).  
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“post-WTO period” (2001-2006) to examine the relationship between tariff  reductions 
and their initial levels, and report the results in Figure 2.14 and Figure 2.15 respectively.36 
Similarly, all the observations are plotted near the fitted regression line and there is less 
dispersion in tariff  reduction across sectors, consistent with the suggestions in Brandt et 
al. (2012) that the decline in tariffs was almost entirely proportional and subject to little 
policy discretion.  
[Figure 2.14 about here] 
[Figure 2.15 about here] 
  We further look at the tariff  reductions in the highest protected industries and the 
lowest protected industries to consider that industries with different degrees of  
protection may have different lobbying power and reflect various abilities to affect 
policymakers. And hence we follow Ahsan and Mitra (2014) to classify 3-digit industries 
into two categories, the highest or the most protected industry and the lowest or the least 
protected industry, according to the average industry output tariff  rates for each industry 
around 2000-2006, and we list the 10 highest (most) protected industries and the 10 
lowest (least) protected industries in Table 1.5.37 Table 1.5 shows that the difference in 
tariffs between the lowest (least) protected industry (Manufacture of  Ferroalloy Smelting, 
IO: 57) and the highest (most) protected industry (Manufacture of  Sugar, IO: 16) is 
30.74 percentage points. Then we graph the output tariff  trends for that two groups of  
industries during the sample period in Figure 2.16 and Figure 2.17 respectively, and both 
figures demonstrate that the declines in output tariffs was very similar across industries 
                                                             
36 We also use 2002 as the initial year of  post-WTO period in Figure 2A.3 as China joined WTO 
at the end of  2001. We treat 2002 to be the first year of  post-WTO period as a robust check and the 
results seem to be more heterogeneity than that using 2001 as initial year. This leaves some scope for 
policy endogeneity to allow policymakers tailor the cuts for specific sectors but only in a sense that 
tariff  cuts are being negotiated and fixed. It is not the dependency of  policy on unobservable that we 
should worry about. 
37 Note that the 3-digit industry level is equivalent to the IO sector level, and hence we use the 
IO sector number to denote the industry code in Table 5. Moreover, we report the average output 
tariffs for each 3-digit industry around 2000-2006 in Table 1A.11 and show the rankings as well. We 
rank the 3-digit output tariffs from the highest to the lowest. Note that there are 122 IO sectors in 
2002 China Input/ Output Table but only 69 of  them belong to manufacturing industries.  
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with different degrees of  trade protection. For instance, Manufacture of  Alcohol and 
Alcoholic Beverages (IO: 20), one of  the most protected industries, with output tariff  of  
53 percent in 2000 experiences a 32 percent drop in output tariff  by 2006 whilst 
Manufacture of  Electronic Component (IO: 77), one of  the least protected industries, 
with initial output tariff  of  12 percent experiences a 4 percent fall in output tariff  by 
2006. The results support the notion that tariffs decline by a same proportion of  their 
initial levels, indicating that the dispersion in tariff  reductions is driven by the initial tariff  
dispersions. As a result, an initially highly protected industry receives a largest cut and an 
initially lowly protected industry receives a smallest cut, consistent with the argument that 
tariff  reform in China can be well described as tariff  compression as in Brandt et al. 
(2012), with initially highly protected industries receiving the largest cuts.   
[Table 1.5 about here] 
[Figure 2.16 about here] 
[Figure 2.17 about here] 
  In short, tariff  reductions are already fixed as China signed the accession agreement in 
2001 and under pressure from WTO, the tariff  reductions could be predicted. Only some 
specific-sectors can make government to tailor their tariff  reductions to maintain their 
performance and so on income, but in an expectation as achieving negotiated tariff  cuts, 
and hence policymakers become less selective to determine trade protection, implying 
that in the sample we can treat tariffs as exogenous variables. 
  However, while we are confident that our trade protection measures are exogenous, we 
nonetheless seek to be doubly sure that trade protections are in fact exogenous to 
economic and political protection. Consequently, we seek to control for such potential 
endogeneity problem and address this by adapting the similar strategy used by Topalova 
and Khandelwal (2011); Brandt et al. (2012); Ahsan and Mitra (2014) in two ways: we first 
examine whether measures of  trade protection (output tariffs, input tariffs and ERP) are 
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correlated with industrial characteristics; then we investigate whether past wages predict 
current measures of  trade protection.38 
  In Table 1.6 we report regression results of  trade protection on characteristics at the 
industry level in variety measures of  protection. We regress the 6-period change in 
output tariffs, input tariffs and ERP between 2000 and 2006 on various industrial 
characteristics in 2000 with control of  industry fixed effect and the regressions are 
weighted by taking the square root of  the quantity of  firms within an industry.39 We 
include several characteristics that may affect policymakers’ decision, for instance, 
industry average wage and skill intensity (policy makers may protect industries which hire 
low skilled or vulnerable workers), industry employment (taken by its logarithm value, 
which captures the notion that a larger labor force may lead to more protection), industry 
output and value-added (used by their logarithm values to capture the ability to put 
pressure on policymakers for more lobbing powers), and the industry revenue and profits 
(measured in logarithm values which address the possibility that low-income industries 
may lobby the government for more protections).40 There are four panels in Table 1.6, 
panels A and B report the regressions of  change in 4-digit and 3-digit output tariffs on 
industry characteristics respectively, panel C reports the regressions of  change in 3-digit 
input tariffs and panel D reports the regressions of  change in ERP, and each cell 
presents one result of  regressing a measure in trade protection on industry-specific 
characteristics. All of  the estimated results show that industry-specific characteristics 
before trade reform are unable to affect changes in trade protection with the exception 
of  regression of  6-period change in input tariffs against 2000 industry mean wage. 
[Table 1.6 about here] 
                                                             
38 In Ahsan and Mitra (2014), they only check whether in India the past share of  total wage over 
total revenue can determine current tariff  rates. 
39 For robust checks, we use 2001 or 2002 as the initial year as well and examine whether 
5-period change or 4-period change in trade protections are correlated with initial industry 
characteristics. The results are reported in Tables A12 and A13 and they are robust. There is no 
correlation between industry characteristics before trade reform and changes in trade protection with 
exceptions of  regressing 6-period change in output (input) tariffs against 2001 (2002) industry mean 
wages. 
40 Note that skill intensity is measured by using China Annual Survey Data and is only available 
in 2004. 
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  Our results are consistent with the findings in Brandt et al. (2012), as they find that by 
2007, no characteristics at the Chinese industry level can predict tariff  rates significantly. 
However, they also find that skill intensity is negatively and significantly correlated with 
tariff  levels, which is in contrast to ours, since we find that initial industry skill intensity is 
uncorrelated with change in trade protections. Our results support the view that neither 
political nor economic factors can necessarily explain the changes of  trade protection in 
China. A possible explanation of  this is that import tariff  rates were determined when 
China signed the agreement with WTO and the conclusion of  the negotiations 
represents a commitment undertaken by China to remove trade protection (barriers) 
gradually and expand market access for foreign companies. Hence, it is suggested that 
tariff  reduction across industries between 2000 and 2006 can be treated as exogenous. 
  Brandt et al. (2012) argue that in the post-WTO period higher-productive sectors had 
lower trade protection one or two year earlier and hence tariffs endogeneity may not be 
fully ruled out in the post-WTO period but the only possibility is on a basis of  
expectation in sector performance. However, we still doubt that tariff  protections are 
endogenous to firm wages and we finally examine whether tariff  rates can be tailored or 
set by government to adjust industry average wages. Hence, we aggregate firm wages into 
industry level, take their average values, and then regress our measures of  current trade 
protections (output and input tariff  rates, and ERP) against one lag of  industrial average 
wages, where industry and year fixed effects are controlled. The regressions are weighted 
by the yearly quantity of  firms within an industry and industry standard errors are 
clustered. We perform this analysis separately for the full sample period, the pre-WTO 
period and the post-WTO period, and present the results in Table 1.7. There is no 
significant correlation between past wages and current tariffs or ERPs for all concerns of  
different periods and all measures of  tariffs used in our study except in regression of  
3-digit output tariffs for the full sample and regression of  3-digit input tariffs for the 
pre-WTO period. For column (1) in panel B of  3-digit output tariffs, the coefficient on 
lagged industry mean wage is negative and significant at the 10% level, suggesting that if  
industry mean wage decreases the industry will get more lobbies on final products since 
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lower income predicts higher output tariffs and hence higher trade protection. For 
column (2) in panel C of  3-digit input tariffs, the coefficient on lagged industry mean 
wage is positive and significant at the 10% level, suggesting an opposite mechanism 
compared to output tariffs, which is if  industry mean wage decreases firms in that 
industry will become much easier to access to imported intermediate inputs since lower 
income predicts lower input tariffs and hence lower trade barriers. All of  these suggest 
that policymakers may have adjusted tariff  policies to industrial relative performances. 
However, in the post-WTO period, tariff  protections are not driven by the industry 
average wage. 
[Table 1.7 about here] 
  All tests above show that tariff  policy endogeneity is not a big concern in our study as 
tariff  reduction process has been set and committed with China’s entry into WTO and 
policymakers liberalize all industry barriers although adjusted to some industries’ relative 
performance under the fixed negotiated process. As a result, we restrict the sample to the 
period 2002-2006 and in each specification, we use lag tariff  measures to consider that 
tariff  reductions making an effect on firm wages is not instantaneous.41 
  Nonetheless, as robustness checks we further adopt an instrumental variables (IV) 
approach in some specifications for concern about the potential endogeneity problem of  
tariffs. Finding appropriate instrument for tariff  changes is not a simple process. The 
majority of  researchers choose instruments for tariff  reductions that are not related to 
firm wages. Amiti and Davis (2011), who adopted the approach of  Trefler (2004), use the 
initial proportion of  production labor divided by total employment and the initial input 
tariff  rates as instruments for changes in output and input tariff  rates respectively, and 
try to block tariff  liberalization in Indonesia. In the case of  India, Ahsan and Mitra (2014) 
use five year lags of  output tariff  rates as the instrument for one year difference in tariff  
rates. For the empirical studies of  China, in Hu and Liu (2014) Chinese output and input 
                                                             
41 For the purpose of  robustness checks, we use full sample for regression analysis as well and 
report the results in Tables A14-A23.  
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tariffs are instrumented by the Philippine tariffs.42 Cheng (2015) uses changes in Albania 
and Lithuania’s tariffs as instruments for China’s tariff  concessions, whilst Yu (2015) uses 
the one lagged firm output tariffs, one lagged firm input tariffs and interactions of  
lagged tariffs and fitted processing intensity as instruments. 
  Following Trefler (2004), Amiti and Davis (2011) and Yu (2015), we use lagged of  
one-period difference in our output (input) tariff  term as the instrument for output 
(input) tariff  term.43 The economic rationale is that one year lag of  one-period change in 
output (input) tariff  term will affect the level of  output (input) tariff  term but it is not 
related to residuals. For example, if  an industry j experiences a small reduction in the 
previous period, it means that it is difficult for government to remove its relative high 
protection in foreign trade as the industry has relative strong lobbing power. Thus, in the 
future period, this industry would still be expected to maintain a relative high level of  
output (input) tariff  term. Moreover, the interaction between lagged of  one-period 
difference in output (input) tariffs and exporter (importer) dummy is adopted as an 
additional instrument for output (input) tariffs.  
  We then turn to briefly introduce the data sources that we rely on for our empirical 
analysis in the next section. 
2.4. Data  
To explore how trade liberalization affects workers’ wages, we draw on three main 
sources of  micro-data: detailed industrial firm data, which provides production 
information at the firm level, comprehensive trade transaction data and tariff  rate data, 
and the last two are at the product level. China’s tariff  rate data is from the World 
Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database, also used by Kamal et al. (2012) and Hu 
                                                             
42 For example, 2001 Chinese tariff  rates are instrumented by 1995 Philippine tariff  rates. 
43 Note that our output (input) tariff  term is output (input) tariffs lagged by one-year period and 
hence, the instrument for output (input) tariff  term is two-year lag of  one period difference in current 
output (input) tariffs. We also include two-year lag of  one-difference in current output (input) tariffs 
interacted with exporter (importer) as our additional instrument for output (input) tariff  term.  
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(2014).44 The detailed industrial firm production data are collected from the Chinese 
Annual Survey of  Industrial Firms (CASIF), which is conducted by the National Bureau 
of  Statistics of  China (NBSC).45 The comprehensive trade transaction data are obtained 
from the Chinese Customs Trade Statistics (CCTS) dataset which is recorded and 
collected by the General Administration of  Customs of  China (GACC). Data from all 
three sources cover the period from 2000-2006. 
2.4.1 Tariff Data (WITS) 
 
The tariff  data are available at the 6-digit product level for our sample period and the 
product is coded by the Harmonised System (HS).46 Our measure of  tariffs is based on 
effectively applied tariffs, which means taking the tariff  rate and weighting it by imports. 
2.4.2 Firm-level Production Data (NBSC) 
 
The industrial firm production data cover all state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
non-SOEs whose annual turnover is over 5 million RMB (commonly referred to as the 
“above-designated size” firms).47 The dataset has broad sector coverage and includes the 
mining, manufacturing, production and supply of  electric power, gas and water industries. 
The dataset provides rich information for each firm and includes not only the basic 
information but also financial variables from three statement of  financial accounting 
standards, such as firm name, firm ID, total capital, annual sales, employment, and so on. 
Since the dataset does not include all Chinese manufacturing firms for each year, it is not 
reasonable to take a firm’s exit from the dataset as its exit from the market due to no 
production. Hence, we rarely discuss the issue of  firm entry and exit.  
                                                             
44 The WITS software provides access to international merchandise trade, tariffs and non-tariff  
measures (NTM) data. 
45 Each observation in the CASIF dataset is a plant and definitely we are not able to identify or 
trace a firm with multi-plants. To make it simple, we still call them “firm”.  
46 The WITS covers China’s tariff  data for our sample period except for 2002. Following Yu 
(2015) we obtain the 2002 tariff  data from the Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS).  
47 At 2014 an exchange rate of  RMB=0.154 US dollar and the value of  5 million RMB is 
770,000 US dollars. 
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2.4.3 Product-level Transaction Data (GACC) 
 
The disaggregated trade transaction data is collected at the HS 8-digit product level and 
covers monthly trade records for all firms, starting from 1st January 2000 and ending on 
31th December 2006. It records rich information for each trade transaction, including 
basic information such as firm name, firm ID code given by the Customs and also 
includes highly disaggregated information, such as 8-digit HS code, value, destination and 
mode of  international trade. Most importantly, it records exports and imports so we can 
trace the effect of  engagement in international trade separately for each type of  trade. All 
values for each trade transaction are expressed in US dollars. 
2.4.4 Matching the Production Data with the Transaction Data 
 
To examine the relationship between firms’ performance and engagement in 
international trade requires us to link indicators of  firm performance from the NBSC 
with detailed trade data, this means therefore we need to combine the GACC and NBSC 
datasets.  
  However, in practice merging those two datasets is not a simple process. Although 
each firm in either the production or trade dataset has a registered ID, different coding 
systems are used for each dataset. Indeed, the firm ID in the production dataset is coded 
by the local administrative authorities and is a 9-digit code. In contrast, the firm ID in the 
trade dataset is coded by the Customs and is a 10-digit code. As a result, one cannot 
simply merge the two datasets using firm IDs.  
  As an alternative, we use firm name, contact person name, telephone number and 
postcode-common variables from both datasets to identify each and every unique firm. 
The process of  data preparation for both data sources, matching and cleaning, is fully 
presented in Appendix 1A.48 We therefore have an unbalanced panel with 953,609 
                                                             
48 We combine the best of  the matching methods from both Upward et al. (2013) and Yu (2015). 
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observations and 332,958 unique firms in 2000-2006 for estimation purpose. 
2.5. Results 
Our estimations are based on our uniquely merged dataset, an unbalanced panel from 
2002-2006 (post-WTO period), the industrial output and input tariff  rates and the 
industrial ERP are used.49 For tariff  variables, only the first are at the four-digit industry 
level and the last two are at the three-digit industry level. We control for two-digit 
industry fixed effects, year fixed effects and time-varying location-year fixed effects in all 
the regressions and we cluster errors by firm.50  
2.5.1 Assumptions Identification 
 
Using the post-WTO and full sample data we first estimate the following three 
assumptions as listed below before our main regressions and the results are reported in 
Tables 1.8 (Tables 1A.14 for full sample) and 1.9 (Table 1A.15 for full sample). The 
regressions in Tables 1.8 and 1.9 all include two-digit industry effects and year effects. 
Ⅰ. Assumption 1: if  trade barriers between countries become weaker, it may induce a 
stronger competition in markets and thus definitely affect firm profits. Hence, if  we can 
prove that there is a positive relationship between firm profits and firm wages, then we 
can assume that firm wages will change by the changes of  firm profits after tariff  
liberalization.  
  In column (1) and (2) of  Table 1.8, we estimate the relationship between firm wages 
                                                             
49 Amiti and Davis model (2011) did not address the issue of  processing trade which is not a 
major concern for Indonesia. In China, however, processing trade plays an important role and 
processing firms enjoy a special tariff  treatment. For our sample, nearly 7.5% of  total observations 
are engaged in processing trade and processing trade contributes to almost 70% of  total exports and 
60% of  total imports in China. So including firms involved in processing trade could bias our 
estimation, hence, we drop trade processing firms from our sample. 
50 Since we use industry-level tariffs and ERP for estimation, we should also cluster errors by 
industry or by industry-year group. However, when using fixed-effects linear model in STATA13, our 
panel spans more than one cluster if  we do so. Hence, we only cluster errors by firm.  
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and firm profits and find there is a positive link between wages and profits, both in firm 
total profits and in firm operating profits. With a coefficient equal to 0.068 on the log of  
firm total profits, it shows that firm wages are positively and significantly connected to 
firm profits. With a significant coefficient equal to 0.069 on the log of  firm operating 
profits, this positive relationship still holds. Hence, Assumption 1 is proved by using our 
data in post-WTO period.51 
[Table 1.8 about here] 
Ⅱ. Assumption 2: Following a huge reduction in both output and input tariff  rates, 
foreign products (final goods or intermediates) become easier to enter the domestic 
market and domestic products with high quality also become easier to enter the foreign 
market. If  local firms are only keen to the domestic, due to the tougher import 
completion, they may experience a profit loss and thus lower wages. But if  local firms 
can export, then as they can access to more markets they may earn more profits and thus 
pay higher wages. In another direction, if  local firms are available to import a vast variety 
of  intermediates with high productivity, as a result of  this, they produce high-quality final 
outputs and sell them at a higher price, which may raise their profits and thus wages. 
Since we have proved assumption one, we then hypothesis that firm wage may be 
dependent on firm’s different engagement in globalization. 
  Despite within industry firm wages varying within a relative narrow range, firm wages 
vary greatly due to different market orientation. Comparing global oriented firms to 
domestic oriented firms in the last three columns of  Table 1.8, from column (3) we 
observe that on average pure exporters pay 10.4% higher wages, exporting and importing 
firms pay the second highest wages (45.7%) and pure importers pay the highest wages 
(56.2%). In column (4) we use the log of  firm capital as a control of  firm size and find 
the conclusions obtained from column (3) still hold. With additional controls of  industry 
                                                             
51 Assumption 1 is proved by using our full sample data as well, since the coefficients on the log 
of  firm total profits and the log of  firm operating profits are 0.071 and 0.073 respectively in columns 
(1) and (2) of  Table 1A.14 and both of  them are highly significant.   
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skill intensity in column (5), firms that import only pay the highest wages, which is 
consistent with the results as before. However, our findings on firm wages differ from 
Amiti and Davis (2011) who found that the highest wages are paid by exporting and 
importing firms, wage heterogeneity arises by firm’s different engagement in 
globalization and hence, we prove Assumption 2 as well.52 
Ⅲ. Assumption 3: There is a fixed cost for entry into each foreign market. If  a local firm 
wants to enter foreign markets as much as possible in order to acquire higher profits and 
thus higher wages, it need to be larger, more powerful and high-efficient. Hence, we 
assume that there is a connection between firm ability and its global engagement. 
  In Table 1.9, from columns (1) and (2) we conclude that firms oriented to domestic 
market have the smallest employment and from columns (3) and (4) we see that domestic 
oriented firms are the least productive firms. Exporting and importing firms are the 
largest firms whilst pure importers are the most productive firms. In general, exporting 
and importing firms hire on average 79% more workers than domestic firms even with 
controls of  industry skill intensity and the log of  firm capital, and pure importers are on 
average around 45% more productive than domestic oriented firms. In addition, firms 
that both export and import have on average nearly 30% higher employment than pure 
importers, which are consistent with other studies in the heterogeneous firm such as 
Bernard et al. (2007), Amiti and Davis (2011), but on average exporting and importing 
firms are about 4% less productive than pure importers, which is in contrast to the 
finding in Amiti and Davis (2011) as they document that the most productive firms are 
those both exporting and importing firms. As a result, Assumption 3 is also made by our 
post-WTO dataset.53 
                                                             
52 We also prove Assumption 2 by using our data in 2000-2006 and report the results in columns 
(3)-(5) of  Table 1A.14, as the coefficients on trade dummy variables are all significantly positive, 
indicating there are wage differentials between firms that only serve domestic market and firms 
engaged in global markets. Besides, the ranking of  firm wages is the same and can be concluded as: 
domestic< pure exporter< exporter and importer< pure importer.  
53 Our full sample data perfectly fits Assumption 3 as well as shown in Table 1A.15 but with 
slight differences as following: in column (1), pure exporters hire slightly more than pure importers 
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[Table 1.9 about here] 
  After confirming that our data are perfectly fitting the assumptions stated in Amiti and 
Davis (2011) model, we start our main estimations in the following sections. 
2.5.2 Trade Protections and Firm Wages: Baseline Results 
2.5.2.1 Tariff Rates 
 
In columns (1)-(5) of  Table 1.10, we present the results from an OLS estimation of  
equation (3) with the one-year lagged of  output and input tariffs. In columns (1) and (2) 
we investigate the impact of  decreasing output tariff  rates on firm wages. To address the 
importance of  differential effects on exporting firms and non-exporting firms, we only 
regress the log mean wage on the one-year lagged output tariffs in column (1) and find 
industrial output tariffs have a negative and significant impact on firm wages, indicating 
that average wages increase with reductions in output tariffs. In column (2) an interaction 
of  output tariffs and an exporter dummy is included. It shows that the output tariff  
coefficient is now a little higher and the interaction coefficient is significantly positive, 
suggesting that exporting firms pay lower wages than non-exporting firms after falls in 
output tariff  rates. The negative sign on output tariffs and the positive sign on the 
interaction, which contrasts to predictions (i) and (ii) of  equation (3) for our output tariff  
variables, could be explained by import-competition effects. For example, increased 
import-competition induced by a fall in output tariffs may force domestic producers to 
raise their productivity level to survive in the current market and hence those domestic 
producers attempt to become more productive producers. As a result, the wage of  
non-exporting firms goes up and the relative wage gap of  exporting firms may be closed 
by non-exporting firms as they obtain a higher productivity level and the marginal 
exporting firms with lower productivity may become less profitable and thus pay less. In 
addition, the negative coefficient on output tariffs showed in both columns contrasts to 
                                                                                                                                                                              
and in column (4), firms that both export and import have the highest value-added, which is slightly 
higher than that in pure importers.  
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prediction (i) could also be explained by another possible explanation that non-exporting 
firms appeared in the sample might import intermediate inputs and benefit from 
accessing to a variety of  cheap and high-quality imported inputs.  
[Table 1.10 about here] 
  The net effect for exporting firms by falling output tariff  rates is the sum of  -0.143 
and 0.096, which is equal to -0.047. However, we conduct the joint significance tests to 
test whether in general cutting output tariffs makes no effect on average exporters and 
hence, the null hypothesis of  such test is that the sum of  the output tariff  coefficient and 
the interaction coefficient is equal to zero. As the sum of  coefficients reported in column 
(2) for the joint significance test is insignificant, we can conclude that the net effect of  
cutting output tariff  on exporters is zero, indicating wages for exporting firms 
unchanged following falls in output tariff  rates. 
  In columns (3) and (4), we investigate the effects of  a fall in input tariffs. Alternatively, 
to differentiate such effects on importing firms and no-importing firms, we only regress 
the log mean wage on the one lag of  input tariffs in column (3) and find a negative sign 
on input tariffs at the 1% significance level, which is opposite to prediction (iii), 
indicating a higher wage in non-importing firms with a cut in input tariffs. In column (4) 
an interaction of  input tariffs and an importer dummy is included. We still find a 
significantly negative sign on input tariffs, but an insignificantly positive sign on the 
interaction term. The significantly negative coefficient on input tariffs is opposite to 
prediction (iii) of  equation (3) as well and indicates an increase in wages of  
non-importing firms after falls in input tariff  rates. The potential explanation for this 
opposite sign on the input tariff  coefficient is that similarly, domestic intermediate 
producers face stronger import-competition, which is induced by falling input tariffs, and 
such competition pressure forces them to decrease local prices, or to be more productive 
to meet a higher requirement and thus raise their profits and so on wages. This could also 
explain a part of  the gains for non-exporting firms after a cut in output tariffs as they 
may use the much cheaper but good-quality domestic inputs as well. 
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  In addition, the coefficients on exporter and importer dummies are insignificant in 
columns (1)-(4), showing that there is no significant beneficial gains obtained by firms 
from international trade through either exporting or importing.  
  Column (5) combines the specifications of  columns (2) and (4) and includes lagged 
output tariff  rates, lagged input tariff  rates, and their interaction terms. For output tariff  
variables, the coefficient sign on output tariffs and the coefficient on output tariffs 
interacted with an exporter dummy remain the same significance levels but are with 
smaller magnitudes. In terms of  our input tariff  variables, the input tariff  coefficient 
remains a significantly negative sign but is with a little smaller magnitude, and the 
interaction coefficient is still positive and significant. The coefficients on tariff  variables 
in column (5) are broadly close to those in the previous specifications where output and 
input tariff  variables are included individually, implying that we can clarify the differential 
impacts of  tariff  liberalization on firm wages by different types of  tariffs. 
  Based on the results of  the first four columns in Table 1.10, we argue that the impact 
of  decreasing tariffs on firm wages in China are quite different from that in Indonesia as 
documented in Amiti and Davis (2011). Our empirical results using Chinese 
manufacturing firm data do not support the predictions derived from the model of  Amiti 
and Davis (2011), which states that falling output (input) tariffs makes exporting 
(importing) firms pay higher wages but makes non-exporting (non-importing) firms pay 
lower wages. Our findings are totally in contrast with such predictions since we find that 
decreasing output (input) tariffs increases wages at domestic-serving (domestic-sourcing) 
firms, but decreasing output tariffs makes exporting firms pay lower wages than firms 
that face even stronger import-competition locally. 
  Since the theoretical model in Amiti and Davis (2011) also highlights a differential 
impact of  decreasing tariffs on marginal firms, we further consider this issue. Those 
marginal firms, who switch their status form sourcing and serving local market to foreign 
market, may face stronger competition and thus have a decrease in firm profits and son 
on firm wages, if  their export (import) share is not sufficiently large. To find out the 
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critical value of  such “sufficiently large” share, in column (6) we use the firm’s exact 
trade shares instead of  trade dummies to re-estimate equation (3) and report the results 
for share variables still in the cells for dummy variables. The result in column (6) shows 
that the output tariff  coefficient is -0.116 and the input tariff  coefficient is -0.360. Since 
we use output and input tariff  rates as natural values in estimation and if  we take the 
output tariff  coefficient of  -0.116 as an example, it implies that a 10% decrease in output 
tariff  rates leads to a 0.0116 (0.116×0.1=0.0116) increase in the log mean wage in 
non-exporting firms and equivalently to increasing firm mean wage by 1.16%. Similarly, 
for the input tariff  coefficient of  -0.360, it implies that a 10% decrease in input tariff  
rates leads to a 0.0360 (0.360×0.1=0.0360) increase in the log mean wage in 
non-importing firms and equivalently to increasing firm mean wage by 3.6%. But the 
coefficient on interaction terms (OTjt−1 × ExportShare𝑘𝑗𝑡 , ITjt−1 × ImportShare𝑘𝑗𝑡 ) 
are insignificant and thus we cannot calculate the critical values of  export share and 
import share for marginal exporters and marginal importers respectively.54 
  To isolate the synergistic effects for trading firms, which are also predicted y Amiti and 
Davis (2011), we split global engaged firms into three categories: pure exporters 
(FXX𝑘𝑗𝑡 = 1), pure importer s (FMM𝑘𝑗𝑡 = 1), and both exporter-importers (FXM𝑘𝑗𝑡 =
1 ). Then we replace an exporter dummy with a pure exporter dummy and an 
exporter-importer dummy to multiply with output tariffs and replace an importer dummy 
with a pure importer dummy and an exporter-importer dummy to multiply with input 
tariffs. In column (7) we find that a drop in output (input) tariff  rates increase wages for 
non-exporters (non-importers), and a drop in output tariff  rates decrease wages for both 
exporting and importing firms relative to non-trading firms only. Comparing the result in 
column (7) with that in column (5), we notice that the magnitude for firms that both 
export and import are larger than that for exporters in column (5), which are not 
identified by their import status. Therefore, although the coefficient sign is inconsistent 
                                                             
54 Taking the marginal exporter as an example, if  the output tariff  coefficient (α1) and its 
interaction coefficient (α2) are both significant, the critical export share, for marginal exporters to 
avoid experiencing a wage loss following output tariff  cuts, should be calculated as (− α1 α2⁄ ). The 
calculation approach is that α1 + α2 × export share ≤ 0 ⇒ hence, export share ≤ −α1 α2⁄ . 
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with prediction in the Amiti and Davis (2011) model, the synergistic effects still works 
for firms that both export and import. For importers, the coefficient on interaction 
terms ( ITjt−1 × FMM𝑘𝑗𝑡 , ITjt−1 × FXM𝑘𝑗𝑡 ) are insignificant as well. As the joint 
significance test in column (7) for firms that both export and import seems to be 
insignificant by experiencing a cut in output tariff  rates, the net effect for both exporting 
and importing firms is indifferent from zero and there is no impact on them after output 
tariff  drops. Moreover, we estimate such effects by replacing trade dummies with trade 
shares in column (8) and produce the similar conclusions. The coefficient on export 
share of  exporter-importers is reported in the former cell for FXM𝑘𝑗𝑡 indicator whilst 
the coefficient on import share of  exporter-importers is reported in the latter cell for 
FXM𝑘𝑗𝑡 indicator in the last column of  Table 1.10. But the joint significance test in the 
last column, for those exporter-importers experiencing a fall in output tariff  rates, 
becomes significant now, suggesting that for them, the net effect of  decreasing output 
tariffs is not zero.  
  All the results above point out that a firm’s choice of  different engagement in 
globalization is important, which may affect its profit and thus its wage. If  we ignore this 
in our study, we only test the mean impact of  decreasing tariff  rates on wages for all firm 
types, without identifying a specific impact on each type of  firms. In past reseatch, 
without mentioning tariff  changes in intermediate inputs sector would overestimate the 
impact of  such changes in final goods sector on firm performance. For robustness, we 
use the full sample (2000-2006) data to estimate all regressions in Table 1.10 as well and 
report the results in Table 1A.16. We see from Table 1A.16 that the conclusions are close 
to those in Table 1.10.55 
2.5.2.2 Effective Rate of Protection 
As discussed before, we want to link the combination effects of  falls in output and input 
tariff  rates on firm wages and present the results from an OLS estimation of  equation (4) 
                                                             
55 The interaction coefficient of  output tariffs and export shares is significantly positive in the 
last column (6) of  Table 1A.16. In addition, the net effect of  decreasing output tariffs on exporters in 
that column is not zero according to the joint significance test.  
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with the one-year lagged of  3-digit industrial effective rate of  protection in Table 1.11. 
[Table 1.11 about here] 
  In columns (1) we only regress the log of  firm average wage on the one lag of  ERP to 
investigate the effects of  a fall in ERP on firm wages and find industrial ERP is 
negatively and statistically significantly correlated with firm wages, indicating that average 
wages increase with reductions in ERP. The significantly negative coefficient on industry 
ERP is inconsistent with our hypothesis that we assume β
1
> 0, which is based on 
predictions from the Amiti and Davis (2011) model. To address the importance of  
differential effects on firms engaged in globalization, in column (2) we include the 
interaction term between industry ERP and three dummy variables to denote the 
different status of  pure exporters ( FXX𝑘𝑗𝑡 ), pure importers ( FMM𝑘𝑗𝑡 ) and 
exporter-importers (FXM𝑘𝑗𝑡). It shows that the industry ERP coefficient is now a little 
higher and the interaction coefficient of  industry ERP and an exporter-importer dummy 
is positive and significant, suggesting a decrease in wages of  firms that both export and 
import relative to domestic firms when industry ERP becomes weaker. To find out the 
critical value of  trade shares for trading firms to maintain a growth of  wages with a lower 
ERP, we re-estimate equation (4) with trade shares in column (3) to replace of  trade 
dummies (FXX𝑘𝑗𝑡 and FMM𝑘𝑗𝑡) as included in column (2) and report the results for 
share variables still in the cells for dummy variables. However, the coefficient on industry 
ERP interacted with export share of  exporter-importers and the coefficient on industry 
ERP interacted with import share of  exporter-importers are reported in cells ERP𝑗𝑡−1 ×
FXM_ExportShare𝑘𝑗𝑡  and ERP𝑗𝑡−1 × FXM_ImportShare𝑘𝑗𝑡 respectively. Since the interaction 
coefficient of  industry ERP and export share of  exporter-importers is 0.309, both 
exporting and importing firms that do not export exceed 26% (−(−0.081 0.309⁄ ) ≈ 0.26, 
since the coefficient on industry ERP is significant and equal to -0.081) of  their outputs 
could still benefit on wages from a decrease in industry ERP, or equivalent to a tougher 
import competition.  
  Comparing the coefficients on industry ERP in columns (1), (2) and (3) of  Table 1.11 
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with the sum of  output tariff  coefficient and input tariff  coefficient in columns (5), (7) 
and (8) of  Table 1.10 respectively, we notice that the sum of  output tariff  coefficient and 
input tariff  coefficient is always much larger than the coefficient on industry ERP, which 
satisfies our concern that the impact of  weakening trade barriers in final goods sector 
can be offset by reducing trade barriers in intermediate inputs sector .  
  Furthermore, it is known that the sum of  the industry ERP coefficient and its 
interaction coefficient represents the net effect of  decreasing industry ERP on globalized 
firms and we conduct the joint significance tests and report the results in Table 1.11. 
Since the results imply that the net effects from decreasing industry ERP for both 
exporting and importing firms are always insignificantly different from zero.56 We 
further use the full sample data to estimate all regressions in Table 1.11 and report the 
results in Table 1A.17. Nonetheless, the conclusions in Table 1.11 are also hold in Table 
1A.17 but with slightly smaller magnitudes.  
2.5.3 Additional Controls for Firm Characteristics  
2.5.3.1 Tariff Rates 
 
In Table 1.12 we report the empirical results of  several robustness checks for our OLS 
estimations. To check whether the effects of  tariff  reductions on firm wages are sensitive 
to firm ownership structure, we include three dummy variables (SOE, foreign-owned and 
HMT) in column (1) of  Table 1.12.57 We can see our results for all tariff  variables are 
robust and we find a significantly positive sign on the coefficient of  a foreign-owned 
dummy, indicating that foreign-invested firms play a positive impact on firm wages in 
                                                             
56 We only conduct the joint significance test for the situation that each coefficient is significant. 
In Table 1.11, only the industry ERP coefficient and the interaction coefficient for exporter-importers 
are both significant in column (2). 
57 In addition, we also include other variables (e.g. owner indicators or owner shares) to control 
for firm ownership and report those results in columns (1) and (2) of  Table 1A.18 in Appendix Tables. 
In the following columns (3) and (4), we include owner shares as well. The conclusions for tariff  
variables are robust as well as those in joint significance tests for the net impact of  tariff  reductions 
on trading firms. The coefficients on a foreign indicator and foreign share are found to be 
significantly positive, the same sign as found for a foreign-owned dummy in column (1) of  Table 1.12. 
Besides, the coefficient on HMT share is positive and significant.  
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China and hence workers in these firms get on average higher wages. Although the 
coefficient on SOE dummy is negative, it is insignificant and does not support plenty of  
conclusions based on the previous empirical work (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Brandt et al. 
2012) where SOEs are found to be less efficient and most likely to pay lower wages but 
they may offer other sets of  compensation.58  
[Table 1.12 about here] 
  Another concern is that large firms usually have higher productivity, earn higher 
profits and hence pay higher wages. We want to be certain that the findings are driven by 
cuts in output and input tariff  rates, not by picking up the role of  firm size, so we 
include the firm’s log capital as a proxy for controlling firm size in column (2).59 After 
controlling for the firm size, the results are still robust and the coefficient on lnK is 
highly significant and positive, which demonstrates that larger firms pay higher wages. 
Then we include firm productivity and add in firm TFP in column (3).60 The coefficient 
signs on our tariff  variables remain unchanged and the labor productivity coefficient is 
significantly positive, demonstrating that firms with higher productivity pay higher wages 
to workers.  
  In column (4), we drop any firms that change their two-digit industry affiliation during 
our sample period, and we see that the coefficient signs on our tariff  variables maintain 
the same but with higher magnitudes except for the coefficient on output tariff  
                                                             
58 Using the data from China and India, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) state that traditional SOEs 
are seen to be less productive and less efficient. Also in Brandt et al. (2012), they show that in China, 
on average SOEs are the least productive firms among all types of  firms. Nonetheless, Elliott and 
Zhou (2013) point out that the performance of  state-owned enterprises differ markedly between 
those that export and those that supply the domestic market only. However, when we go back to full 
sample data for analysis in Table 1A.19, we find a negative coefficient on SOE dummy at 10% 
significance level in column (2), which supports the negative impact of  SOEs found in a lot of  
previous studies.  
59 As an addition for the control of  firm size, we include use the log employment instead of  the 
lnK and report the result in column (3) of  Table 1A.18. Still, the results for tariff  variables are robust 
and the coefficient on the log of  total employment is significantly negative as expected.  
60 The log of  value-added per worker that has been used as the supplementary for productivity 
control and the result based on this variable is reported in column (4) of  Table 1A.18. The findings 
for tariff  variables are consistent with those in column (3) of  Table 1.12 and the significantly positive 
coefficient on the log of  value-added per worker suggests a positive link between firm wages and firm 
productivity.  
  72 / 256 
 
interaction term. Compared with those shown in column (3) of  Table 1.12, such 
differential in magnitudes between the sample without industry switchers and the full 
sample results relates to the effect of  tariff  reductions to resources reallocation between 
industries. A similar finding is mentioned by Lu (2011) who finds that a reduction of  
trade frictions lead to a higher demand for goods with comparative advantage, thus labor 
moves to labor-intensive sectors in China.  
  The last two columns of  Table 1.12 show the findings based on a balanced sample 
where we keep only the firms that appeared in the sample for all five years, and the 
former includes dummy variables to denote an exporter or an importer whilst the latter 
includes variables of  trade shares instead. The coefficients on all tariff  terms are robust 
to the previous analysis by using an unbalanced sample and additionally find the 
interaction coefficient of  input tariff  and an importer dummy is significantly positive in 
column (5). Hence, our results still hold even with controls of  firm ownership, firm 
turnover and other characteristics.  
  The joint significance tests for net effects of  decreasing tariffs on wages of  trading 
firms are also reported in Table 1.12 and the results imply that the net effect for 
exporters (importers) by falls in output (input) tariffs is always insignificantly different 
from zero. Moreover, we re-estimate all regressions in Table 1.12 by using the full sample 
data for robustness and report the results in Table 1A.19. From Table 1A.19, we notice 
that the findings are broadly similar to those in Table 1.12.61  
2.5.3.2 Effective Rate of Protection 
 
  For industry ERP, we then include several controls of  firm characteristics as well and 
report the results of  our robustness estimations for equation (4) in Table 1.13. First of  all, 
we include three dummy variables (SOE, foreign-owned and HMT) in the first column 
and find the results for industry ERP and its interaction terms with trade dummy 
                                                             
61 In the last two columns of  Table 1A.19, the interaction coefficient of  output tariff  and an 
exporter dummy remains the same sign but becomes insignificant now as well as the coefficient on a 
foreign dummy.  
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variables are robust. A positive and significant coefficient on foreign-owned dummy is 
also found, indicating that foreign-invested firms and HMT-controlled firms play a 
positive impact on firm wages in China and hence workers in these firms get on average 
higher wages, which is consistent with those in the first column of  Table 1.12 by using 
output and input tariffs.62 However, the coefficient on SOE dummy is negative and 
insignificant.  
[Table 1.13 about here] 
  Then we consider the role of  firm size and include the log firm capital as a proxy for 
controlling firm size in column (2).63 After controlling for the firm size, the results are 
still robust and the coefficient on lnK is highly significant and positive, which 
demonstrates that larger firms pay higher wages, and the coefficient on 
exporter-importer dummy is negative at the 5% significance level, suggesting a negative 
impact on firm wages with a firm status in both exporting and importing.  After that we 
include firm productivity and add in firm TFP in column (3). In comparison with the 
results in column (2), the coefficient signs on our industry ERP variables and other 
variables remain unchanged and maintain the same significance level but the 
exporter-importer coefficient becomes highly significant now.64 The labor productivity 
coefficient is significantly positive, which implies that firms with higher productivity pay 
higher wages to workers.  
                                                             
62 In addition, we also include other variables (e.g. owner indicators or owner shares) to control 
for firm ownership and report the results in columns (5) and (6) of  Table 1A.18. In the following 
columns (7) and (8), we include owner shares as well. The findings for industry ERP are robust as well 
as those in joint significance tests. The coefficients on a foreign indicator and foreign share are found 
to be significantly positive, the same sign as found in column (1) of  Table 1.13. Additionally, we have 
a significantly positive sign of  the HMT share coefficient  
63 As an addition for the control of  firm size, we include the log employment instead of  the lnK 
and report the result in column (7) of  Table 1A.18. Still, the results for industry ERP are robust as 
well as the finding in joint significance test. The coefficient on the log employment is significantly 
negative as expected.  
64 The log of  value-added per worker that has been used as the supplementary for productivity 
control and the result based on this variable is reported in column (8) of  Table 1A.18. The findings 
for industry ERP are similar to those in column (3) of  Table 1.13 as well as the conclusion for net 
effect of  decreasing industry ERP on both exporting and importing firms. The significantly positive 
coefficient on the added-value variable suggests a positive link between firm wages and firm 
productivity.  
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  In column (4), we drop any firms that switch their two-digit industry affiliation during 
our sample period, and we see that the coefficient signs on our industry ERP variables 
maintain the same but with a higher magnitude on industry ERP and a lower magnitude 
on interaction term between industry ERP and a exporter-importer dummy. Such 
differential magnitudes in industry ERP variables could be explained by the effect of  
resources reallocation between industries due to the change in trade protection across 
different sectors.  
  The results reported in the last two columns are using a balanced sample where we 
keep only the firms that are always found to appear in our sample, and the former 
includes exporter and importer dummy variables whilst the latter includes trade share 
variables instead of  trade dummy variables. The coefficients on industry ERP, its 
interaction terms and all other firm control variables are robust to the previous analysis 
based on the full sample except for industry ERP interacted with import shares of  
exporter-importers and a foreign dummy. Besides, we find a significantly negative 
coefficient on exporter-importer dummy in column (5) and a significantly negative 
coefficient on export shares for both exporting and importing firms in column (6). So we 
conclude that our estimations of  firm wages by using the industry ERP are robust after 
including additional controls of  firm type, firm size and other heterogeneous 
characteristics.  
  The joint significance tests for net effects of  industry ERP reductions on wages of  
exporter-importers are also reported in Table 1.13 and the results imply that such net 
effect is zero for all listed specifications. Besides, we re-estimate all specifications in Table 
1.13 by using data in 2000-2006 instead of  that in post-WTO period for robustness 
purpose and report the results in Table 1A.20. Observed from Table 1A.20, we conclude 
that the findings are broadly close to those in Table 1.13.65  
                                                             
65 The coefficient on HMT dummy is significantly positive in all the specifications of  Table 
1A.20, but the export share coefficient for exporter-importers becomes insignificant now. 
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2.5.4 Robustness Checks 
2.5.4.1 Endogeneity of Tariffs (IV)  
As mentioned in section 3.5, we conduct an instrumental variables (IV) approach to 
re-estimate the specifications in Table 1.12 in order to control for the possible reverse 
causality caused by endogeneity of  tariffs. Hence, we use one year lag of  one-period 
difference in our output (input) tariff  rates and such lagged difference interacted with 
exporter (importer) dummy as our instruments for output (input) tariff  term, and report 
the results in Table 1.14.66  
[Table 1.14 about here] 
  In comparison to those results reported in Table 1.12, for tariff  variables, we still have 
a significantly negative sign on the output tariff  coefficient and a significantly positive 
sign on the coefficient of  output tariffs interacted with exporter dummy, but the input 
tariff  coefficient becomes insignificant now. The magnitudes on the coefficients of  
output tariff  variables in the IV specifications in Table 1.14 are larger than the 
magnitudes found in the OLS specifications in Table 1.12, suggesting that the possible 
endogeneity of  tariffs may cause an under-estimate of  impacts on firm wages by 
decreasing tariffs, but not change the main findings. Moreover, the coefficient signs on 
exporter dummy, log of  firm capital and firm TFP remain the same.  
  We also report the results of  several tests in the first-stage of  IV estimation to verify 
the quality of  instruments used in Table 1.14. For under-identification test, the null 
hypotheisi is that the model is under-identified. Using the Kleibergen-Paap LM statistics, 
we check whether the instrument set is relevant and reject the null hypothesis in all the 
IV estimates at 1% significance level and show that the instrument set is correlated with 
                                                             
66 Specifically, the instruments in column (6) of  Table 14 are one year lag of  one-period 
difference in our output and input tariff  terms and their interaction terms with export and import 
share respectively. Note that our output (input) tariff  term is output (input) tariffs lagged by one-year 
period and hence, the instrument for output (input) tariff  term is two-year lag of  one period 
difference in current output (input) tariffs.  
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the endogenous variables. We use Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic to check the 
weak-identification tests and reject the null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are 
weakly correlated with the endogenous variables as the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics are 
all greater than the Stock-Yogo critical values listed by STATA 13, and we can conclude 
that the IV estimates pass the weak-identification tests.67 Further, we report Hansen J 
statistic and p-values for over-identification test. In all the columns the p-values for 
over-identification tests are above 0.1 which indicates that the instruments are valid.  
  The joint significance tests show that in all these specifications, the net effect for 
exporters by decreasing output tariff  rates is always zero with the exception of  the 
specification in column (5).  
  Observed from Table 1.14, we conclude that the findings are broadly close to those in 
Table 1.12 and hence, the endogeneity problem of  tariffs does not seem to be a big issue 
in our study. Therefore, we go back to use OLS estimation instead of  IV estimation for 
the rest of  our empirical study.   
2.5.4.2 Firm Heterogeneous Choices  
2.5.4.2a Choices of Trade Status 
 
In this section, we concern about a firm’s choice to engage in international trade may be 
endogenous and such firm’s switching into and out of  international trade may bias our 
key results. Hence, in the next stage we fix the setting of  an exporter dummy and an 
importer dummy in several ways to check whether our key results still hold. We only use 
the new setting of  trade dummies in interactions between tariffs and trade dummies and 
we believe that our main conclusions on the interaction coefficients of  tariffs and trade 
dummies may not change. Then we fix the set of  trade dummies in several ways and 
                                                             
67 STATA 13 reports both the Cragg-Donald statistic and the Kleibergen-Paap rk F-statistic for 
weak-identification test. As we cluster the robust errors at the firm-level, it is a sensible and clearly 
superior to the use of  the latter rk Wald F-statistic as mentioned in Baum et al. (2007). Although we 
only report Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic in Table 14, we also check the Cragg-Donald statistics and find 
they are well above the Stock-Yogo critical values. To save pace, we do not report the Cragg-Donald 
statistics. 
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include the results in Table 1.15. 
[Table 1.15 about here] 
  In the first column of  Table 1.15, a firm that always exports (imports) in our sample is 
now defined as an exporter (importer). In the next column, a firm that exports (imports) 
in 2002 is defined as an exporter (importer) and in column (3), a firm that exports 
(imports) at its first entry is defined as an exporter (importer). The results reported in 
columns (1)-(3), are broadly similar to our key results before. Now in columns (2) and (3) 
the interaction coefficient of  output tariff  and an exporter dummy becomes insignificant 
although it remains the same magnitude as that in column (3) of  Table 1.12. Nonetheless, 
the interaction coefficient of  input tariff  and an importer dummy becomes positive and 
significant at a high significance level, which suggests that importing firm lower their 
wages by a drop in input tariffs. The joint significance tests in these columns for the net 
effect of  cutting tariffs on trading firms is again all zero. 
  Further, we continue to use an exporter (importer) as defined in column (3) to interact 
with our tariff  variables, drop any firms that change global status in column (4). Hence, 
we do not report the coefficients on exporter and importer dummies in column (4) as 
these two dummy variables are dropped. The results are robust in column (5) but with a 
positive and insignificant coefficient on a foreign dummy. In the last two columns of  
Table 1.15 we go back to the sample without dropping any firms that change global 
status. In column (5) we use trade shares instead of  trade status to interact with our tariff  
variables and fix the trade shares at entry. The results in column (5) broadly hold but with 
coefficient on output tariffs interacted with export shares positive and insignificant.  
  Another concern is that a firm’s life cycle could also affect firm wages and hence bias 
out key results. As shown in the last two columns of  Table 1.12 when using a balanced 
panel, the coefficients on tariffs variables in column (5) are slightly higher and the 
interaction coefficient of  input tariff  and an importer dummy becomes significantly 
positive now in a comparison with those in column (3) of  Table 1.12. All of  these imply 
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that firm exit decision could account for some part of  impact on firm wages after tariff  
reductions, since it is given that there is a higher possibility of  less-productive firms to 
exit. Thus, in the final column we include an exit dummy and go back to use firm current 
trade status to calculate the interaction terms between tariffs and trade dummy variables. 
If  a firm appears in current time t but exits in time (t+1), then an exit dummy equals 
one.68 We see that our key conclusions hold for the tariff  coefficients, which shows that 
exit does not make a considerable effect on the findings. Nonetheless, the coefficient of  
an exit dummy is -0.004 but insignificant.  
  The joint significance test for column (4) shows that the net effect from decreasing 
output tariff  rates on exporting firms is insignificantly different from zero. Moreover, we 
re-estimate all specifications in Table 1.15 by using data in 2000-2006 instead of  that in 
post-WTO period for robustness purpose and report the results in Table 1A.21. 
Observed from Table 1A.21, we conclude that the findings are broadly close to those in 
Table 1.13.69 
2.5.4.2b Exiting Firms 
In this section, we investigate how exiting firms affect firm wages in details by using 
industry effective rate of  protection in our estimations.  
  In the first column of  Table 1.16, we include an exit dummy variable and find that the 
coefficient on industry ERP is a little lower and the interaction coefficient of  industry 
ERP and a dummy of  firms that both export and import remains the same when 
                                                             
68 Note that the sample only includes firms selling at least 5 million RMB per year. Some firms 
that exit from the sample may not have been closed without production and may still be producing 
before they achieve this sales-threshold or before they are ‘discovered’ again. And hence, exit here 
means that firm leaves from such a large sales-threshold. Further, with the concern of  exiting firms, 
we drop data in 2006 since we do not have data in 2007 to identify the business status of  those firms 
appeared in 2006.  
69 In addition, the coefficient on HMT dummy is significantly positive in columns (1)-(3) and (5) 
of  Table 1A.21 and the interaction coefficient of  output tariff  and export share in columns (5) and (6) 
are positive and significant. However, the coefficients on interaction terms of  input tariffs are 
insignificant in all columns. Moreover, the net effect of  decreasing output tariffs on exporters is in 
addition different from zero significantly in all specifications except in the last column when exit 
decision is considering. 
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comparing with those in column (3) of  Table 1.13. There is a have a negative but 
insignificant sign on the coefficient of  an exit dummy, which is the same as that in 
column (6) of  Table 1.15 when output and input tariffs are including together. Then in 
the second column, we include the interaction term between industry ERP and the exit 
dummy instead of  industry ERP interacted with trade dummy variables and it is noted 
that the coefficient on industry ERP is still negative and significant at a high significance 
level and its interaction coefficient is positive and also significant at a high significance 
level, indicating that relative to non-exiting firms, exiting firms pay lower wages following 
a weaker trade protection. Besides, the coefficient of  an exit dummy now turn to be 
highly significant and negative, indicating that workers worked in firms making a decision 
to exit may experience a loss in their wages. Such a finding fits the prediction in Amiti 
and Davis (2011) that firm eventually exit if  they pay lower wages and become the least 
efficient ones. The joint significance test in column (2) shows that the net effect from 
cutting industry trade protection on exiting firms is not significantly different from zero. 
[Table 1.16 about here] 
  We first distinguish firms between four trade categories: pure exporters (FXX𝑘𝑗𝑡), pure 
importers (FMM𝑘𝑗𝑡), exporter-importers (FXM𝑘𝑗𝑡) and domestic-only firms (DOM𝑘𝑗𝑡) 
and we further use one exit dummy variable to identify firm-types: exiting firms and 
non-exiting firms. As a result, industry ERP reduction effects now vary across eight 
different firm types: for non-exiting firms, they are non-exiting pure exporters, 
non-exiting pure importers, non-exiting exporter-importers and non-exiting 
domestic-only firms; for exiting firm, they are exiting pure exporters, exiting pure 
importers, exiting exporter-importers and exiting domestic-only firms. And hence, we 
include seven dummy variables to denote firm types, where a dummy variable of  
non-exiting domestic-only firms is omitted, and use them to interact with industry ERP 
in column (3). 
  In column (3) the industry ERP is highly significant and negative, suggesting that a fall 
in industry ERP will increase wages for domestic firms that do not exit. With the 
  80 / 256 
 
exception of  non-exiting pure exporters, non-exiting pure importers, exiting pure 
importers and exiting exporter-importers, the coefficients on interaction terms between 
industry ERP and firm types are all positive and significant, indicating that other than 
non-exiting pure domestic firms, other types of  firms pay lower wages after a cut in 
industry ERP. The coefficient of  an exit dummy remains unchanged. In the joint 
significance test of  column (3), cutting industry ERP only has a non-zero net effect on 
exiting pure domestic firms and the sum of  coefficients on industry ERP and its 
interaction term with exiting domestic firms is significantly negative, suggesting that an 
increase in wages of  exiting domestic-only firms following a decrease in industry trade 
protection. Moreover, such a finding is consistent with that in column (1) of  Table 1.16 
as industry ERP has a significantly negative coefficient, which also suggests that firms 
only serve domestic market boost their wages after a fall in industry trade protection. 
  Then, in the rest columns of  Table 1.16 we use a balanced panel to re-estimate the 
specifications in the first three columns and find the results are robust for industry ERP 
variables and the exit dummy.  
  In addition, we use full sample data instead of  data in post-WTO period to 
re-estimate all specifications in Table 1.16 for robustness checks and report the results in 
Table 1A.22. It is concluded from Table 1A.22 that the findings are broadly close to 
those in Table 1.16 except for using a balanced sample.70 
2.5.5 Channels 
Our results so far provide vast evidence to support that falling tariff  rates can increase 
wages in non-trading firms and also as a result of  such falls in output tariff  rates, 
exporting firms pay lower wages than non-exporting firms. Nonetheless, industry ERP 
                                                             
70 None of  the coefficients on industry ERP and its interactions is significant in columns (4)-(6). 
The interaction coefficient of  industry ERP and an exit dummy in the second, the interaction 
coefficient of  industry ERP and exiting pure exporter (domestic firms) in the third column all 
becomes insignificant now.  
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reductions have a positive impact on domestic oriented firms as well and the reductions 
in industry ERP lead to a lower wage in firms that both export and import relative to 
pure domestic firms.  
  A possible channel to affect firm wages after tariffs liberalization is that firms engaged 
in international trade attract different types of  workers and hence adjust their demands 
on workers in response to changes in trade protection. Thus, in Table 1.17 we add-in 
one-year difference in the log employment in our regressions, where output and input 
tariffs are used in the first two columns whilst industry ERP is used in the last two 
columns. The results for output tariff  variables still hold in column (1) and the input 
tariff  coefficient remains negative but turns to be insignificant now. What’s more, 
one-year difference in the log of  total employment has a highly significant and negative 
coefficient, indicating that changing labordemand has a negative effect on firm wages and 
hence, if  a globalized firm intends to hire more workers to expand its production, an 
increase demand of  laborwill lower wages for workers at a globalized firm. Alternatively, 
if  a domestic oriented firm tries to survive from an even tougher import-competition, it 
will cut the demand of  laborand hence pay higher wages. Since the coefficient on 
one-year difference in the log of  total employment is also significantly negative in 
column (3), the same mechanism works after a fall in industry trade protection.  
[Table 1.17 about here] 
  Another potential channel to affect firm wages after trade protection reductions is 
straightforward to find out, as the weaker trade barriers will induce importers access a 
variety of  intermediate inputs and cheaper inputs can help import-using firms to raise 
productivity via learning and a quality upgrading effect, and hence achieve higher profit 
leading to the payment of  higher wages. Thus, another possible channel to boost firm 
wages is that firms would turn to purchase intermediate inputs with good quality and 
high productivity as discussed by Amiti and Konings (2007). Hence, we additionally 
include the log firm import scope to capture the variety effect and here import scope 
means the variety of  inputs that a firm imports. In columns (2) and (4), we test the 
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channel that the wage gains may be attributable to switching to multiple imported inputs, 
so we include the log firm import scope in both columns and find a positive coefficient 
on it but insignificant. It seems that importing more intermediate inputs is not helpful 
for raising firm wages. The results for tariff  variables in column (2) are the same as those 
in column (1) and the results in both column (3) and column (4) are robust to such 
findings in our previous estimations. 
  Moreover, we use data in 2000-2006 instead of  data in post-WTO period to 
re-estimate all specifications in Table 1.17 and report the results in Table 1A.23. From 
the results in Table 1A.23, it is concluded that the findings are similar to those in Table 
1.17.71 
2.6. Conclusion 
In this paper we have investigated the effect of  tariff  falls in the wages of  Chinese firms. 
Using an OLS approach our results show that decreasing output tariff  rates can induce a 
higher wage for firms selling final outputs in the domestic market but induces a lower 
wage for exporting firms relative to non-exporters, whilst decreasing input tariff  rates 
can induce a higher wage for firms sourcing intermediate inputs domestically  
  Specifically, based on the results in the fifth column of  Table 1.10, the output tariff  
coefficient is -0.119, which can be interpreted as that a 10% decrease in output tariff  
rates can lead to a -0.0119 gain in the log mean wage of  non-exporters and hence, a 1.19% 
growth in firm wages. Alternatively, the coefficient on input tariffs is -0.372, which can 
be interpreted as that a 10% decrease in input tariff  rates can lead to a 0.0372 gain in the 
log mean wage of  non-importers and hence, a 3.72 % growth in firm wages. Overall, falls 
in input tariff  rates have a stronger effect on firm wages than that from output tariff  falls, 
                                                             
71 In addition, the coefficient on SOE dummy is significantly negative in Table 1A.23 and the 
input tariff  coefficient turns to be significantly negative now in the first two columns when output 
and input tariffs are being used. Besides, the coefficient on log firm import scope becomes 
significantly positive now in columns (2) and (4), which implies that higher import-using firms are 
more likely to pay higher wages. 
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which is at least three times the wage growth by decreasing output tariff  rates. However, 
cutting input tariffs in general has a zero net effect on import-using firms as well as that 
of  cutting output tariff  rates on exporting firms.  
  Our results are opposite to predictions arising from the Amiti and Davis (2011) model 
which is based on Indonesia but are quite close to those conclusions in Kamal et al. 
(2012), also a study in the case of  China. Most importantly, our results imply that workers 
in firms that only source or only serve domestic market share part of  the gains from 
China’s WTO accession documented by Brandt et al. (2012), which suggests that the 
positive effect of  trade liberalization can be profound for the local economy. Our 
findings also highlight the importance of  trade policy in determining the outcomes for 
home country market.  
  In this study, we only focus on the impact of  ordinary trade in China through trade 
liberalization. Since it is well known that processing trade becomes a significant part of  
international trade in China and contributes the majority of  China’s export, we leave this 
area for our future study. 
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Chapter 3. Trade Liberalization, Profits and Wages in 
China: Are Processing Firms Different? 
 
 
Abstract 
Since joining the WTO in 2001 it is well documented that China’s economy benefited 
from lower tariff  barriers and a massive increase in exports to the rest of  the world. An 
important but little understood dimension of  China’s exports led growth is the role of  
processing firms that process imported intermediates within China for future export. 
Through processing trade, China has become an intrinsic part of  the global value chains 
(GVC), which mainly locate firms in the production stage of  the whole production 
process, producing final products from raw materials and exporting them, or processing 
imported intermediates for future exports to foreign buyers, and traditionally the whole 
production process includes product designing, producing, searching and serving the 
target markets. In this paper we examine the relationship between tariff  reductions and 
wages for Chinese firms, paying attention to firms engaged in processing trade who can 
enjoy special treatment in tariff  rates and are often located in China’s numerous special 
economic zones (SEZs). Using a detailed dataset matching manufacturing data with 
custom trade data for the period 2002-2006 we find that during periods of  tariff  
liberalization, a reduction in output tariffs increases the wages of  workers in processing 
firms relative to non-processing firms, an effect that is greater, the greater a firm’s 
intensity in the use of  intermediate imports. For input tariffs we find that wages increase 
for workers in the more traditional non-processing firms only. However, falls in tariff  
rates have a more complex impact on firm profits. Output tariff  reductions are found to 
decrease firm profits for non-processing firms. 
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3.1. Introduction 
China is well known by its role of  global export processers. Processing trade is also 
known as a scheme of  tariff  drawback, which documents that tariff  rates should not be 
applied to firms importing certain amount of  intermediate inputs as they are then 
assembled or processed for the manufacture of  goods that are subsequently exported. 
Given China’s large low-skilled labor market, China created a considerable export 
processing sector that has become an intrinsic part of  the global value chain. The use of  
processing trade that employs vast numbers of  workers has enabled China to become the 
factory of  the world and the world’s largest exporter. Estimates suggest that over 50% of  
China’s entire international trade flows by 2006 are occupied by processing trade 
(Fernandes and Tang, 2012; Manova and Yu, 2014; Zhu, 2014; Yu, 2015; Brandt and 
Morrow, 2015). 
  In this paper we explore how processing trade affects firm wages since a firm is 
engaged in this specific part of  the global value chain. Based on detailed Chinese 
manufacturing firm data and China’s highly disaggregated customs transaction data we 
investigate how workers have been effected by China’s engagement in the global value 
chain by which workers are employed at a stage of  simply assembling or processing 
components imported from other foreign countries into final goods for re-exporting to 
developed countries, for example, the US or EU consumer markets. We also examine a 
related topic which is to what extent the profits from processing trade are shared with 
the workers and how this has changed with trade liberalization. Finally we examine the 
extent to which the intensity by which a firm engages in processing trade influences wage 
differentials between trading firms.  
  In the first stage in Figure 3.1, we present the trends in output and input tariffs, and 
average wage in both processing-import-using firms and trading firms without 
processing imports. As expected there is a downward trend in both types of  tariffs 
following China’s accession into the WTO and its commitment as part of  the accession 
process to gradually reduce Chinese import duties. In contrast, average wages in 
processing and non-processing firms have increased with the mean wage for workers in 
  86 / 256 
 
processing firms being higher than that for workers in non-processing firms. In this 
paper, we explore the channels through which wages growth varies across firm type 
following tariff  liberalization. 
 [Figure 3.1 about here]  
  A large number of  studies have examined the impact of  China’s processing trade. 
Koopman et al. (2012) demonstrated that both foreign wholly-invested firms and 
Sino-foreign joint ventures are most likely to produce and export final products with a 
high proportion of  imported processing inputs but with a low proportion of  domestic 
inputs, which entails less added-value in domestic production. Manova and Yu (2014) 
state that credit constraints influence the design of  international trade contracts, shifting 
firms to engage in the stage of  producing or creating low added-value, which may in turn 
affect the patterns that firms and countries are located or engaged in GVCs. Their work 
also points out that the establishment of  healthier financial markets in developing 
countries is a great help to boost added-value, revenue and profits. Most importantly, 
through GVCs more manufacturing firms in developing countries become capable to 
share part of  trade gains. 
  Some of  them try to find a connection between trade liberalization and processing 
trade. Based on firm-level tariffs, Yu (2015) found that decreasing output tariff  rates has 
a positive impact on productivity of  firms engaged in global trade and such impact is 
larger than that found in decreasing input tariff  rates. However, those impacts induced by 
tariff  reductions become smaller by increasing a firm’s share in processing trade. Brandt 
and Morrow (2015) tend to examine the impact of  Chinese tariff  reductions on a firm’s 
choice between traditional ordinary trade and processing trade and they address that 
cutting industry-level input tariff  rates shifts or drives firms to participate more in a 
traditional trade pattern, with both the intensive and extensive margins playing roles. 
While Zhu (2015) shows how the presence of  domestic trade costs alongside of  the 
sheer magnitude of  processing trade drastically affects how trade distributes its impact 
across firms of  different types and it also shows that falling trade costs unequivocally 
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deliver welfare gains in both countries.  
  Based on three major data sources (Chinese Industrial Firm dataset, Custom Trade 
dataset and Chinese applied tariffs data), we construct output tariff  rates, input tariff  
rates and effective rates of  protections (ERP) at the firm level, so we are able to shed 
light on how workers gain from international trade in the context of  global production 
chains through tariff  liberalization. Based on our empirical estimations, we argue that a 
cut in output tariffs causes firms with imported processing components to pay higher 
wages than non-processing firms and such wage differentials will become greater since a 
crease can only be found in non-processing firms who experience a cut in input tariffs. 
Such findings are partly consistent with those found previously for firm performance, 
such as productivity (Yu, 2015) or profits (Manova and Yu, 2014). Particularly, a 10% fall 
in output tariff  rates leads to a 1.37% increase in average wage in processing firms 
relative to non-processing firms. We also highlight that cutting output tariffs in the years 
2002-2006 contributes almost 0.49% to the wage gap between processers and 
non-processers covered in the sample after WTO and cutting input tariffs contributes 
overall nearly 0.23% wage gains for non-processers in the post-WTO period. 
  The rest of  the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the background of  
processing trade in China. Section 3 illustrates our empirical estimation strategy and the 
measurement for firm-specific tariffs and ERP whilst section 4 describes our data 
sources. Section 5 presents our empirical estimated results and finally, in section 6 we 
conclude and make some policy implications. 
3.2. Processing Trade in China 
3.2.1 The Definition of Processing Trade and Two Major Types 
 
Processing trade in China is defined as the activity of  importing all or part of  the raw 
materials and intermediate inputs from oversea enterprises to local enterprises for 
manufacturing procedure of  assembling and processing those intermediate components 
into final goods. Local manufacturers then re-export them to the foreign buyers who are 
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in charge of  selling and marketing (Feenstra and Hanson, 2005). 
  In 2012, there are 16 specific types of  processing trade are reported by China’s 
General Administration of  Customs.72 Among them, two main types are frequently 
considered to be important: assembling and processing with imported intermediate 
inputs. They dominate the processing trade of  China’s manufacturing industries and 
account for 99% of  total processing trade in manufacturing for the period 2000-2006.73 
  In terms of  processing with assembly, commonly referred to assembling means that 
the foreign partner purchase and provide raw materials and intermediate components to 
local manufacturers, the local manufacturers get those inputs free from foreign partners 
and then assembly them into final goods. Since the foreign partner own those 
intermediate inputs, after assembling they also own the final goods, distribute and sell 
them in the markets, and hence, they can fully earn revenues from those products but the 
Chinese enterprises can only earn an assembly fee for each product through this type of  
processing trade. 
  The second processing type referred to processing with imported intermediate inputs 
means that the local manufacturers buy and import intermediate inputs from foreign 
                                                             
72 Our data only contains 12 types of  processing trade and are based on Customs 2-digit codes 
given by the General Administration of  Customs: International aid (code: 12), Compensation trade 
(13), Assembly (14), Processing with imported inputs (15), Consigned goods (16), Border trade (19), 
Contracting projects (22), Goods on lease (23), Outward processing (27), Barter trade (30), Bonded 
warehousing (33) and Entrepot trade (34). In specific, international aid (12) is defined as financial aid 
(capital) or donations (goods/services) from governments or other organizations and outward 
processing (27) is defines as exporting raw materials, intermediate components for oversea assembly 
or processing and re-importing those finished goods after processing. Hence, we must pay special 
attention to this trade regime when we identify a firm’s processing status or direction since it works in 
the opposite direction to what processing trade usually does. For the detail definition and description 
of other types of processing trade, it can be found in Upward et al. (2013).  
73 Our sample only includes manufacturing firms that are SOEs and non-SOEs with annual 
sales above 5 million RMB (commonly referred to as the “above-designated size” firms) and based on 
this sample nearly 47% of  observations that engage in processing trade are foreign-owned and 
HMT-owned firms (the ownership is defined as foreign/HMT share greater than 50%). Based on this 
sample, the proportion of  processing with assembly and inputs in total processing trade may be 
overestimated because of  two concerns. One concern is that large and foreign-owned firms are more 
willing to become processers as found in Yu (2014), and the other concern is that many foreign 
companies are more willing to carry out processing trade in China in order to benefit from 
government concessions, cheaper labor and low expenses of  land-use, and have more power to 
conduct processing with assembly and inputs in China. As a result, if  we go back to the full sample of  
manufacturing firms which also includes small and medium-size firms, the proportion drops as small 
and medium-size firms have less ability to engage in processing trade. 
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partners, process such imported raw materials and intermediate components into final 
outputs and then re-export them to foreign markets. In contrast to assembling, the local 
manufacturers engaged in processing with imported intermediate inputs own such raw 
materials and intermediate components for future processing and are capable to sell the 
final goods abroad. Therefore, their profits are dependent on the sales of  the exporting 
final goods.   
3.2.2 The Role of Processing Trade  
 
Over 2000-2006, processing trade plays an important role for the development of  
China’s economy and we find that in total its trade volume accounts for approximately 66% 
of  China’s foreign trade. In particular, processing exports constitute 71% of  total 
Chinese exports and processing imports accounts for 58% of  total imports.74 Our 
findings are consistent with previous research (J.P. Morgan, Koopman et al, 2008, 2012; 
Manova and Yu, 2014; Yu, 2015).75 J.P. Morgan reported that in 2009, bonded processing 
accounted for 48.2% of  China’s export-import volume, a dramatic increase from 5.68% 
in 1981, and it has been pointed out by Koopman et al (2008, 2012) that since 1996 
Chinese annual processing exports have contributed to more than a half  of  its total 
exports. Also Manova and Yu (2014) stated that by 2005, nearly one third of  Chinese 
exporters chose to be processers and accounted for more than one half  of  China’s total 
exports. Finally, Yu (2015) noted that in the early 1990s China experienced a huge growth 
in processing imports and in 1992 processing imports began to be the leading part of  
China’s imports, while Chinese government adapted to a market economy. Afterwards, 
greater than one half  of  China’s total imports was contributed by processing imports by 
2006. 
  In Figures 3.2 and 3.3 we report China’s processing trade versus ordinary trade where 
the former is for processing exports and the latter is for processing imports. Each year at 
least 70% of  total exports are contributed by processing exports since 2000 as shown in 
                                                             
74 The calculation of  all percentages (66% of  total, 71% of  exports and 58% of  imports) are 
based on our matched sample around 2000-2006.   
75 Our proportions are slightly higher, which may be due to using our matched sample only 
including SOEs and non-SOEs with annual sales above 5 million RMB (commonly referred to as the 
“above-designated size” firms), not using the entire customs data sample of  firms which includes 
small and medium-sized firms as well. But the studies from others (J.P. Morgan, Koopman et al, 2008, 
2012; Manova and Yu, 2014; Yu, 2015) are based on the entire customs sample.  
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Figure 3.2. Additionally, in contrast with ordinary exports, the volumes of  processing 
exports are always greater and the gap between them is growing wider from almost 200 
billion RMB increasing to more than 1,100 billion RMB in 2006, which is a near six fold 
increase in value over the period. However, its share in total exports has declined slightly 
from 76% in 2000 to 70% in 2006. From Figure 3.3 we observe that more than one half  
of  annual total imports are contributed by processing imports since 2000. Similar to the 
findings of  processing exports, the volumes of  processing imports are always greater 
than that of  ordinary imports except in 2001 and the gap between them is widening from 
the lowest of  -19.5 billion RMB to a high of  331 billion RMB. Interestingly, in contrast 
to processing exports, the share of  processing imports in total imports increased during 
our sample period.  
[Figure 3.2 about here] 
[Figure 3.3 about here] 
  Hence, it is clear that processing trade has become a major source of  China’s foreign 
trade activities and it has not only helped to deepen China’s integration into the global 
economy, but also has contributed enormously to the booming domestic economy. 
However, under the regime of  processing trade with assembly, the Chinese 
manufacturing firms have no right to decide what kind of  intermediates to source since 
the categories of  raw materials and intermediate inputs are set by foreign buyers and they 
could only charge an assembly processing fee. Under the regime of  processing trade with 
imported inputs, although the Chinese manufacturing firms are free to decide what kind 
of  intermediates to source and where to source, they could only get a part of  total 
profits since they transact with a foreign buyer who covers any costs and hence under 
Nash equilibrium they take their contribution as bargaining power to split profits 
(Manova and Yu, 2014). Moreover, following a fall in tariffs due to trade liberalization, 
the comparative advantage of  enjoying tariff  exemption for firms engaged in processing 
trade becomes weaker gradually, and processing firms that are lack of  financial supports 
and with higher credit constraints are in difficulty to improve their productivity level and 
hence become even less productive when comparing with firms engage in ordinary 
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trade.76 77 
3.2.3 The Advantage in Custom Tariffs and Taxation 
 
In China there is a special system for processing trade, called bonded system, which 
covers bonded areas, warehouses and factories, and under this system, firms engaged in 
processing trade can rebate tariffs and taxes relative to imports if  part of  the imported 
intermediate inputs is used for assembling or processing since such proportion of  
imported inputs can enjoy zero tariffs and zero taxes. However, if  those processed final 
outputs are sold locally, local processing firms will be levied by Chinese customs for 
tariffs on those imported intermediate inputs used for processing such locally sold 
outputs, which are supposed to re-export after assembling and processing. Furthermore, 
for the purpose of  processing trade, the foreign partners may provide and import 
equipments for local manufacturers and such equipments can also enjoy tariff  
exemptions and free from taxes of  value-added.   
  Given manufacturing firms engaged in processing enjoy zero tariffs when importing 
intermediate inputs for processing trade thus will reduce production costs. The benefits 
from tariff  exemptions may in turn encourage some traditional producers to become 
processing producers either partially or entirely.78 If, for example, a firm is a partial 
processer then as only part of  the imported raw materials are used for the processing 
exports of  final outputs and hence be exempt from tariffs, for example, if  a firm could 
not sell all of  its processed products in foreign markets, then only the imported amount 
used for producing processing products will enjoy the advantage of  zero tariffs. Hence, it 
is important to capture a firm’s actual degree of  participation in processing trade.  
  To accurately measure the extent of  processing trade, we need to know the detailed 
information about each firm’s production line. However, we do not have this information 
and hence to solve this problem, we assume that only a firm undertakes both processing 
                                                             
76 Manova and Yu (2014) document that firms with higher financial constraints as well as low 
productive firms are more willing to become processers and they are especially to engage in 
assembling.  
77 Yu (2015) states that both types of  output and input tariff  reductions can increase firm 
productivity. However, such positive impacts become smaller if  a firm imports a higher proportion of  
processing inputs. 
78 Here partially processing producers mean that manufacturing firms conduct both ordinary 
trade and processing trade. Pure processing producers only assemble and process goods. 
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exports and processing imports in the same period, it has engaged in the processing 
business. So only the firms that satisfy such requirements are treated as successful 
processing producers that receive tariff  exemptions for the full volume of  processing 
imports. Alternatively, firms that only have customs transactions of  processing exports 
or processing imports are excluded from our sample because it is hard for us to judge the 
real tariff  charges that are appeared to them. This is a strong assumption as the value and 
quantity of  processing inputs may not be matched with the value and quantity of  
processing outputs although those trade activities occur in the same period or happen 
one after another. Due to data restrictions, we cannot trace those input-outputs of  
production directly. Once the clear production line data are available for China, this is can 
be explored in more detail. However, we roughly believe that if  these processing imports 
appear with these processing exports in the same period t, such processing imports are all 
used to produce such processing exports and hence this amount of  processing imports 
could entirely enjoy zero tariffs. 
3.2.4 Defining a Processing Firm  
 
Under the law, Chinese processers should be well-organized to prove their capability for 
processing which means ownership of  factories, processing equipment and already 
having an established work force. In addition, the Chinese enterprise should have the 
authorized import and export licenses to operate trade activities. Additionally, they 
should obtain government granted certifications of  capability in both manufacturing 
production and processing trade. If  local manufacturers tend to begin an operation in 
processing trade, they must present to the Chinese customs both certificate of  approving 
processing trade and the contracts related to processing trade and further apply for the 
registration handbook of  processing trade. 
  Hence, even though firms might not be located in a bonded area, they are still able to 
execute processing business by holding the processing trade registration handbook. 
Hence, we define a firm as a processing firm not using its location information but its 
importing information. A processing firm is defined as a firm with non-zero processing 
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imports, no matter if  it is a pure processer or a mixed processer.79 
3.2.5 Characteristics of Processing Firms  
 
In this section, Table 2.1 summarizes the characteristics of  processing firms including the 
number, the proportion, the distribution of  ownership and performance. We also 
investigate in how the proportion of  processing firms varies by 2-digit industry level with 
the result shown in Figure 3.4.80  
[Table 2.1 about here] 
  Table 2.1 shows that although the quantity of  processing firms in China grew rapidly, 
the proportion of  processing firms in total exporting and importing firms decreased 
from nearly 50% in 2000 to less than 40% in 2006. Consistent with Yu (2015), we find 
that processing firms are mainly invested in and controlled by foreign and HMT owners 
and they dominate the processing business in China’s local market, accounting for more 
than 65% of  processing firms in China. On the other hand, state-owned enterprises are 
less likely to be processors.81 In terms of  size (total employment), we find that the 
average size of  a processing firm increased year by year, and matches Yu (2015), where 
he noted that large and foreign-owned firms are more willing to self-select into being 
processers. In terms of  performance, we find that since 2000 mean value-added per 
worker and the mean wage per worker in processing firms grew considerably, while the 
mean of  total factor productivity (TFP) remained relatively stable. These trends may be 
explained by the simple assembly and processing work without technical development or 
improvement.     
  We then compare processors with ordinary traders through the use of  the premium 
variables, which are equal to the average performance of  processing firms over the 
average performance of  firms engaged only in ordinary trade. The premiums of  
                                                             
79 Pure processers are firms that only import raw materials and components for assembly and 
processing purpose, without any ordinary imports, and mixed processers are firms that have both 
processing and ordinary imports. 
80 The manufacturing industry names matched with the two-digit industry codes appeared in 
Figure 3.4 are stated in Table 2A.1 (Appendix Table). 
81 The conclusion is made based on the statistic summary shown in the ownership category of  
Table 2.1, where the SOE is defines as a firm with its government share no less than 50%, the 
foreign-owned is defined as a firm with its foreign share greater than 50%. 
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variables to describe firm performance are all greater than one except for the variable of  
value-added per worker. Premiums with a value greater than 1 show that the processing 
firms exhibit better performance when compare with ordinary trading firms. Hence, 
processors appear to pay higher wages and are more productive. However, the premium 
of  value-added per worker is around 0.55 over our sample period, indicating that even 
though processing firms are more productive, they produce much lower value-added for 
each worker. This high level of  average TFP may be driving by the issue of  foreign 
ownership.82 Hence, using value-added per worker to capture a trading firm’s capability 
in manufacturing production may be a better indicator, as it excludes the value created by 
intermediate inputs and could reflect the true value created during manufacturing 
production.83 The lower value-added level may also reflect a fact that processing firms 
lack motivation for technical innovation. Our results are again similar to other relative 
studies (Manova and Yu, 2014; Yu, 2015).84  
  Additionally, we show the trends of  processing firms varying across time based on 
2-digit Chinese industrial code (CIC) level classification in Figure 3.4, where the black 
line is representative of  the share of  processing firms in total number of  manufacturing 
firms penetrating foreign markets within each industry, and the grey line is representative 
for the total number of  processing firms within each industry. 
[Figure 3.4 about here] 
  We find that processing firms are mainly concentrated in labor-intensive, 
high-pollution and high-energy-consumption industries.85 86 87 These include: textiles 
                                                             
82 Note that we only take simple average value of  firm TFP here, not control for firm 
ownership structure. If  we take a summary analysis only for the trading firms without any foreign 
ownership (we check both situations: the foreign share is equal to zero or the foreign-owned dummy 
is equal to zero), the mean value of  TFP in non-processing firms then is slightly greater than that in 
processing firms, with a value of  TFP premium around 1.001.  
83 Hence, we use value-added per worker to control for productivity for the two-stage Heckman 
selection model, which is following Amiti and Davis (2011) that they use the log of  value-added per 
worker as the indicator to control for firm productivity.  
84 The former argues that firms with higher credit constraints as well as low productive firms are 
more likely to self-select to engage in processing trade, whilst the latter argues that firms with low 
productivity level are more willing to self-select to become processers and the negative productivity 
gap between processers and non-processers through tariff  liberalization becomes even larger if  firms 
engage more in process trade.    
85 Following Mckay and Song (2012), an industry with a higher ratio of  labor inputs over capital 
inputs in production is defined as a labor-intensive industry and 12 industries are categorized as 
labor-intensive industries: textiles, garment and foot wear (18); leather products (19); wood and wood 
products (20); furniture manufacturing (21); entertainment products (24); plastic products and fur (30); 
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(CIC: 17), apparel and footwear (CIC: 18), leather products and fur (CIC: 19), furniture 
(CIC: 21), paper and paper products (CIC: 22), printing and re-production media (CIC: 
23), cultural and entertainment products (CIC: 24), rubber products (CIC: 29), plastic 
products (CIC: 30), metal products (CIC: 34), electric machines and appliances (CIC: 39), 
electric equipment (CIC: 40), instruments and appliances(CIC: 41) industries, with the 
share of  processing firms on average greater than 0.5. Overall, the proportion of  
processing firms in China is on a downward trend for all the manufacturing industries. 
However, in some industries the number of  processing firms increased dramatically, 
including textiles, apparel and footwear, plastic products, electric machines and appliances, 
and electric equipment industries. 
  In the next section, we turn to introduce our measurements of  trade protection and 
our empirical estimation strategy.  
3.3. Estimation Strategy 
3.3.1 Tariff Measures  
 
Following Yu (2015), we construct firm-level output and input tariff  rates using universal 
firm-product transaction records. In addition, we also calculate China’s industry output 
and input tariffs following Amiti and Konings (2007). Appendix 2A provides a 
description of  our methodology. 
3.3.1.1 Firm-specific Output Tariff 
 
The output tariff  of  a multi-product firm could be affected by multiple tariff  lines. To 
compute a firm-specific output tariff, we use a product-sales weighted average of  these 
product-level tariffs and we fix the product-sales share at the year in which the firm first 
enters the sample following Topalova and Khandelwal (2011), where 
                                                                                                                                                                              
metal products (34); universal equipment (35); special equipment (36); instruments and appliances (39); 
communications and computers (40); and appliances, electrical machines and equipment (41).  
86 Following Mani and Wheeler (1998), pollution-intensive industries include: Iron and Steel; 
Non-Ferrous Metal; Industrial Chemicals; Petroleum Refineries; Non-metallic Min Pro; Pulp and 
Paper; Other Chemicals; Rubber Products; Leather Products and Metal Products, which are listed and 
ranking in Table 1 of  their paper.  
87 Following Li and Pan (2013), in China high energy-consumption sectors include oil and 
chemical industries.  
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  The tariff mt  is the effectively applied tariff  of  product m in year t, and the weight 
m initialtkj _, for firm k within industry j is computed by the firm k’s sales of  product m in 
the initial year it appeared in the sample, m initialtkj _, , divided by the firm’s total sales 
in the same year,  initialtkj _, . Of  course, a product may be sold in both domestic and 
global markets. Hence, in the firm k’s first entry year m initialtkj _,  includes product m’s 
foreign sales  m initialtkj _,  and domestic sales 
mD
initialtkj _,
, and  initialtkj _,  includes 
the firm k’s total export values  
m
m
initialtkj _,  and total sales in domestic-oriented 
market, 
m
mD
initialtkj _, . We use the time-invariant shares to weight the firm output tariffs 
to avoid potential pitfall due to the possible reverse causality problem in firm wages.88 
  In a multi-product firm k, the share of  product m, exported to foreign markets or sold 
in domestic market are defined in equations (2) and (3) respectively, and  m initialtkj _,
denotes the share of  product m in total exports and mD initialtkj _, denotes the share of  
                                                             
88 A product with a high-profit margin must be sold more and hence its sales would take 
account of  a larger share in a firm’s total sales. Note that wages are positively related to profits. Hence, 
when we investigate the impact of  decreasing tariff  rates on firm wages, a bias on the output tariff  
coefficient could be caused by using the current product-sales share to measure the firm-specific 
output tariffs, since the direction of  such a bias is determined by the change of  tariff  rate 
(higher/lower) on large-sale products. For example, if  a high-profit product with a larger proportion 
in total sales incurs a higher tariff  rate, then the output tariff  effect on firm profits (wages) would face 
an upward bias. Alternatively, if  a high-profit product incurs a lower tariff  rate, a downward bias on 
the output tariff  coefficient could be caused when investigating its impact on firm profits (wages). 
Therefore, to avoid this potential reverse causality, we fix the weight to measure firm output tariffs, 
and for each product we construct its time-invariant weight using data of  firm’s initial year in the 
sample by following Topalova and Khandelwal (2011). However, setting an invariant weight for tariff  
rates (output/input) calculation may possibly introduce a systematic measurement error. If  in the 
following year, firms export (import) more share of  products, we may under-report the value of  firm 
output (input) tariff  rates since we fix the weight as initial. In another case, if  firms export (import) 
less share of  products, we may over-report the value of  firm output (input) tariff  rates. Based on such 
under-report (over-report) tariff  rates, we may further over-estimate (under-estimate) the effects 
caused by changing tariff  rates. 
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  As pointed out by Melitz (2003), a high productive firm can sell final outputs in 
foreign markets as well as in local market. Hence, we assume that a product sold 
successfully in the foreign markets is also sold in the local market, and hence the product 
should be sold in the same share domestically and globally. Thus, we suppose 
 mD initialtkj
m
initialtkj _,_, 
 , which means equation (2) is equal to equation (3), and 
then we have: 
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  After that, we insert (2), (4) into (1) and have:  
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  As a result, we have equation (1) = equation (3) and finally we obtain a measure of  
firm-specific output tariffs given by equation (5): 
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  However, since we make the extremely strong assumption (Yu, 2014) that the 
proportion of  a product sold domestically by trading firms is the same as that in the 
foreign markets, we should exclude the firms with zero domestic sales (pure exporting 
firms) and the firms with zero exports (pure domestic-sale firms), otherwise, either of  
them could bias our measure of  firm output tariffs. In our sample, around 9.7% (20,926 
observations) of  firms are pure exporting firms and around 11.6% (25,032 observations) 
are pure domestic-sale firms.89 To ensure our main estimation results are not biased by 
those two types of  firms, we drop them from our sample in the following regressions 
which leaves 170,083 observations.90 
3.3.1.2 Firm-specific Input Tariff 
 
As mentioned in section 2.3., processing imports could enjoy tariff  exemption in China 
and that part of  imports is duty free for a processer. To compute a firm-specific input 
tariff, following Yu (2015) we take average of  these product-level tariff  rates by using the 
ordinary input-costs as weights and we fix the share at the year in which a firm first 
enters the sample to avoid potential endogeneity problems. Thus, we compute a firm 
input tariff  as follows: 
 
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89 Theoretically, pure exporting firms should be defined as firms with 100% exporting share, 
which means that total sales is equal to total exports. Actually, due to the different requirement of  
reporting date, for example, if  a firm receives a payment for exports in advance, this amount of  
exporting value should be recorded under the relative accounting entry according to Accounting 
Standards, even though the real exporting is not made. However, the customs could record this export 
value at the time of  shipping exports or exporting done. Hence, there may appear a differential time 
node between the records of  firm and that of  customs even for the same trade transaction. As we use 
the merged firm-customs dataset, due to the different marking point caused by different system rules, 
even an actual pure exporter may not 100% match the value of  its total sales with the value of  its total 
exports, although in theory those two should be equal. Consequently, we roughly treat a firm as a pure 
exporting firm with its exporting share no less than 0.9, which is very close to one.    
90 According to our assumption and calculation of  firm output tariff  rates, we believe that if  a 
firm sells chocolate in the foreign market accounting for 30% of  total exports, it also sells chocolate 
in the domestic market which accounts for 30% of  total domestic sales as well. Hence, we give a 30% 
weight to the chocolate tariff  when calculating a firm’s output tariff. Based on this rule, such weight 
for pure exporting firms is 100% and for pure domestic firms it is 0%. As a result of  this, including 
pure exporting firms may over-estimate the effects of  falls in output tariff  rates and including pure 
domestic firms may under-estimate the effects of  such falls. 
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  The tariff mt  is the effectively applied tariff  of  product m in year t, and the weight 
mOMinitialtkj _, for firm k within industry j is computed by the firm k’s ordinary imports of  
product m in its initial year that it appeared in the sample, mOMinitialtkj _, , divided by the 
firm’s total imports in the same year., 
m
mTM
initialtkj _, . Certainly, a product m may be 
imported under two different regimes, both ordinary trade ( OTm ) and processing trade 
( PTm ). Hence, in the firm k’s first entry year 
m
mTM
initialtkj _, includes the firm k’s total 
ordinary import values, 
m
mOM
initialtkj _,  and total processing import values, 
m
mPM
initialtkj _, . 
  As previously noted, as that the part of  imported inputs for processing and assembly 
are not subject to tariffs, we do not include the set of  importing processing inputs in 
equation (6).  
3.3.1.3 Firm-specific Effective Rate of Protection (ERP) 
To test the robustness of  our results we use several alternative measures of  trade 
protection. Hence, we construct a measure of  the firm-level effective rate of  protection 
(ERP). At the firm level, the disciplining effect of  decreasing output tariff  rates might be 
balanced by decreasing input tariff  rates, and so rather than include both measures in the 
same equation, we use the firm-specific ERP to capture the net effect of  both types of  
protection on outputs and intermediate inputs. This was done following Corden (1966): 
)7(
1  kjt
kjtkjt
kjt
tariffinputtariffoutput
ERP 

  
where  kjt  are the input-value share of  firm k in the production of  its total outputs 
and  kjt  can be expressed as: 
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where the value of  total processing imports is excluded from total intermediate inputs in 
firm k.91 
3.3.1.4 Industry-level Trade Protection 
 
To complement firm-level tariffs, we also calculate industrial output and input tariff  rates 
at the Chinese Input-Output (IO) sector level following Amiti and Konings (2007), 
which is equivalent to 3-digit Chinese Industry Classification (CIC) level. We then further 
construct an ERP measure at the industry level to evaluate the level of  trade protection 
in China. The measurement of  industrial tariff  rates and industry ERPs are explained in 
detail in Appendix 2A. 
3.3.1.5 Summary of Tariffs 
 
In Table 2.2 we present China’s output and input tariff  rates at three-digit industry level 
and at firm-level for each year from 2000-2006. Generally, output tariffs are greater than 
input tariffs; almost one and a half  times the rate of  the latter at industry level. At the 
firm level, output tariffs are nearly 4.5 times the rate of  input tariffs. Obviously, input 
tariffs at the firm level are always much smaller than those at the industry level as the 
calculation of  firm-level input tariff  rates has taken into account the participation of  
processing trade, which may induce tariff  exemptions for some part of  intermediate 
inputs. 
[Table 2.2 about here] 
                                                             
91 For robustness, we include another firm ERP measure in our estimations which is measured 
as:
kjt
tariff kjtinputtariff kjtoutput
ERP kjt 


1
2_ , where outputkjttotalinputkjttotalkjt  and we do not 
exclude the value of  total processing imports from total intermediate inputs in firm k. 
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  Both types of  tariffs have experienced a reduction over the sample period. Specifically, 
industrial mean output tariff  rates dropped from 18.49% in 2000 to 10.13% in 2006 
while industrial mean input tariff  rates dropped from 12.32% in 2000 to 6.59% in 2006. 
At the firm level, mean output tariff  rates fell from 18.97% in 2000 to 9.39% in 2006 
while mean input tariff  rates fell from 4.05% in 2000 to 2.12% in 2006. A downward 
trend is also found for the dispersion of  tariff  rates as the standard deviations are 
decreasing. Table 2.2 illustrates that China had its highest output and input tariff  rates in 
2000 after which tariff  rates began to fall, and more importantly, after the accession to 
the WTO in 2001 China began to reduce tariffs sharply in 2002 but the reduction slowed 
after 2002. On average, output and input tariffs experienced a sharp cut in 2002 and fell 
by approximately 25%, while in 2006 average output and input tariffs only declined by 
around 2.5% at both the industry and firm level, which support the finding in Brandt et al. 
(2010) and Kamal et al. (2012) that the sharpest fall in tariffs occurred immediately after 
accession to the WTO. What is clear is that, China joining the WTO led to a substantial 
reduction in tariff  rates for the majority of  manufacturing industries. 
  Finally, Table 2.3 reports the correlations of  output and input tariffs at different levels 
of  aggregation. It shows that 3-digit industrial output tariffs and 3-digit industrial input 
tariffs are highly correlated with a correlation coefficient of  0.763.92 Yu (2015) also finds 
a strong positive correlation between the industrial output and input tariffs but at a lower 
level (corr. =0.578). In addition, in Table 2.3 we also check the correlation between firm 
output and input tariff  rates and we find a weak correlation between firm output and 
input tariff  rates with a correlation coefficient of  0.004, which is smaller than that in Yu 
(2015) who obtains a coefficient of  0.092.93 
[Table 2.3 about here] 
                                                             
92 Note that such correlation coefficient at the industry level is based on our unbalanced panel 
merged with the three-digit industry tariffs. The correlation coefficient between industry-level tariffs 
before merging is much smaller and equal to 0.71. 
93 Since our matching is better than Yu (2015) and hence we may merge more products within a 
firm than he does, therefore, the diversity of  products may then weaken the correlation between 
firm-level output and input tariff  rates.  
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3.3.2 Empirical Strategy 
 
To investigate the effects of  output and input tariff  reductions on the average wage of  
trading firms, we consider the following empirical framework: 
ln(wage)𝑘𝑗𝑡 = α1Output Tariff 𝑘𝑗𝑡−1 + α2Output Tariff 𝑘𝑗𝑡−1 × Processing 𝑘𝑗𝑡
+ α3Input Tariff kjt−1 + α4Input Tariff 𝑘𝑗𝑡−1 × Processing 𝑘𝑗𝑡
+ α5Processing 𝑘𝑗𝑡 + ΠX𝑘𝑗𝑡 + ρ𝑘 + ρ𝑙𝑡
+ ε𝑘𝑗𝑡 .                                                                                                                (8) 
  The dependent variable ln(wage)𝑘𝑗𝑡 is the logarithm of  firm k’s average wage per 
worker in industry j in year t, defined as the total wage bill divided by total employment, 
measured by the number of  employees. 94  Output Tariff 𝑘𝑗𝑡   and Input Tariff 𝑘𝑗𝑡 
describe firm output and input tariff  rates respectively, both of  them are constructed by 
using the initial trading weights which are time-invariant, and hence the coefficient α1 
(α3) gives the impact of  decreasing output (input) tariffs on wages of  ordinary trading 
firms. To capture the potential differential effects on wages between processing firms 
and ordinary trading firms induced by tariff  reductions, we include an interaction of  firm 
output (input) tariff  rates and a processing dummy. Processing 𝑘𝑗𝑡 is a dummy variable 
that denotes the firm’s processing status, which is equal to one if  the processing import 
of  firm k is non-zero in year t, and zero otherwise. The coefficient α5 before the 
processing dummy is used to capture the impact of  processing trade on firm wages.  
  The vector X𝑘𝑗𝑡 includes other firm level characteristics as controls, such as the firm 
size (the logarithm of  firm capital), the firm performance (TFP𝑑𝑙  𝑘𝑗𝑡, the total factor 
productivity of  firm k) and ownership variables.95 Following Yu (2015), we do not use 
the logarithm of  firm k’s total employment as a traditional control for the firm size but 
                                                             
94 Here the total wage bill only includes the standard payment to workers and does not include 
the welfare and unemployment insurance. For a robustness check, we include those extra wage 
components to construct a variable of  total compensation, and the average of  which is used as a 
dependent variable. The results are quantitatively similar.  
95 Our measure of  TFP is estimated following the De Locker (2007) approach and the 
modification conducted by Elliott et al. (2015). 
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we use the variable ln(K)𝑘𝑗𝑡, the logarithm of  firm k’s capital as an proxy for firm size 
instead.96 There are three dummy variables to describe the firm ownership structure: 
state-owned enterprise (SOE), foreign-owned, Hong Kong/Macao/Taiwan owned 
(HMT), and a dummy for other types of  firms is omitted.97 The SOE dummy is equal to 
one if  a firm k’s government share is no less than 50%, and zero otherwise; the 
foreign-owned dummy is equal to one if  a firm k’s foreign share is greater than 50%, and 
zero otherwise; and the HMT dummy is defined as well as the foreign-owned dummy, 
equal to one if  a firm k’s HMT share is greater than 50% and zero otherwise 
  Finally, we include ρ𝑘  to control for unobservable and time-invariant firm fixed 
effects. ρ𝑙𝑡 is to control for firm-invariant location-year fixed effects that the shocks 
over time may differ across different regions in China.98 ε𝑘𝑗𝑡 is the error term.  
  However, using a processing dummy to identify the role of  processing trade in trade 
liberalization may face an over-estimation problem since the coefficient is likely to be 
over-estimated. For example, if  a firm with a processing dummy equal to 1 is classified or 
                                                             
96 In our estimates the dependent variable is the log of  firm k’s average wage, which could be 
written as: ln(wage)𝑘𝑗𝑡 = ln(total wage bill/labor)𝑘𝑗𝑡= ln(total wage bill)𝑘𝑗𝑡 − ln(labor)𝑘𝑗𝑡 . Since the 
logarithm of  firm labor is used as the denominator of  the dependent variable, in equation (8) still 
using it as a proxy to control for firm size is inappropriate. Hence, we use ln(K)𝑘𝑗𝑡 to control for firm 
size.  
97 Other ownership variables are used as robustness checks. One proxy we used includes 
government share, foreign share and HMT share as one proxy, which represent the capital owned by 
local or central government, foreigners, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan respectively, and the other 
proxy includes two indicators, SOEs and foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs). Following Yu (2015), we 
construct the indicators based on a firm’s registration type (qiye dengji zhuce leixing). The role of  SOEs 
is simple to identify (including code: 110, 141, 143 and 151) and a FIE is identified as a firm invested 
by other foreign countries. In particular, quite a lot of  the Chinese firms are invested by Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan and we also treat those firms as the FIEs. Specifically, FIEs include: HMT 
joint-stock corporations (code: 210), HMT joint venture enterprises (220), fully HMT-invested 
enterprises (230), HMT-invested limited corporations (240), foreign-invested joint-stock corporations 
(310), foreign-invested joint ventures (320), wholly-owned FIEs (330) and foreign-invested limited 
corporations (340). Additionally, Brant et al. (2012) also addressed that they utilize firm registration 
type to construct firm’s ownership categories, but they have four categories: SOEs, foreign firms, 
private firms and hybrid firms (local government owned, town-owned, village-owned, etc.). 
98 Following Kamal et al. (2012), we utilize information on a firm’s region code to construct 
firm’s location categories. Based on two-digit region code, which is equivalent to the province level, 
we group Chinese regions into five categories – (1) Costal: Beijing (code: 11), Tianjin (12), Hebei (13), 
Shanghai (31), Jiangsu (32), Zhejiang (33), Fujian (35), Shandong (37), Guangdong (44) and Hainan 
(46); (2)Inland: Shanxi (14), Anhui (34), Jiangxi (36), Henan (41); (3)Northeast: Hubei (42), Hunan 
(43); (4)Southwest: Liaoning (21), Jilin (22), Heilongjiang (23), Guangxi (45), Chongqing (50), Sichuan 
(51), Guizhou (52) and Yunnan (53); (5)Northwest: Inner Mongolia (15), Tibet (54), Shanxi (61), 
Gansu (62), Qinghai (63), Ningxia (64) and Xingjiang (65). So there are four location dummies: Costal, 
Inland, Northeast and Southwest, and a Northwest dummy is omitted. 
  104 / 256 
 
treated as an entire processing firm, means that it will be one hundred percent or fully 
affected by processing activity, although it only has one percent processing imports. This 
may cause an over-estimation problem as we over-state the impact of  processing trade on 
firm wages and actually such impact is mainly due to ordinary trade which accounts for 
99% of  total imports. From our sample, the proportion of  processing imports in total 
imports for processing firms is around 78% on average and it has a wide distribution, 
ranging from slightly greater than zero up to 100 percent. As a result, it is necessary and 
appropriate to take processing intensity into account, not simply using a processing 
indicator to identify the status of  processing trade. In equation (8), we replace the 
processing dummy Processing 𝑘𝑗𝑡 with the measure of  processing intensity, which is 
defined as the share of  firm k’s imports through processing trade over its total imports in 
year t. Unlike the discrete dichotomous dummy variable, this measure is continuous. We 
include an interaction term between firm output (input) tariff  rates and its 
Processing Intensity 𝑘𝑗𝑡  to capture the differential effect on firm wages between 
processers and non-processers following a fall in output (input) tariffs. Specifically, our 
main empirical estimations use the following framework: 
ln(wage)𝑘𝑗𝑡 = γ1Output Tariff 𝑘𝑗𝑡−1 + γ2Output Tariff 𝑘𝑗𝑡−1 × Processing Intensity 𝑘𝑗𝑡
+ γ3Input Tariff kjt−1 + γ4Input Tariff 𝑘𝑗𝑡−1 × Processing Intensity 𝑘𝑗𝑡
+ γ5Processing Intensity 𝑘𝑗𝑡 + ΓX𝑘𝑗𝑡 + ρ𝑘 + ρ𝑙𝑡
+ μ𝑘𝑗𝑡 .                                                                                                                (9) 
  Similar as before, the effect for ordinary trading firms following a fall in output (input) 
tariffs is equal to γ1(γ3), the net effect for processing firms by decreasing output (input) 
tariff  rates is the sum of  γ1 and γ2 (the sum of  γ3 and γ4), and the coefficient γ5 
before the variable of  processing intensity is used to capture the other potential gains 
induced by a firm’s engagement in processing trade besides tariff  liberalization. Still, we 
include the vector X𝑘𝑗𝑡 to control for other firm level characteristics, ρ𝑘 to control for 
unobservable and time-invariant firm fixed effects and ρ𝑙𝑡 to control for firm-invariant 
location-year fixed effects, and μ𝑘𝑗𝑡 is the error term.  
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  Alternatively, we exploit another approach to investigate the effects of  trade reform on 
firm average wage by combining the impacts of  output and input tariffs and use either 
3-digit industry ERP or firm ERP to estimate the following equations (10) and (11): 
ln(wage)𝑘𝑗𝑡 = θ1ERP 𝑘𝑗𝑡−1 + θ2ERP 𝑘𝑗𝑡−1 × Processing 𝑘𝑗𝑡 + θ3Processing 𝑘𝑗𝑡 + ΛX𝑘𝑗𝑡
+ ρ𝑘 + ρ𝑙𝑡
+ τ𝑘𝑗𝑡 .                                                                                                                  (10) 
ln(wage)𝑘𝑗𝑡 = λ1ERP 𝑘𝑗𝑡−1 + λ2ERP 𝑘𝑗𝑡−1 × Processing Intensity 𝑘𝑗𝑡
+ λ3Processing Intensity 𝑘𝑗𝑡 +ΨX𝑘𝑗𝑡 + ρ𝑘 + ρ𝑙𝑡
+ υ𝑘𝑗𝑡 .                                                                                                                (11) 
 
3.3.3 Self-selection into Processing Activities 
 
A firm may self-select into processing trade and self-determine its processing intensity, or 
the depth of  processing engagement, according to its productivity and any financial 
constraints (Yu, 2014; Manova and Yu, 2014). Hence, the processing variables, processing 
dummy and processing intensity are likely to be endogenous. To avoid this, we perform a 
Heckman two-stage selection procedure to predict the fitted processing intensity for each 
firm and use this predicted processing intensity to replace the actual processing intensity 
for our empirical estimation.  
  The Heckman selection procedure is specified as follows:  
  (i) In the first stage, the probability of  being a processing firm, is estimated by using a 
probit regression, 
Prob(Processing 𝑘𝑗𝑡 = 1|Ζ) = Φ(Ζϖ)
= Φ(β0 + β1Firm Age 𝑘𝑗,𝑡−1 + β2ST Liability 𝑘𝑗,𝑡−1 + β3ln (VA) 𝑘𝑗,𝑡−1 + β4ln(K) 𝑘𝑗,𝑡−1
+ β5𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑘𝑗,𝑡−1+𝛽6Foreign share 𝑘𝑗,𝑡−1+𝛽7HMT share 𝑘𝑗,𝑡−1 + δ𝑗
+ δ𝑡),                                                                                                                                                     (12) 
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where Processing 𝑘𝑗𝑡 indicates a firm’s processing status (Processing 𝑘𝑗𝑡=1 if  a firm 
imports any processing inputs, Processing Intensity 𝑘𝑗𝑡>0 and zero otherwise), Ζ is a 
vector of  explanatory variables for self-selection mechanism, Φ  is the cumulative 
distribution function of  the standard normal distribution and ϖ is a vector of  unknown 
parameters. Following Manova and Yu (2014) and Yu (2015), a firm’s choice to become  
a processer is affected by its age (Firm Age 𝑘𝑗𝑡, defined as current year t minus the firm 
k’s birth year), financial constraints (ST Liability 𝑘𝑗𝑡, short-term liability, which is defined 
as the share of  current liability over total assets), firm performance (ln (VA) 𝑘𝑗𝑡, the log of  
firm k’s value-added per worker), firm size (ln(K) 𝑘𝑗𝑡) and its ownership structure, which 
we use ownership shares to describe.99 We use the one-period lag of  all explanatory 
variables and include the controls for industry effects δ𝑗 at the 3-digit level and year 
effects δ𝑡.  
  (ii) In the second stage, to quantify a firm’s depth of  engagement in processing trade, 
we estimate a linear function of  the explanatory variables except for firm age and 
incorporate a transformation of  predicted probabilities of  being a processing firm as an 
additional explanatory variable. 
3.3.4 Endogeneity Concerns 
 
One concern with the empirical specification in equations (8) and (9) is possible 
endogeneity which may be caused by potential reverse causality between firm income and 
tariff  reductions. This in turn causes a negative bias on the tariff  coefficients. The 
argument is that, although the reduction of  tariff  rates are restricted after China joining 
WTO, firms within low-income industries would still lobby or seek trade protection from 
the government (Grossman and Helpman, 1994), which could lead to the maintenance 
of  tariffs at relatively high levels and protect the low-profit firms from the tougher 
import-competition. If  a firm in a low-income industry does not have the lobbing power 
to affect tariffs, facing tougher import competition induced by the lower tariffs, might 
                                                             
99 The ownership shares include the capital share controlled by central or local government, the 
capital share invested by foreigners and the capital share invested by Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.  
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mean that it would exit the current market or cut costs and earn less to survive, which 
would certainly impact worker’s wages. However, if  a firm has lobbing power, it would 
not need to cut workers’ wages.  
  However, there are two main reasons why we do not expect the endogeneity of  tariffs 
to be primary concern in our estimations. First, as explained in greater detail in Brandt et 
al. (2012) and in chapter two, the tariff  liberalization conducted in 2001 after China 
joining WTO was negotiated and in China the striking uniform import tariffs after trade 
reform cannot be explained by policy endogeneity. It seems that changes in trade policy 
result in all tariffs moving to a low (same) level, which supports the argument that tariff  
endogeneity is not a big issue in China. As a result, they believe that tariff  reductions are 
exogenous when exploiting causality between productivity and policy reforms. However, 
in chapter two, we clearly discuss the endogeneity issue in multiple ways and conclude 
that while the immediate changes in tariffs after the accession to WTO are exogenous, 
the same cannot be said of  tariffs before 2001.  
  Nonetheless, this does not necessarily imply that firm tariffs are exogenous to firm 
wages. And hence, we examine whether past firm average wages predict current firm 
tariff  rates and ERPs. To do so, we then regress our measurement in trade protection at 
the firm level on the one-year lagged firm average wage as well as three-digit industry 
effects and year effects.100 In Table 2.4 our estimated results rarely support the notion 
that firm-level trade protection is driven by firm average wages since firm tariffs are 
unlikely to be driven by firm average wages after 2001 and firm ERPs are unlikely to be 
driven by firm average wages for the period 2000-2006.101 Hence, it is suggested that 
firm protection after 2001 can be treated as exogenous and as a result, we restrict the 
                                                             
100 In chapter two of  this thesis, we have already examined this relationship based on industry 
tariffs and industry ERP and found that industry protection is not driven by firm average wage in the 
post-WTO period. Hence, we only test on firm tariffs and firm ERP. 
101 For firm output tariffs, the coefficients on lagged firm average wages are insignificant for 
pre-WTO period and post-WTO period but significant for full sample. For firm input tariffs, the 
coefficients on lagged firm average wages are insignificant for full sample and post-WTO period but 
significant for pre-WTO period. For ERP, both at the industry level and at the firm level, the 
coefficients on lagged firm average wages are insignificant for all different periods. Due to the 
coefficients on lagged firm average wages for tariffs are very small, we keep the first 4 digits after the 
decimal point only in Table 4 whilst in other tables we always keep the first 3 digits.   
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sample to the period 2002-2006 and use one-year lagged trade protection in each 
specification because firm wages are unlikely to have adjusted instantaneously. 
[Table 2.4 about here] 
  Moreover, as concluded in chapter two based on IV estimations, the endogeneity 
problem of  tariffs does not seem to be a big issue in our study. Therefore, we treat 
firm-level trade protection as exogenous variables for firm wages and use OLS approach 
in all our specifications as reported in section 5. Then in the following section, we 
introduce three data sources that we used and data merging and cleaning as well.  
3.4. Data  
3.4.1 Data Sources 
 
To examine the impact of  decreasing tariff  rates on wages of  trading firms, and whether 
such impact is affected by the extent of  firm’s engagement in processing trade, we draw 
on three main sources of  micro-data: detailed industrial firm data, comprehensive trade 
transaction data and tariff  rate data.  
  China’s tariff  data available at the HS 6-digit product level for 2000-2006 are from the 
WITS database and are also used by Kamal et al. (2012) and Hu (2014). 102  For 
measurement, we use effectively applied tariffs which means taking the tariff  rate and 
weighting it by imports.  
  The detailed industrial firm data that includes all SOEs and non-SOEs whose annual 
turnover is over 5 million RMB (commonly referred to as the “above-designated size” 
firms) are from the Chinese Annual Survey, which is officially conducted and collected by 
                                                             
102 The WITS provides data of  exports, imports, tariff  and measures of  non-tariff  barriers and 
hence, we use it to access to China’s tariff  data for our sample period except for 2002. Following Yu 
(2015) we obtain the 2002 tariff  data from the TRAINS. 
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the NBSC.103,104 Our main interest is the manufacturing industries and hence we exclude 
the mining industry, industry of  electric production and supply and industry of  natural 
gas and water from this dataset. The dataset also provides rich information on three 
standard accounting statements and they are Balance Sheet, Cash Flow Statement and 
Income Statement.105  
  The detailed exports and imports are recorded at the HS 8-digit product level and are 
reported monthly for all trading firms and are from the Customs Trade database which is 
officially managed by the GACC. It reports the value of  the universal trade transactions 
in US dollars and also indicates the trade regime for each transaction (i.e. ordinary trade 
and processing trade), which is one of  the main interest variables for our research 
purpose.106 
3.4.2 Data Merging and Cleaning 
 
To find out the impact of  processing trade on firm wages after tariff  falls, we rely on the 
merged sample from the latter two data sources. Therefore, we combined the annual 
industrial firm data and the monthly trade data by using firm name, contact person name, 
telephone number and postcode-common variables from both datasets to identify each 
and every unique firm.107  
  Our research aims to investigate the differential impacts of  tariff  reductions on 
trading firms and hence we exclude the firms with no exports and no imports 
                                                             
103 The value of  5 million RMB is a 770,000 US dollars in 2014 as the exchange rate is 1 
RMB=0.154 US dollar. 
104 Each observation in the CASIF dataset is a plant and definitely we are not able to identify or 
trace a firm with multi-plants. To make it simple, we still call them “firm”. 
105 We drop two sectors and three industries based on 2-digit industry codes. One is the mining 
sector, including codes 06, 07, 08, 09, 10 and 11; the other is the sector of  energy production and 
supply, which includes the codes 44, 45 and 46; additionally, tobacco (16), arts and crafts (42) and 
resource renewable and recycling (43) industries are excluded. 
106 China’s Customs specified the range of  processing trade in 2012 and based on 2-digit regime 
codes, we listed the processing trade types in Table 1A.10.  
107 We combine aspects of  the matching methods from both Upward et al. (2013) and Yu (2015) 
and we report the detailed matching process in Appendix 1A.3.  
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(non-trading firms) from our clean merged dataset.108 As explained in section 3.1.1, to 
make sure our measurement of  firm output tariffs are not biased, we should further 
exclude the firm with zero domestic sales (pure exporting firms) and the firms with zero 
exports (pure domestic firms). Intuitively, the latter are already excluded in the first step 
since we exclude the non-trading firms and hence we only need to further exclude the 
former. We therefore have an unbalanced panel with 135,793 observations and 56,765 
unique firms for period 2000-2006 in total.   
3.5. Empirical Results 
3.5.1 Baseline 
  
In this chapter, we aim to investigate how tariff  liberalization affects firm wages and 
present our estimations starting with a comparison between industry tariff  rates and firm 
tariff  rates in Table 2.5. In these estimations we cluster errors by firm and control for 
several fixed effects, including invariant effects (3-digit industry effects, location effects 
and year effects) and time-varying effects (location-year effects) in all regressions. 
[Table 2.5 about here] 
  The first three columns of  Table 2.5 report the results with industry output and input 
tariffs and their interaction terms and the last three columns report the results with firm 
output and input tariffs and their interaction terms. First, we only use output and input 
tariffs as explanatory variables and include processing dummy as well in columns (1) and 
(4), and we find that for industry tariffs, reductions in both output and input tariffs do 
not affect firm wages, however, a different situation occurs for firm tariffs where we have 
                                                             
108 The clean principle and process are also reported in Appendix 1A.4 and 1A.6. However, the 
data used for chapter two are already dropped processing firms in the cleaning step after merging. 
Hence, to satisfy our research purpose on processing firms for this chapter, we use the clean merged 
sample without dropping processing firms to exclude non-trading firms. Thus, the majority of  the 
observations are excluded and such non-trading firms account for nearly 83% of  the clean merged 
sample before excluding processing firms, and almost 17% of  observations are trading firms, which is 
consistent with Bernard et al. (2007) that only a small proportion of  firms are able to engage in 
international trade.  
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the output tariff  coefficient positive and significant and the input tariff  coefficient 
negative and significant in column (4), suggesting that decreasing firm output tariff  rates 
induces a decrease in firm wages and decreasing firm input tariff  rates induces an 
increase in wage payments to workers. However, the coefficient on processing dummy is 
insignificant in both column (1) and column (4). 
  One possible explanation for our unexpected finding is that when constructing our 
industry output and input tariffs, the weights used are at a more aggregated level and also 
take the products’ information of  consumption and sales for other non-trading firms. 
Hence, using industry tariffs may be too broad to capture an individual trading firm’s 
reaction to the tariff  changes.  
  An interaction of  output tariff  rates and a processing dummy and an interaction of  
input tariff  rates and a processing dummy are included in columns (2) and (5), tariffs in 
the former column are at the industry level and in the latter they are at the firm level. In 
columns (3) and (6) we replace the processing dummy with each firm’s processing 
intensity and also include its interactions with both tariff  rates at different aggregated 
levels. For industry tariffs, the input tariff  coefficient is always insignificant. However, in 
columns (2) and (3) the output tariff  coefficient becomes significantly positive and 
additionally, the interaction coefficient of  processing status (either processing dummy or 
processing intensity) and output (input) tariff  is significantly negative (positive), which 
suggests that decreasing output (input) tariff  rates increases (decreases) wages of  
processing firms, but decreasing output tariff  rates also decrease wages of  on-processing 
firms. For firm tariffs, we still have the output tariff  coefficients positive and significant 
and the input tariff  coefficients negative and significant in the last two columns. Only the 
coefficient on a processing dummy in column (2) is highly significant and negative, 
implying that firms engaged in processing trade pay lower wages.  
  Although the output tariff  coefficients in both column (2) and (5) remain the same 
sign but are with different magnitudes, which implies that when calculating tariffs at a 
more disaggregated level, the effect of  falling tariffs on firm wages is diminishing, form a 
number of  0.110 to 0.083, reducing by nearly 25%. Hence, such differences and the 
insignificant coefficients on tariffs in column (1) both suggest the pitfalls of  using tariffs 
at the industry level. For instance, if  product m in an industry experiences a fall in output 
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tariffs, such reduction would not be directly relevant to a firm does not produce such a 
product. Hence, the pro-competition effect may be overestimated for a firm if  industry 
output tariffs are used. Further, the input tariff  coefficient in column (2) is insignificant 
but it becomes significantly negative in column (5), which indicates that if  we ignore the 
fact that processing imports can enjoy tariff  exemptions, as a result of  this, a potential 
measurement error may be introduced during our estimation. Hence, using firm tariff  
rates are better at capturing the effect of  tariff  exemptions due to processing trade. 
  Moreover, even though a firm’s processing status has been taken into account, the 
impact of  firm-level tariff  reductions on average wages indicates no statistically 
significant differential effects for processing firms, no matter using processing dummy or 
processing intensity. One possible explanation is that a firm’s decision to become a 
processing trading firm or its decision to import the amount of  processing inputs is 
endogenous and this would bias our estimation results. To avoid this potential problem, 
we do not use the current processing status for measurement. Hence, we use the 
two-stage Heckman selection procedure to model a firm’s self-selecting into processing 
trade in section 5.2 and utilize the adjusted processing intensity obtained from Heckman 
estimation for the rest of  specifications.109 Further, the joint significance tests on output 
tariffs suggest that the net impact for processing firms by decreasing industry output 
tariff  rates is none. 
  Additionally, we use industry level ERP and firm level ERP as a measure of  trade 
protection for robustness checks and report the results in Table 2A.2. Only the 
coefficients on industry ERP are significantly positive, suggesting that falls in industry 
ERP lower wages for firms not engaged in processing trade.  
[Table 2A.2 about here] 
                                                             
109 Processing intensity is a more accurate way than processing dummy to describe a firm’s 
engagement in processing trade since processing intensity is a continuous measurement of  firm’s 
different engagement in processing trade. Using processing dummy may result in overestimating the 
role of  processing firms. According to the definition of  a processing dummy, if  a firm’s processing 
intensity is only 1% or even smaller, it would still be given processing dummy with value one and thus 
its processing intensity becomes 100% now, which may induce a measurement error.  
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  As discussed before, we conduct Heckman Two-stage Selection model in the next 
section to control for the potential endogeneity that a less-productive firm may self-select 
into processing trade.  
3.5.2 Heckman Self-selection Procedures 
 
To avoid the potential endogeneity bias caused by firm’s self-selection into processing 
activities, we conduct the Heckman two-stage procedures to obtain the adjusted 
processing intensity for our main estimations as follows. 
  As mentioned by Manova and Yu (2014) and Yu (2015), a firm’s choice to become a 
processor is affected by many factors, like firm age, size, productivity, ownership 
structure and its ability to get financial support, so we use such factors as our explanatory 
variables to determine a firm’s processing status. In the first stage, we use firm age to 
determine the choice of  being processing firms but exclude such a age variable in the 
second stage, where a firms processing intensity is determined. The fact that firm age 
serves such purpose has been mentioned in Amiti and Davis (2011), which believes that 
older firms are seen to be more likely to export.   
  We report the results in Table 2.6, where industry and year effects are controlled. We 
control for three-digit industry specific effects and year fixed effects. From the first-stage 
probit estimation, firms established earlier are more likely to self-select into being 
processors, which is also concluded in Amiti and Davis (2011) also in Yu (2015). Similarly, 
large and foreign firms are more willing to become processors as well as low productive 
firms, which is also consistent with the conclusions in Yu (2015) although we use a 
different variable, the log value-added per worker, as a proxy for concerning firm 
productivity and the log capital as a proxy for firm size, while in Yu (2015) TFP and the 
log employment are used to measure the effect of  firm productivity and size respectively. 
Finally, Manova and Yu (2014) predicted that firms with high-leverage, where the 
leverage is the ratio of  short term debt to current asset, or tough financial constraints are 
more likely to turn to processing trade, whilst Yu (2015) predicted that firms mainly 
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controlled by central government or local government are less likely to become 
processing firms. In our first-stage estimation, we obtain the predicted signs for such two 
variables and the coefficients of  them are significant at the 1% significance level. Instead 
we use short-term liability, where the short term liability is defined as the share of  
current liability over total assets, to control for financial constraints that firms may face 
and we have a positive coefficient on it, which demonstrates that a firm with more debts 
is more likely to become a processing firm. 
[Table 2.6 about here] 
  From the second-stage linear estimation for determining firms’ share of  processing 
imports, the estimated coefficients of  explanatory variables have identical signs to those 
obtained in the first-stage probit estimation except for log firm capital where the 
coefficient on log firm capital becomes negative but insignificant. Our findings are partly 
consistent with the conclusions in Yu (2015) as he concluded that large and foreign firms 
have a higher proportion of  processing imports. Additionally, the coefficients on the 
short term liability and the government share are positive and negative respectively and 
become marginally statistically significant at the 1% significance level, which implies that 
firms with low liquidity would engage more in processing trade and firms that are highly 
controlled by government seem to participate less in processing trade.  
  Hence, from Heckman model we have the adjusted processing intensity for each firm 
now and we use this instead of  the original intensity for our following estimations, which 
has been discussed in our estimation strategy before. 
3.5.3 Preliminary Estimates  
 
As noted in the previous sections, we use the adjusted value of  firm’s processing intensity 
predicted by the Heckman selection procedure instead of  the original or actual one for 
controlling the endogeneity caused by self-selection to become processing firms. The 
results in Table 2.7 are OLS panel estimations and all the results are based on the 
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controls of  three-digit industry specific effects, invariant location and year effects, year 
fixed effects and time-varying location-year effects.  
[Table 2.7 about here] 
  We run the fixed effects model with the industry tariff  variables and adjusted 
processing intensity in the first column and we then turn to using firm tariff  variables 
and adjusted processing intensity in column (2). The interaction coefficient of  industry 
output tariff  rates and the adjusted processing intensity is significant and negative in 
column (1). Comparing such results for industry output tariffs with those in column (3) 
of  Table 2.5, the interaction coefficient remains the same sign but is with a larger 
magnitude now, indicating that the endogeneity problem of  self-selection may cause an 
under-estimate effect. In comparison with the results for industry input tariffs in column 
(3) of  Table 2.5, the industry input tariff  coefficient becomes significantly negative now 
which is insignificant before, whilst the interaction coefficient of  industry input tariff  
rates and the adjusted processing intensity remains positive but becomes insignificant 
now which is significantly positive before.  
  Alternatively, in column (2) firm output tariffs interacted with adjusted processing 
intensity has a significant and negative coefficient now, and such coefficient in column (6) 
of  Table 2.5 is negative but insignificant. Moreover, the firm output tariff  coefficient is 
statistically significant and positive in column (6) of  Table 2.5 but such coefficient 
becomes insignificant in column (2) of  Table 2.7. For firm input tariff  rats, in the last 
column of  Table 2.5 and in the last column of  Table 2.7, the input tariff  coefficient 
remains statistically significant and negative. But the latter coefficient is greater than the 
former, more than twice of  the former. Hence, we conclude that the endogeneity of  
self-selection into processing trade can bias our results and we should always use the 
adjusted value of  firm’s processing intensity predicted by the Heckman selection 
procedure in our rest estimations.  
  Additionally, with a comparison of  the results in Table 2.7, we find that the 
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magnitudes for firm tariff  variables are slightly greater those in industry tariff  variables, 
suggesting that it is much better or more accurate to choose firm tariffs as our indicators 
rather than industry tariffs. Since the interaction of  output tariff  rates (industry/firm) 
and the adjusted processing intensity is negative and significant, we can argue that falling 
output tariff  rates makes processors pay higher wages than non-processors, and such 
positive impact becomes stronger as firm processing intensity grows, which is in contrast 
to the findings in Yu (2015) which states cuts in output tariff  rates can lead to a growth 
in firm productivity but such growth will decrease if  a firm increases its engagement in 
processing trade. The potential explanation is firms engaged in processing trade rarely 
sell products in the domestic markets, and hence they may bare less import competition 
caused by cutting output tariffs than non-processors when comparing with other trading 
firms. In our sample, the mean export share of  non-processing firms is around 23% and 
hence nearly 80% of  their outputs are sold locally. Thus, such majority of  outputs which 
serves domestic market has to face even tougher import competition by dropping output 
tariff  rates and hence earn less and pay lower wages relative to processing firms since 
their exports may not be sufficient large to outweigh the loss from domestic market. 
Therefore, if  a firm engages more in processing trade, it will sell less in the domestic 
market and following a cut in output tariffs it would face less import competition than 
non-processing firms, and hence earn more and pay higher wages relative to 
non-processing firms.     
  As the input tariff  coefficient (industry/firm) has a significantly negative sign, we can 
argue that non-processing firms experience a gain in firm wages following a fall in input 
tariff  rates, similar to those in Yu (2015). Since a drop in input tariffs, firms become 
much easier to access to variety of  imported inputs with high quality and hence increase 
productivity and pay higher wages. 
  As a robustness check, we then regeress the firm average wages with the ERP variables 
and adjusted processing intensity and report the results in Table 2A.3. The coefficients 
on the ERP variables themselves and their interaction terms are all insignificant although 
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the firm adjusted processing intensity remains a significantly positive sign at the 1% 
significance level, indicating that the combination effect of  output and input tariffs is 
close to zero.  
[Table 2A.3 about here] 
 
3.5.4 Additional Controls for Firm Characteristics  
 
It is also worthwhile to check whether our findings above hold after including other firm 
characteristics. Thus, we further consider the role of  firm ownership structure, 
productivity, size and financial variables. The results are provided in Table 2.8. 
[Table 2.8 about here] 
  In column (1) of  Table 2.8, we include three dummy variables to characterize a firm’s 
ownership and they are SOE dummy, foreign-owned dummy and a dummy for 
HMT-owned. The coefficients on all the significant terms are exactly the same in terms 
of  magnitudes as those in column (2) of  Table 2.8, and we have a significantly positive 
coefficient on foreign-owned dummy, indicating that workers worked in foreign-owned 
firms get higher wages. 
  Another possibility that may drive our key results is upgrades in firm productivity 
induced by dropping tariff  rates. According to Yu (2015), falling output (input) tariff  
rates can lead to a higher level of  productivity but such a productivity growth may 
become smaller if  a firm imports more in processing inputs. To check this, we include 
firm total factor productivity (TFP) in the second column of  Table 2.8 and see that its 
coefficient is highly significant and positive, suggesting that a high productive firm pay a 
higher wage. But the coefficient on the adjusted processing intensity is now a little 
smaller as well as the interaction coefficient of  output tariff  rates and the adjusted 
processing intensity and the input tariff  coefficient, but the latter still remain at the same 
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significance level. 
  Here, we also include the log firm capital as the control for firm size in column (3) and 
obtain a highly significant and positive coefficient on it. Hence, firms with higher capital 
pay higher wages. We then include firm leverage in the following column as a proxy for 
controlling firm financing capability, where firm leverage is the ratio of  current liability to 
current asset as described in Manova and Yu (2014), and find that it has a positive 
coefficient although insignificant. Thus, firms with lower leverage, being financially 
healthier and less constrained, do not tend to pay higher wages to workers, which is 
inconsistent with Manova and Yu (2014) that profits are affected by producers’ financial 
health and firms with higher liquidity and less constraints are more free to choose 
opportunities to maximize their profits. But, more importantly, the inclusion of  the firm 
size and leverage leaves the significant coefficients on tariffs unchanged and the 
coefficient of  adjusted processing intensity is almost the same. 
  Additionally, we include the total debt ratio at the firm-level in column (5) as another 
alterative control for firm financing capability, where firm total debt ratio is the ratio of  
total debt to total asset, and find that it is significantly negative as expected in column (5). 
Thus, firms with higher debts are more financial constrained and hence pay lower wages 
to workers, supporting the views in Manova and Yu (2014).  
  Our conclusions for all these specifications in Table 2.8 remain consistent with the 
conclusion of  column (2) in Table 2.7. Reductions in output tariff  rates can increase 
wages of  firms that have processing business relative to non-processing firms and such 
increases in wages by dropping output tariff  rates will become larger by increasing firm’s 
processing intensity. We also find that reductions in input tariff  rates can induce 
non-processors to pay higher wages but can not cause wage differentials between 
non-processors and processors.  
  Finally, in Tables 2A.3 and 2A.4 we use two different measures of  firm ERP to 
evaluate the impact of  trade protection on firm average wages with several firm 
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characteristic controls as robustness checks. The conclusions from both tables are clearly 
consistent with those in Table 2A.2, implying that a fall in firm ERP does not affect firm 
average wages but importing more processing inputs has a positive impact on firm 
average wages. 
[Table 2A.3 about here] 
[Table 2A.4 about here] 
3.5.5 Channels  
 
We have presented robust evidence that output tariff  reductions boost the wages of  
processing firms and the impact becomes stronger as the share of  processing imports 
increases whilst input tariff  reductions boost the wages of  non-processing firms. W can 
conclude that there is a connection between tariff  reductions and firm wages, however, 
and we still need to assess the plausible channels to interpret the mechanism of  such 
effects, as they are partly consistent with the findings of  Manova and Yu (2014) and Yu 
(2015), who conclude that a firm boosts its productivity after experiencing a fall in 
output (input) tariff  rates and such a positive impact may become weaker by an increase 
in firm’s processing intensity(Yu, 2015) and compared with processing firms, ordinary 
trading firms are exposed to high risk due to contracts maybe imperfectly enforced and 
hence have more bargaining power to acquire more profits when they have access to 
international trade (Manova and Yu, 2014).    
  According to Amiti and Davis (2011), firm wages are dependent on firm performance 
and positively correlated with profits. We first detect the relationship between firm tariff  
changes and profits and report our findings in Table 2.9. Based on our panel sample, we 
first regress the log total profits as a proxy for denoting firm performance on output and 
input tariff  rates as well as their interactions. We find that if  firms are global engaged, 
they could obtain profit gains by decreasing tariff  rates especially for output tariffs, but 
the coefficients on tariff  interactions are insignificant which indicates that such a positive 
impact on firm profits is not affected by changes in firm processing intensity, which is 
consistent with Manova and Yu (2014) that once a firm can manage and occupy more 
stages of  global supply chains, as a results of  this, it can achieve higher added-value and 
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thus higher profits. However, the requirement of  high working capital and financial 
constraints prevent firms to jump from a low-productive stage to a high-productive stage 
freely.  
[Table 2.9 about here] 
  As a result, in China the situation in terms of  firm profits is quite different from that 
of  firm wages and we try to figure out the reasonable explanations behind this. One 
possible channel is that lower input tariffs induces access to a vast variety of  imported 
intermediates (Amiti and Konings, 2007; Helpern et al., 2010) and this results in firms 
switching their usage of  intermediate inputs form low to high-quality products, if  
switching allows them to increase variety and quality, then this action is likely to increase 
their TFP and thus enable them to pay higher wages. This is one prospect and another is 
that lower output tariffs induce tougher competitions as smaller barriers and weaker 
protections would allow more foreign goods to enter the local market. To occupy and 
explore the market, firms need to upgrade their products and still maintain their profits, 
and hence, it is desirable for them to use high-quality inputs for production. Specifically, 
if  firms engaged in processing trade, they have little ability or power to choose and 
decide the variety of  processing inputs, and hence we focus on firm’s scope of  ordinary 
imports which are more related to the dependence of  a firm’s own choice. As a result, we 
regress firm average wage bills additionally on the log of  firm ordinary imported inputs 
in column (2) and expect the coefficient on it should be positive, but we observed that 
the log of  firm ordinary imports has an insignificantly negative coefficient, showing that 
intermediates switching is not attributable to firm wages. Besides, the channel for 
processing firms to boost their wages after tariff  reductions may be addressed through 
the structural changes of  products from low-productivity to high-productivity and we 
hypothesis that multi-product firms can have more chance to acquire higher profit and 
thus pay more. So we also include the log of  firm export scope as the measure for such 
effect in column (2) and see an insignificant and negative impact of  export scope on firm 
wages, suggesting that workers do not benefit from firms that export multiple products. 
The possible explanation is that even though switching to such intermediate imports with 
high-quality, firms still lack technological experiences to adjust or find out an appropriate 
way for better usage of  imported inputs, or firms have already purchased or obtained 
better returns in the short-run, but they would still like to keep the profits for future 
development and desire to have a sustainable profit growing ability, and hence they do 
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not share part of  their profits with workers.  
  As stated before, we should check the correlation between a firm’s expenditure on 
research and development (R&D) and its wages. To consider that firms may earn higher 
profits from investing in technology development, we include the log firm R&D as our 
control in column (3) and find its coefficient is negative as expected but insignificant. 
This may be explained by lacking R&D data for full sample. We only ave the R&D 
information in year 2004-2006 and they just account for 34% of  the observations around 
2002-2006.110 Thus, we only run a small sample regression and the effect of  R&D 
expenditures or investment in new technologies is under-estimated. It is also hard for use 
to investigate the improvement or importance of  technology upgrade or detect the gians 
from technology improvement.  
  We also detect such channels by using the measures of  firm effective rate of  
protections in Table 2A.5 and find the same conclusions as those for firm tariffs. 
[Table 2A.5 about here] 
3.5.6 Discussion of results 
 
Since our estimates are robust after all controls, we start to discuss the economic or 
policy implications of  our findings. Based on the result of  column (2) in Table 2.7, the 
interaction coefficient of  firm output tariff  rates and the adjusted processing intensity is 
-0.327, which is used to address the differential effects between processing firms and 
non-processing firms following a fall in output tariffs, and the firm output tsriff  
coefficient becomes insignificant, so on average, we can only conclude that the 
differential effect for processing firms by falling output tariff  rates is -0.327×0.42＝
-0.13734, given that the mean of  firm adjusted processing intensity is 0.42. This negative 
0.13734 could be interpreted as saying that a 10% decrease in output tariff  rates can lead 
to a 0.013734 growth in the log mean wage in processing firms and equivalently to a 1.37% 
growth in firm wages. Thus, in short processors pay 1.37% higher wages than 
non-processors by drops output tariff  rates. From Table 2.2 we can see that average firm 
output tariffs are reduced by 3.55% points in our strict sample, from 19.97% in 2002 to 
                                                             
110 Here we only include the observations with valid R&D information, which are without the 
observations with negative R&D expenses.  
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9.39% in 2006. Thus, we could predict that cutting output tariffs in the years 2002-2006 
contributes almost 0.49% (-0.13734×3.55%＝0.487557%) to the wage gap between 
processors and non-processors covered in our sample after WTO.  
  For firm input tariffs, its coefficient is -0.379, which is used to describe the impact on 
non-processing firms following a cut in input tariff  rates. But the interaction coefficient 
of  input tariff  rates and the adjusted processing intensity is insignificant, so on average, 
we can only conclude that falling input tariff  rates has a negative impact on 
non-processing firms and the number is -0.379, implying that a 10% decrease in input 
tariff  rates can lead to a 3.79% increase in wages for non-processing firms. Moreover, 
from Table 2.2 we can see that average firm input tariffs are reduced 0.61% points, from 
2.73% in 2002 to 2.12% in 2006. Thus, we could predict that cutting input tariffs 
contributes overall nearly 0.23% (-0.379 × 0.61% ＝ 0.23119%) wage gains for 
non-processing firms in the sample. 
3.6. Conclusion  
The impact of  tariff  liberalization on firm wages has attracted a considerable interest 
from academics and policy makers. While some attention has been paid to the role of  
processing trade in global value chains (GVCs), no prior study has found how processing 
trade affect firm wages through tariffs liberalization in China. Our article aims to fill this 
gap and we tend to explore how reductions in both types of  output and input tariffs 
affect wage payments for trading firms. Specifically, we try to figure out the role of  
processing trade: whether China has gained or lost in labor welfare after participating in 
processing trade through trade liberalization?   
  Based on our empirical results, we have examined the linkage between tariff  
reductions and wages for trading firms over 2002-2006. Specifically, taking the special 
tariff  treatment into account for processing firms, we can conclude that during tariff  
liberalization in China, a fall in output tariff  rates induces a higher wage for processors 
than non-processors, but such a fall in input tariff  rates makes non-processors 
experience a wage gain. Such findings are partly consistent with those found previously 
for firm performance, such as productivity or profits. 
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  One concern in our empirical practices is the firm heterogeneity, which could affect 
firm wages. Another concern to determine a firm’s wage is the role of  worker 
heterogeneity, which has been stressed its importance in early studies (Abowd et al., 1999; 
Abowd et al., 2002; Frias et al., 2009). But the current data do not support us to address 
the latter issue and we may discuss the topic of  changes in laborcomposition following 
tariff  liberalization in our future work. 
  As highlighted in our estimates, a firm’s switching in processing engagement could 
have influence on firm wages. It would be very interesting to investigate the role of  
changes in firm production structure or shifts in product composition as a response to a 
firm’s different engagement in processing trade after tariff  falls. All of  these remain the 
directions for our future study.  
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Chapter 4. Export Status Switching and Wages 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the impact of tariff reductions on the firm’s decision of to switch 
between different modes of exporting. We find that a cut in output tariffs decreases the 
wages of  pure processing exporters who do not switch and a cut in input tariffs increases 
the wages of  pure processing exporters who switch to being pure ordinary exporters.  
In contrast, pure ordinary exporters who switch to being pure processing exporters pay 
lower wages when they experience a cut in input tariffs. We highlight that input tariff  
reduction at the firm level can determine the decision of  the firms to switch between 
different modes of  exporting and most importantly, such reduction on firm level input 
tariffs always encourage exporting firms switch to another export status to upgrade their 
productivity level. 
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4.1. Introduction 
Between 1990 and 2009, China’s share of  world manufacturing exports grew from only 
two percent to thirteen percent (Hanson, 2012). An important dimension of  this 
impressive growth has been the remarkable but declining role of  processing exports in 
China. In 1999, processing exports represented 53.7 % of  China’s total exports, but by 
2006 this had fallen to 53.6% and by 2012 it accounted for just 34.8%. Recent studies 
have argued that the composition trade matters for China and its trading partners. 
Koopman et al. (2012) and Kee and Tang (2015) find that ordinary exports comprise 
more than two times as much domestic value-added per USD as do processing exports. 
Recent work by Jarreau and Poncet (2012), and Yu (2015) also indicates that in 
comparison to processing trade the most traditional channel of  ordinary trade entails 
substantially more technological upgrading and facilitates larger spillovers to the domestic 
economy.  
  In this paper we examine the impact of tariff reductions in China on the switching 
behavior of firms between different modes of exporting. The difference between 
ordinary trade and processing trade in China differs most prominently in terms of tariff 
treatment and hence the ability of processing firms to sell their final products to foreign 
markets free from import and export tariffs. Manufacturing firms engaged in processing 
business enjoy a zero tariff rate for all the import of intermediate inputs for processing 
trade which reduces production costs relative to non-processors. The benefits that 
processors experience from tariff exemptions may encourage other domestic producers 
to switch, either partly or entirely, from a domestic producer and ordinary exporter to an 
exporter processor.111 
                                                             
111 Part processing producer means that manufacturing firms conduct both ordinary trade and 
processing trade. Processing producers that export all of  their outputs are called are pure as 
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  Based on three major data sources (Chinese Industrial Firm dataset, Custom Trade 
dataset and Chinese applied tariff  data), we construct firm-level output and input tariffs 
and a firm level effective rate of  protections (ERP) to investigate the impact of  export 
mode on wages following a period of  trade liberalization and explore the determinants 
of  firm export switching. The rest of  the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we 
describe the data sources and section 3 introduces the different trade modes in China. In 
section 4 we describe our estimation strategy and our measures of  firm-specific tariffs 
and ERP. Section 5 presents our results and section 6 concludes. 
4.2. Data 
4.2.1 Data Sources 
 
To investigate the determinants of  switching in different modes of  exporting firms, we 
draw on three main sources of  micro-data: tariff  data, detailed firm-level production data 
and product-level transaction data.  
  China’s tariff  data available at the Harmonised Commodity and Description and 
Coding System (HS) 6-digit level for 2000-2006 are from the World Integrated Trade 
Solution (WITS) database, also used by Kamal et al. (2012) and Hu (2014).112 Our 
measure of  tariffs is based on effectively applied tariffs, which means taking the tariff  
rate and weighting it by imports. 
  The detailed firm-level production data are collected from the Chinese Annual Survey 
of  Industrial Firms (CASIF), which is conducted by the National Bureau of  Statistics of  
China (NBSC), and cover all state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs with annual 
                                                                                                                                                                              
processors and are firms, that participate in enrolled in global markets only for the purpose of  
assembling and processing. 
112 The WITS software provides access to international merchandise trade, tariffs and non-tariff  
measures (NTM) data, and it covers China’s tariff  data for our sample period except for 2002. 
Following Yu (2014) we obtain the 2002 tariff  data from the WTO and the Trade Analysis and 
Information System (TRAINS). 
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sales above 5 million RMB (commonly referred to as the “large-size” firms).113 114 The 
dataset has broad sector coverage and includes the mining, manufacturing, production 
and supply of  electric power, gas and water industries. Since our main interest is the 
manufacturing industries we exclude the mining, production and supply of  electric power, 
gas and water industries from this dataset. also the dataset provides rich information on 
standard accounting statements The dataset provides rich information for each firm and 
includes not only the basic information but also financial variables listed in the main 
accounting statements (i.e. balance sheet, income statement and cash flow statement), 
such as firm name, firm ID, total capital, annual sales, employment, and so on.115 Since 
the dataset is not a census of  all manufacturing firms in China, it is not well suited to 
study the entry and exit of  firms (if  firms exit the dataset, it is unlikely that they have 
truly disappeared from the economy). 
  The product-level transaction data is from the database of  the Chinese Customs Trade 
Statistics (CCTS) which is compiled and maintained by the General Administration of  
Customs of  China (GACC). Data from all three sources cover the period from 
2000-2006. The disaggregated trade transaction data is collected at the HS 8-digit 
product level and covers monthly trade records for all firms, starting from 1st January 
2000 and ending on 31th December 2006. It records the value of  the universal trade 
transactions in US dollars universal information for each trade transaction and also 
indicates the trade regime for each transaction (i.e. ordinary trade and processing trade), 
which is one of  the main interest variables for our research purpose.116 Moreover, each 
trade transaction includes basic information such as firm name, firm contact person, 
                                                             
113 5 million RMB is 770,000 US dollars in 2014 as the exchange rate is 1 RMB=0.154 US dollars. 
114 The CASIF production data are at the plant level and it is not possible to identify multiple plants 
belonging to a firm. For convenience we use the word “firm”.  
115 For exclusion, we drop two sectors and three industries based on 2-digit industry code. One is the 
mining sector, including codes 06, 07, 08, 09, 10 and 11; the other is the sector of  production and 
supply of  electric power, gas and water, which includes the codes 44, 45 and 46; additionally, tobacco 
(code: 16), handicrafts (code:42) and recycling (code: 43) industries are excluded. 
116  In 2012, there are 16 specific types of  processing trade reported by China’s General 
Administration of  Customs which include: international aid (regime code: 12), compensation trade 
(13), processing with assembly (14), processing with imported materials (15), goods on consignment 
(16), border trade (19), contracting projects (20), goods on lease (23), outward processing (27), barter 
trade (30), warehousing trade (33) and entrepot trade by bonded area (34). 
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telephone number and firm postcode for location, which are useful for our merging 
process in the next section, and it also records trade types (i.e. exports and imports) and 
hence we can trace the effect of  engagement in international trade separately for each 
type of  trade.  
4.2.2 Data Merging  
Our empirical analysis critically relies on the merged data from the latter two data sources, 
NBSC and GACC datasets. However, in practice merging those two datasets is not a 
simple process. Although each firm in either the production or trade dataset has a 
registered ID, different coding systems are used for each dataset. Indeed, the firm ID in 
the production dataset is coded by the local administrative authorities and is a 9-digit 
code. In contrast, the firm ID in the trade dataset is coded by the Customs and is a 
10-digit code. As a result, one cannot simply merge the two datasets using firm IDs.  
  As an alternative, we combined the firm-level production data and the product-level 
transaction data by using firm name, contact person name, telephone number and 
postcode-common variables from both datasets to identify each and every unique firm.117 
The comprehensive process of  data preparation for both data sources, and the matching 
and basic cleaning process, is described in detail in Appendix 1B of  chapter two. We 
therefore have an unbalanced panel with 1,026,728 observations and 350,699 unique 
firms for 2000-2006 in total. 
  To satisfy our research purpose, we further exclude some observations from our 
merged sample and we report the principle of  data exclusion in Appendix 3A. 
4.3. Firm Trade Status in China  
4.3.1 Classification of Firm Trade Status 
 
According to whether a firm chooses to engage in international trade, we can classify 
                                                             
117 We combine aspects of  the matching methods from both Upward et al. (2013) and Yu (2015). 
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firm as a trading firm or non-trading firm. For the latter, it means that firms do no 
export or import and they source intermediate inputs and sell their final products 
domestically. For the former, there are three different trade statuses: export only, import 
only, or both export and import. Specifically, in China firms can penetrate global markets 
through either ordinary trade or processing trade. Ordinary trade is a traditional and the 
most difficult route for firms to engage in international trade. The second is through 
processing trade which can be considered as an easier route into international markets. 
Therefore, if  firms want to export (import), they can access this through ordinary 
exports (ordinary imports) or processing exports (processing imports). As a result, we 
classify Chinese manufacturing firms into eight groups, one group for non-trading firms 
and seven groups for trading firms. These categories are listed in Table 3.1.118  
[Table 3.1 about here] 
  As our intention is to measure a firm’s ability to export and to investigate the role of  
firm switching trade status on exports, we concentrate in those firm groups that include 
exporting. First, we define firms that do not export as type I, called non-exporters (NE), 
and hence, group 1 (firms with no exports and no imports) and group 3 (firms with 
ordinary imports only) are included in type I. For exporters, based on the composition of  
export status there are three types. First, Type II pure ordinary exporters (OE), Type III 
pure processing exporters (PE) and Type IV mixed exporters (ME). Type II pure 
ordinary exporters are those firms that only use the traditional route and sell products 
directly to foreign markets, and hence, include group 2 (firms with ordinary exports only) 
and group 4 (firms with ordinary exports and ordinary imports). Type III, mixed 
exporters, are those firms that export through both the ordinary trade channel and the 
processing trade channel, and include group 5 (firms with ordinary exports and engaged 
                                                             
118 Note that there are 4 groups for firms that both export and import. Because for either export or 
import there are 2 possible modes to choose, and according to mathematical principle, when 
combining trading activities of  export and import, there should be 4 (2×2=4) possible combination 
groups to choose. However, for firms that export (import) only, there is only 1 group left. It is 
because that if  firms engage in processing trade, they must import intermediate inputs from foreign 
suppliers and re-export final products to foreign buyers after processing process. Hence, processing 
export and processing import should appear together in a firm’s trading volumes and for firms that 
export (import) only, they could only choose to export (import) through ordinary trade. 
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in processing trade) and group 6 (firms with ordinary exports, ordinary imports and 
engaged in processing trade). Finally, type IV are pure processing exporters which are 
firms that only export through the processing trade channel and include the final two 
groups from Table 3.1, which are group 7 (firms only engaged in processing trade) and 
group 8 (firms with ordinary imports and engaged in processing trade). 
  Theoretically, since pure ordinary exporters have no processing exports and the share 
of  processing exports in total exports should be equal to 0. For pure processing 
exporters total processing exports should equal total exports, and hence, the share of  
processing exports in total exports should be equal to 1. To distinguish between our 
three types of  exporting firm, we use a firm’s processing export share (ProExp_share). 
ProExp_share is a firm’s processing trade intensity and this is defined as the proportion 
of  firm’s total processing exports over total exports.119  
  Table 3.2 presents a summary of  our firm groups based on our theoretical 
assumptions. Pure ordinary exporters are defined as firms with processing export share 
equal to zero, mixed exporters are defined as firms with processing export share greater 
than zero but smaller than 1, and pure processing exporters are defined as firms with 
processing export share equal to 1. 
[Table 3.2 about here] 
4.3.2 Firm Characteristics of Different Trade Types120 
 
4.3.2.1 Firm Heterogeneity across Different Trade Types 
 
                                                             
119 Note that in chapter three, we treat a firm as a processing firm if  it has any processing imports, in 
order to distinguish firms engaged in processing trade from firms engaged in ordinary trade. Based on 
this, in this chapter we further to distinguish whether such a processing firm may also have ordinary 
exports. Hence, we use processing export share as an indicator to measure a firm’s degree of  
exporting in processing trade. 
120 The summary statistics in this section are based on our merged unbalanced panel only excluding 
firms who do not have processing exports and processing imports at the same period and hence, our 
analysis relies on the sample with 1,014,429 observations.  
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We now investigate how firms that engage in different types of  trade differ. 
Depending on a firm’s decision of  export or not, we group firms into four 
categories following Table 3.2: non-exporters (Type I), pure ordinary exporters (Type 
II), mixed exporters (Type III) and pure processing exporters (Type IV). As we show in 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4, non-exporters account for nearly 86% of  manufacturing firms in 
China and contribute around 64% of  total production respectively.  
  It is interesting to note that pure processors account for only 1.82% of  firms but 
nearly 5% of  outputs. Also, while the number of  pure processors has fallen over our 
period, the output share remained fairly steady. 
[Table 3.3 about here] 
[Table 3.4 about here] 
  In Table 3.5, we summarize the proportion of  exports by firm type. For exporters, 
during the sample period, pure ordinary exporters account for less than 9% of  total 
firms (from Table 3.3) but contribute more than 16% of  total production (from Table 
3.4) and almost 20% of  total exports in China (from Table 3.5). The largest proportion 
of  exports are from mixed exporters who account for only 3.5% of  total firms but 
contribute nearly 15% of  total production and more than 56% of  total exports. Given 
the importance of  mixed exporters it is useful to investigate what factors determine a 
firm’s decision to become a mixed exporter. The other type of  exporting firm that plays 
an important role in China’s exports and the pure processing exporters. Although they 
only account for one fifth of  the pure ordinary exporters and produce less than one third 
the output of  pure ordinary exporters, they contribute slightly more to exports than pure 
ordinary exports (nearly 1.24 times of  the latter) and account for around a quarter of  
total exports in China.  
[Table 3.5 about here] 
  For the period 2000-2006, the number of  non-exporter firms and the quantity of  
  132 / 256 
 
output of  non-exporters fell. However, pure ordinary exporters experienced an increase 
in both the quantity of  firms, total production and total exports. For those firms engaged 
in processing trade, mixed exporters slightly increase in number and production and 
maintain their percentage of  exports. Pure processing exporters experienced a slight 
decline in the number of  firms but a large drop in their export values, decreasing by 
almost 5% of  total exports. Hence, following Chin’s period of  trade liberalization the 
number of  pure processors appeared to fall. In this paper we want to understand 
whether pure processors have exited the market or switched trade type.  
4.3.2.2 Export Share of Exporters 
 
In Table 3.6 we further calculate the export shares of  all exporters, pure ordinary 
exporters, mixed exporters and pure processing exporters, based on exporting values 
from Custom dataset. Table 3.6 shows that around 46% of  exporters sell less than 20% 
of  their total outputs in foreign markets, although this propensity has been falling over 
time from over 52% in 2000 to 44% in 2006. At the other end of  the table, we see that 
about 10% sell sell greater than 90% of  their outputs abroad.121  
 [Table 3.6 about here] 
  When we compare the distribution shown in Table 3.6 with the situation in the US and 
Germany following Lu (2010) we find the pattern is partly consistent since 66% of  US 
exporters export less than 10% of  outputs and less than 5% of  those exporters sell more 
than a half  of  outputs in foreign markets, while in Germany half  of  exporters export no 
more than 15% of  their outputs and 12.6% of  them export more than half  of  their 
                                                             
121 It is worth noting that our results differ from Lu (2010), whose analysis is based on exporting 
values reported in the industrial firm dataset (NBSC). He finds that less than 20% of  exporters export 
less than 10% of  their outputs and about 37% of  them export more than 90% of  their outputs. One 
possible explanation is that a firm’s exporting value reported by the Customs is the value actually 
conducted by the firm itself  and realized in the current period, and a firm’s exporting value reported 
in the balance sheet of  industrial firms dataset is the delivery value of  exports which also includes the 
value of  products delivered to trading intermediaries and sold abroad by trading intermediates. That is 
why Lu (2010) argues that the distribution of  China’s exporting intensity is different from that of  
developed countries (the US and Germany). He finds that the majority of  the exporters sell more 
percentage of  total outputs in foreign markets and in his work more than half  of  exporters export 
larger than 60% of  their final outputs.  
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outputs. It seems that the percentage for the first category (0<export share<10%) in 
China is smaller than those in the US and Germany, with less than 33.5% of  exporters. 
However, around one half  of  Chinese exporters export less than 25% of  their exports, 
which is similar to the findings for the US and Germany where the majority of  the 
exporters sell less in the foreign markets, consistent with the argument in Bernard et al. 
(2007) that only a small proportion of  firms can enter into foreign markets and serve 
those markets. The main difference is that the percentage for the latter category (export 
share>50%) is larger and accounts for around 32%. One possible concern is that the 
processing trade in China may be influencing the results. We find that nearly 17% of  
processing exporters (firms with processing exports greater than zero) with export shares 
greater than 50% belong to pure processing exporters, around 37% of  them are mixed 
exporters and 46% are pure ordinary exporters. Moreover, the mean processing export 
share is around 42%. Since engaging in processing trade is an easier route for firms to 
enter into foreign markets it explains why in China a larger amount of  exporters export 
more than half  of  their outputs when compared to the US and Germany. 
  In Table 3A.1, we further drop the exporters with non-zero processing export values 
or non-zero processing import values leaving only pure ordinary exporters with 
processing export share equal to zero.122 From Table 3A.1 we find that nearly 44% of  
exporters export less than 10% of  outputs, 57% of  them export less than 20% and 
around 22% of  them export more than 50%. Even then there are some differences 
between the distributions of  developed countries (US, Germany) although the values for 
China are now much closer to those in developed countries. What is clear is that 
processing trade is an important element of  China’s trade.  
[Table 3A.1 about here] 
                                                             
122 A firm that imports processing inputs in the current period must re-export the outputs after 
assembly and processing to receive tariff  exemptions for the full volume of  processing imports. 
However, re-exporting may occur in the current period or the following periods. Hence, to avoid the 
bias of  processing trade, in each year we exclude firms who do not undertake both processing 
imports and processing exports in the same period. Hence, we are left with a sub-group of  OEs (with 
ProExp_share=0). This leaves 83,847 observations in total.   
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4.3.2.3 Summary  
 
Table 3.7 summarizes firm performance according to different types (NE, OE, ME and 
PE). We find that on average, exporting firms produce more, hire more workers and pay 
higher wages than non-exporting firms. Consistent with other empirical studies on China, 
non-exporters are concentrated in private-owned firms, accounting for nearly 90%, and 
are older than firms engaged in processing trade but with the lowest productivity level 
among all firms. This finding is consistent with the argument in Melitz (2003) that only 
more productive firms are capable of  selling products overseas.  
[Table 3.7 about here] 
  Among exporting firms, we observe that mixed exporters hire the most workers, have 
the highest productivity levels, create the most value-added, earn the highest average 
profits and pay the highest average wages. Most of  them are owned by foreigners or 
investors from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan (HMT), which account for more than 60% 
of  total mixed exporters. For pure ordinary exporters, they have the second highest 
productivity level, produce the second most value-added and achieve the second highest 
average profit level but hire the least workers and pay the lowest average wages to their 
workers. For pure processing exporters, they have the lowest productivity level, create the 
least value-added and earn the lowest average profits but hire the second largest 
proportion of  workers and pay the second highest average wages, which is in contrast 
with pure ordinary exporters but consistent with the previous studies who document that 
processing trade tend to concentrate in labor-intensive manufacturing industries.123 It is 
not surprisingly that most of  the pure ordinary exporters are privately-owned firms (up 
to nearly 70% of  total) and most of  the pure processing exporters are HMT-owned 
firms (reaching almost 60% of  total).  
4.3.3 Firm Switching Among Export Types 
 
                                                             
123 The definition of  labor-intensive industries is in footnote 14 of  chapter three. 
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Table 3.8 reports the average transition of  trade types over 2000-2006 among all firms 
including both non-exporting and exporting firms. The pattern figured out here 
highlights the importance of  distinguishing between different modes of  exporters in 
studying their performance and switching effects. Column (1) shows a firm’s trade type in 
period t, and columns (2)-(4) show the three possible trade types of  a firm in period 
(t+1).  
[Table 3.8 about here] 
  Hence, we use exporter dummy variables as our indicator to judge whether a firm 
belongs to a switcher among variety of  export modes. Specifically, we define a firm that 
switches from a pure processing exporter to a pure ordinary exporter (mixed exporter) as 
it is with PE dummy variable equal to one in period t and with OE (ME) dummy variable 
equal to one in the next period. Similarly, we define a firm that switches from a pure 
ordinary exporter to a pure processing exporter (mixed exporter) if  the OE dummy 
variable is equal to one in period t and with a PE (ME) dummy variable equal to one in 
the next period. Then a firm is defined as a switcher switching from a ME to a PE if  it 
belongs to ME in period t, and belongs to PE in period (t+1). Alternatively, a firm is 
defined as a switcher switching from a ME to an OE if  it belongs to ME in period t, and 
belongs to OE in period (t+1). However, except for six kinds of  switchers that switch 
among exporting firms (for PE: PE→OE and PE→ME; for OE: OE→PE and 
OE→NE; for ME: ME→PE and ME→OE) which we are mainly concerned about, 
there are other six kinds of  switchers that switch between non-exporting firms and 
exporting firms (NE→PE, NE→OE, NE→ME, PE→NE, OE→NE and ME→NE).124  
  The results in row 1 of  Table 3.8 show that non-exporters have a high persistence 
(96.25%) which suggests that the existence of  relative high fixed costs for export 
                                                             
124 Note that there are four types of  firms and therefore we have 4× (4-1) =12 kinds of  switchers. It 
is because if  a firm maintains its status in the next period, it is not a switcher and hence, to become a 
switcher, a firm only has (4-1) types of  possibilities to choose from in the next period. Excluding 6 
kinds of  switchers among exporters, there are 8 kinds of  switchers left between non-exporters and 
exporters.  
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preclude non-trading firms from beginning to export. The fact that more non-exporters 
begin exporting through ordinary trade than processing trade implies that although 
starting to export by a traditional channel requires a higher fixed entry cost that firms at a 
lower productivity level may not wish to pay, greater learning effects from exporting 
through ordinary trade channel may provide a substantial incentive for non-exporters to 
become pure ordinary exporters even if  they experience income losses in a short-run. 
Another possible explanation is that since processing trade are dominant by HMT 
investors who enjoy preferential policies and are encouraged by local government to 
conduct processing trade, and most of  the non-exporters are privately-owned firms who 
do not be favoured by policies, it is even harder for them to enter into processing trade 
than ordinary trade.  
  The transition rates of  pure processing exporters are reported in the second row. The 
much higher rate of  switching into ordinary exports as mixed exporters than into pure 
ordinary exporters reflect different structure of  fixed costs for these two export types. 
Another possible explanation is that processing trade may help less productive firms to 
learn more about foreign markets, decreasing the costs in investigation of  foreign 
markets, increasing successful matching rate with potential trading partners and 
facilitating firms become much easier to entry into foreign markets through ordinary 
trade.  
  The third row states the transition rates for firms that are pure ordinary exporters in 
period t. The high exit rate from exporting and the high persistence in pure ordinary 
exporting reflect relative high fixed costs of  entry into foreign markets through ordinary 
exports and the requirement for higher productivity levels. The final row shows the 
transition rates of  mixed exporters. The much higher rate of  switching into pure 
ordinary exporters from mixed exporters than from pure processing exporters is 
consistent with findings in Yu (2015) that less productive firms are more likely to 
self-select into processing trade and highlights that a firm’s decision of  switching from 
current trade mode to another trade mode may be correlated with its current productivity 
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level and its expectation of  productivity. Hence, firm productivity levels are helpful when 
we discuss firm switching into different types of  export and we narrow our empirical 
study to those firms switching between exporting firms. Most importantly, according to 
the mean value of  total factor productivity (TFP) for different types of  exporters, we 
classify our 6 kinds of  switchers into two groups, upward-switchers and 
downward-switchers. The former includes three kinds of  switchers (PE→ME, PE→OE 
and OE→ME) and the latter includes three kinds of  switchers (OE→PE, ME→PE and 
ME→OE).125 
4.4. Methodology 
4.4.1 Tariff Measures 
 
Following Yu (2014), we construct output and input tariffs at the firm-level using detailed 
firm-product transaction records.126  
4.4.1.1 Firm-specific Output Tariff 
 
The output tariff  of  a multi-product firm could be affected by multiple tariff  lines. To 
compute a firm-specific output tariff, we use a product-sales weighted average of  these 
product-level tariffs and we fix the product-sales share at the year in which the firm first 
enters the sample by following Topalova and Khandelwal (2011), where 
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125 According to the mean TFP in Table 7, the order from low to high among exporters is: TFPPE< 
TFPOE < TFPME, and hence, an upward-switcher is defined as a switcher that increases its TFP and a 
downward-switcher is defined as a switcher that decreases its TFP. 
126 Our sample includes firms engaged in processing trade, which can enjoy tariff  exemptions for 
their processing trade, and hence, to take into account of  such tariff  exemption, we need to measure 
output and input tariffs at the firm level to avoid possible bias as if  we measure tariffs at the industry 
level.  
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  The tariff mt  is the effectively applied tariff  of  product m in year t, and the weight 
m initialtkj _, for firm k within industry j is computed by the firm k’s sales of  product m in 
its initial year appeared in the sample, m initialtkj _, , divided by the firm’s total sales in 
the same year.,  initialtkj _, . Certainly, a product may be sold in both domestic and 
global markets. Hence, in the firm k’s first entry year m initialtkj _,  includes product m’s 
foreign sales  m initialtkj _,  and domestic sales 
mD
initialtkj _,
, and  initialtkj _,  includes 
the firm k’s total export values  
m
m
initialtkj _,  and total sales in domestic-oriented market, 

m
mD
initialtkj _, . We use the time-invariant shares to weight the firm output tariffs to avoid 
potential pitfall due to the possible reverse causality problem in firm wages.127 
  Following Melitz (2003), a higher-productive firm is not only capable of  serving the 
local market but also selling final goods in the foreign markets. Hence, we assume that if  
a product sold successfully in the foreign markets it must also be sold in the local market, 
and the product should be sold in the same share domestically and globally. Hence, we 
assume that 
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  We then insert (2) into (1) and obtain a method to calculate firm-specific output tariffs 
in equation (3) given by: 
                                                             
127 A product with high-profit margin will be sold more and hence its sales would take account the 
larger share in a firm’s total sales. Note that wages and profits are positively related. Hence, when we 
investigate the impact of  tariffs on firm wages, a bias on the output tariff  coefficient could be caused 
by using the current product-sales share to measure the firm-specific output tariffs, with the direction 
of  the bias depending on whether tariffs were higher or lower on the products with a larger share in 
total sales. For example, if  a high-profit product with a larger proportion in total sales incurs a higher 
tariff  rate, then the output tariff  effect on firm profits (wages) would face an upward bias. 
Alternatively, if  a high-profit product incurs a lower tariff  rate, a downward bias on the output tariff  
coefficient could be caused when investigating its impact on firm profits (wages). Therefore, to avoid 
this potential reverse causality, we fix the weight to measure firm output tariffs, and for each product 
we construct its time-invariant weight using data of  firm’s initial year in the sample by following 
Topalova and Khandelwal (2011). 
128 The mathematical principle is that if  
f
e
d
c
b
a
, then 

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fdb
eca
 as well and in equation (2) 
we use this principle directly. The detailed derivative process for equation (2) can be found in section 
3.1.1 of  chapter three, from equation (2) to equation (5).  
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  However, since we make a strong assumption following Yu (2015) that the proportion 
of  a product sold domestically by trading firms is the same as that in the foreign markets, 
we should exclude the firms with zero domestic sales (pure exporting firms) and the 
firms with zero exports (pure domestic-sale firms), otherwise, either of  them could bias 
our measure of  firm output tariffs. In our sample, around 9.7% (20,926 observations) of  
firms are pure exporting firms and around 11.6% (25,032 observations) are pure 
domestic-sale firms.129 To ensure our main estimation results are not biased by those two 
types of  firms, we need to drop them from our clean sample in all following 
regressions.130 
4.4.1.2 Firm-specific Input Tariff 
 
As mentioned in section 2.3 of  chapter three, processing imports could enjoy tariff  
exemptions in China and that part of  imports is duty free for a firm engaged in 
processing trade. To compute a firm-specific input tariff, following Yu (2015) we use an 
ordinary input-cost weighted average of  these product-level tariffs and we fix such shares 
at the year in which firm first entry into the sample to avoid potential endogeneity 
problem. Thus, we compute a firm input tariff  as follows: 
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129 Theoretically, pure exporting firms should be defined as firms with 100% exporting share, which 
means that total sales are equal to total exports. Actually, due to the different requirement of  
reporting date, for example, if  a firm receives a payment for exports in advance, this amount of  
exporting value should be recorded under the relative accounting entry according to Accounting 
Standards, even though the real exporting is not made. However, the customs could record this 
amount of  exporting value just at the time of  shipping exports or exporting done. Hence, there may 
appear a differential time node between the records of  firm and that of  customs even for the same 
trade transaction. As we use the merged firm-customs dataset, due to the different marking point 
caused by different system rules, even an actual pure exporter could not 100% match the value of  its 
total sales with the value of  its total exports, although in theory those two should be equal. 
Consequently, we roughly treat a firm as a pure exporting firm with its export share no less than 0.9, 
which is very close to one. The principle of  choosing value of  0.9 is explained in footnote 151 of  
Appendix 3A.    
130 Our clean sample is obtained after the process of  merging and basic cleaning based on two 
datasets, the firm-level production data and the product-level transaction data, and such process is 
described in Appendix 1A of  chapter two in detail. 
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where   
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  The tariff mt  is the effectively applied tariff  of  product m in year t, and the weight 
mOMinitialtkj _,  for firm k within industry j is computed by the firm k’s ordinary imports of  
product m in its initial year that it appeared in the sample, mOMinitialtkj _, , divided by the 
firm’s total imports in the same year., 
m
mTM
initialtkj _,
. Certainly, a product m may be 
imported under two different regimes, both ordinary trade ( OTm ) and processing trade 
( PTm ). Hence, in the firm k’s first entry year 
m
mTM
initialtkj _, includes the firm k’s total 
ordinary import values, 
m
mOM
initialtkj _,  and total processing import values, 

m
mPM
initialtkj _, . 
  As noted that the part of  imported inputs for processing and assembly would not be 
charged for tariffs, we do not include the set of  importing processing inputs in equation 
(4).  
4.4.1.3 Firm-specific Effective Rate of Protection (ERP) 
To test the robustness of  our results we use several alternative measures of  trade 
protections and further construct firm-level effective rate of  protection (ERP). At the 
firm level, the disciplining effect of  lowering output tariffs may be offset by lowering 
tariffs on intermediate inputs, rather than include both measures in the same equation, 
we use the firm-specific ERP to capture the net effect of  both types of  protection on 
outputs and intermediate inputs. Therefore, this was done using the following formula by 
following Corden (1966): 
)5(
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where  kjt  are the input-value share of  firm k in the production of  its total outputs 
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and  kjt  can be expressed as: 
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where the value of  total processing imports is excluded from total intermediate inputs in 
firm k. 
4.4.2 Empirical Strategy 
 
4.4.2.1 Firm Wages and Export Switching 
 
To investigate the impact of  firm switching between different export types on the 
average wage of  exporting firms, we consider the following empirical framework: 
∆ln(wage)𝑘𝑗𝑡 = α1∆Output Tariff 𝑘𝑗𝑡−1 + α2∆Output Tariff 𝑘𝑗𝑡−1 × Switcher 𝑘𝑗𝑡
+ α3∆Input Tariff kjt−1 + α4∆Input Tariff 𝑘𝑗𝑡−1 × Switcher 𝑘𝑗𝑡
+ α5Switcher 𝑘𝑗𝑡 + ΠX𝑘𝑗𝑡 + ρ𝑘 + ρ𝑙𝑡
+ ε𝑘𝑗𝑡 .                                                                                                                (6) 
  The dependent variable ∆ln(wage)𝑘𝑗𝑡 is the log difference in firm k’s average wage 
per worker in industry j between year t and year (t-1), where the average wage is defined 
as the total wage bill divided by the firm size, measured by the number of  employees.131 
∆Output Tariff 𝑘𝑗𝑡−1  and ∆Input Tariff 𝑘𝑗𝑡−1  describes the one-year difference in 
firm-level output and input tariffs respectively, both of  which are constructed by using 
the time-invariant initial trading weights, and hence the coefficients α1 and α3 give the 
effect of  output and input tariff  reduction on wages of  exporting firms without 
switching respectively. To capture the potential differential effects on the firm’s wage 
                                                             
131 Here the total wage bill only includes the standard payment to workers and does not include the 
welfare and unemployment insurance. For a robustness check, we include those extra wage 
components to construct a variable of total compensation payment, and the average of which is used 
as a dependent variable. The results are quantitatively similar and are available upon request. 
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payment between exporting switchers and exporting firms without switching induced by 
tariff  reductions, we interact the firm output (input) tariff  with switcher dummy variables 
and those interaction terms are also included. Switcher 𝑘𝑗𝑡  is a dummy variable 
denoting the firm’s switching direction, which is equal to one if  a firm k with exporting 
switching in year t, and zero otherwise and we have 6 kinds of  switcher dummy variables 
in total.132 The coefficient α5 before the switcher dummy is used to capture the other 
possible gains from exporting switching besides tariff  reductions caused by trade 
liberalization.  
  The vector X𝑘𝑗𝑡 includes other firm level characteristics as controls, such as the firm 
size (the logarithm of  firm capital), the firm performance (TFP 𝑘𝑗𝑡, firm k’s total factor 
productivity level) and ownership variables. Following Yu (2015), we do not use the 
logarithm of  firm k’s total employment to control for the firm size and we use the 
variable ln(K)𝑘𝑗𝑡, the logarithm of  firm k’s capital as an proxy for firm size instead.
133 
There are three dummy variables to describe the firm ownership structure: state-owned 
enterprise (SOE), foreign-owned, Hong Kong/Macao/Taiwan owned (HMT), and a 
dummy for other types of  firms which is the omitted category. The SOE dummy is equal 
to one if  a firm k’s government share is no less than 50%, and zero otherwise; the 
foreign-owned dummy is equal to one if  a firm k’s foreign share is greater than 50%, and 
zero otherwise; and the HMT dummy is defined as well as the foreign-owned dummy, 
equal to one if  a firm k’s HMT share is greater than 50%, and zero otherwise. 
  Finally, we include ρ𝑘  to control for time-invariant and unobservable firm fixed 
effects. ρ𝑙𝑡 is to control for firm-invariant location-year fixed effects that could affect 
wages across all industries but may vary across different regions in China.134 ε𝑘𝑗𝑡 is the 
                                                             
132 They are PE→ME, PE→OE, OE→PE, OE→ME, ME→PE and ME→OE.  
133 In our estimates the dependent variable is the log of  firm k’s average wage, which could be written 
as: ln(wage)𝑘𝑗𝑡 = ln(total wage bill/labor)𝑘𝑗𝑡 = ln(total wage bill)𝑘𝑗𝑡 − ln(labor)𝑘𝑗𝑡. Since the log of  firm 
employment is already used as the denominator of  the dependent variable, it is inappropriate to use it 
as a proxy to control for firm size in equation (6). Hence, we use ln(K)𝑘𝑗𝑡 to control for firm size. 
134 Following Kamal et al. (2012), we utilize information on a firm’s region code to construct firm’s 
location categories. Based on two-digit region code, which is equivalent to the province level, we 
group Chinese regions into five categories – (1) Costal: Beijing (code: 11), Tianjin (12), Hebei (13), 
Shanghai (31), Jiangsu (32), Zhejiang (33), Fujian (35), Shandong (37), Guangdong (44) and Hainan 
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error term.  
We further interact firm output and input tariffs with the change in processing export 
share of  switchers rather than a switcher dummy in some of  the specifications. Finally, 
we exploit another approach to investigate the effects of  exporting switching after trade 
reform on firm average wage by combining the impacts of  output and input tariffs and 
use firm ERP instead of  firm output and input tariffs. 
  To avoid the potential endogeneity of  tariff  reductions, we restrict the sample to the 
period 2002-2006 and use one-year lagged trade protections in each specification because 
firm wages are unlikely to have adjusted instantaneously. 
4.4.2.2 Determinants of Export Switching 
 
We further investigate whether a firm’s decision to switch between different modes of  
exporting is determined by the changes in output tariffs and input tariffs following a 
period of  tariff  liberalization. Hence, we conduct a Probit model as follows: 
Prob(Switcher = 1|Ζ) = Φ(Ζϖ)
= Φ(β0 + β1∆Output Tariff 𝑘𝑗𝑡−1 + β2∆Input Tariff 𝑘𝑗𝑡−1 + β3∆TFP 𝑘𝑗,𝑡 + β4∆ln(K) 𝑘𝑗,𝑡
+ β5∆SOE dummy 𝑘𝑗,𝑡−1+𝛽6∆Foreign dummy 𝑘𝑗,𝑡−1+𝛽7∆HMTdummy 𝑘𝑗,𝑡−1 + δ𝑗
+ δ𝑡),                                                                                                                                                     (7) 
where the dependent variable is Switcher 𝑘𝑗𝑡 , a dummy variable denoting the firm’s 
switching direction, which is equal to one if  a firm k with exporting switching in year t, 
and zero otherwise and we have 6 kinds of  switcher dummy variables to denote an 
exporter’s switching between different modes of  exporting. We include firms output and 
input tariffs, firm performance (TFP 𝑘𝑗,𝑡), firm size (log of  firm capital) and firm 
ownership structure (include three dummy variables, SOE dummy, foreign-owned 
                                                                                                                                                                              
(46); (2)Inland: Shanxi (14), Anhui (34), Jiangxi (36), Henan (41); (3)Northeast: Hubei (42), Hunan 
(43); (4)Southwest: Liaoning (21), Jilin (22), Heilongjiang (23), Guangxi (45), Chongqing (50), Sichuan 
(51), Guizhou (52) and Yunnan (53); (5)Northwest: Inner Mongolia (15), Tibet (54), Shanxi (61), 
Gansu (62), Qinghai (63), Ningxia (64) and Xingjiang (65). Hence, there are four location dummies: 
Costal, Inland, Northeast and Southwest, and Northwest is the omitted dummy. 
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dummy and HMT-owned dummy) as our explanatory variables in equation (7). Finally, 
Φ is the cumulative distribution function of  the standard normal distribution and ϖ is 
a vector of  unknown parameters. 
  To avoid time-invariant firm fixed effects that may be correlated with firm tariffs, we 
take one-period difference for every variable and then use them in our equation. 
Additionally, we control for location-year fixed effects in equation (7) and use the sample 
of  post-WTO period (2002-2006). 
5. Empirical Results 
In order to investigate the impact of  switching between exporters on firm wages, we 
conduct our empirical estimations based on equation (6) with controls of  location-year 
fixed effects in all regressions.  
5.1 Firm Wages and Export Switching  
 
Table 3.9 reports the basic results of  how exporter switching affect firm wages following 
a period of  tariff  liberalization, and we then use the change in firm output and input 
tariffs and those tariffs interacted with switcher dummy variables to investigate how tariff  
reductions affect firm wages by switching among different modes of  exporting. We then 
use six switcher dummy variables in all the columns.  
[Table 3.9 about here] 
  The results in columns (1) and (2) are based on the sub-sample of  pure processing 
exporters in period (t-1), in column (1) we only include firm level output and input tariffs 
and in column (2) we further include their interaction terms with switcher dummies 
(PE→OE and PE→ME). We find that in column (1) only the coefficient on the change 
in firm output tariff  is significant and positive, indicating that a decrease in firm output 
tariffs decreases wages of  exporting firms, which is consistent with our findings in 
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chapter two. In column (2) the positive coefficient on firm output tariffs remain the same 
and we further find a significantly negative coefficient on the change in firm input tariffs 
interacted with a switcher from PE to OE, which suggests that if  a firm switches from a 
pure processing exporter into a pure ordinary exporter, it will pay higher wages for 
workers relative to those firms do not change their status since it experiences a decline in 
input tariffs. Such a growth in wages could be explained by a growth in productivity since 
the ranking of  productivity is that pure ordinary exporters have higher productivity level 
than pure processing exporters. Or another possible explanation is that following a cut in 
input tariffs, firms become much easier to access to high-quality imported inputs and 
hence raise their productivity level and hence pay higher wages. As a result, the gain of  
higher productivity may be the motivation for PEs switching into OEs even if  they need 
to bare the relatively high costs of  conducting ordinary trade. However, we find no 
significant coefficients on either a switcher dummy from PE to OE or a switcher dummy 
from PE to ME. 
  The results in columns (3) and (4) are based on the sub-sample of  pure ordinary 
exporters in period (t-1) and in column (3) we only find a significant and negative 
coefficient on the switcher dummy from OE to PE, implying that lower wages are paid 
for workers that work in a firm switching from a pure ordinary exporter to a pure 
processing firm. This may due to a decrease in firm profits as if  a firm chooses to engage 
in processing trade, it has to share a part of  their profits with foreign buyers. In column 
(4) we only find a find a significant and positive coefficient on the interaction term of  
firm input tariffs and the switcher from pure ordinary exporters to pure processing 
exporters, indicating that if  a firm experiences a cut in input tariffs, it pay lower wages 
during its switching from OE to PE. 
  Moreover, the results in columns (5) and (6) are based on the sub-sample of  mixed 
exporters in period (t-1). We only find a negative and significant coefficient on the 
switcher dummy from ME to OE in columns (5) and (6). The results suggest that 
although a firm switches from being a mixed exporter to a pure ordinary exporting and 
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supposes to experience an increase in its productivity level, it will pay lower wages to 
workers relative to those firms that persist in their previous status. This could be 
explained by the fact that through ordinary trade channel it may cost firms a higher cost 
to enter into foreign markets and learn from exporting in a comparison to processing 
trade. Additionally, it is much easier for mixed exporters to find out and match with 
potential foreign markets for processing trade rather than ordinary trade. That is also why 
mixed exporters could not benefit from switching into pure ordinary exporters. However, 
firm wages are rarely affected by firm switching from mixed exporter to any other type 
of  exporter status when experiencing a reduction on both output and input tariffs. 
  Based on the results of  Table 3.9, we document that decreasing firm input tariffs can 
affect firm wages of  those exporters that switch between pure processing exporters and 
pure ordinary exporters.  
4.5.2 Additional Controls and Determinants of Export Switching 
 
In Tables 3.10-3.12 we include additional controls, which include firm ownership 
structure, firm productivity level and firm size and we further investigate whether tariff  
liberalization can determine a firm’s decision to switch between different modes of  
exporting. Additionally, we allocate firms to one of  three groups: PEs in period (t-1), 
OEs in period (t-1) and MEs in period (t-1). We then report the empirical results for each 
group respectively. 
4.5.2.1 Pure Processing Exporters 
Table 3.10 reports the results based on the group of  PEs in period (t-1). In columns 
(1)-(3) we include additional controls for firm characteristics and find that even after 
controls for firm ownership, firm productivity and firm size, our conclusions based on 
column (2) of  Table 3.9 still hold. In addition, we find that workers worked who are 
employed in HMT-owned firms get higher wages.  
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[Table 3.10 about here] 
  Then, in columns (4)-(7) we detect the relationship between tariff  reduction and firm 
switching from being pure processing exporter to any other type of  export status. In 
column (4) we first examine the link between tariff  liberalization and the firm’s decision 
to switch from pure processing exporter to pure ordinary exporter and only include firm 
level output and input tariffs. For output tariff, we find no significant coefficient on them, 
and for input tariffs, we find a negative and significant coefficient on them, which 
suggests that a fall in firm level input tariffs will lead to a switch from PE to OE. We 
then in column (5) additionally include firm characteristic variables and find our 
conclusion based on column (4) hold. Moreover, the coefficient on the log of  firm 
capital becomes negative and significant and the coefficient on SOE dummy is now 
negative and significant, suggesting that SOEs and firms with more capital are less likely 
to switch from being pure processor exporters to pure ordinary exporters.  
  Similarly, in columns (6) and (7) we investigate whether tariff  reductions can 
determine the decision of  a firm to switch from a pure processing exporter to a mixed 
exporter. We also find a negative and significant coefficient on firm level input tariffs in 
both column (6) and column (7), suggesting that a fall in firm level input tariffs will lead 
to a switch from PE to ME. Additionally, the coefficient on Foreign-owned dummy is 
positive and significant in column (7), which implies that firms owned by foreign 
investors are more likely to switch from being pure processor exporters to mixed 
exporters.  
  Hence, we can conclude that it can be explained by decreasing firm-level input tariffs 
that pure processing exporters switch to either pure ordinary exporters or mixed 
exporters, and such export switching improve a firm’s productivity level. Therefore, pure 
processing exporters benefit from tariff  liberalization, especially from cutting firm level 
input tariffs. 
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4.5.2.2 Pure Ordinary Exporters 
 
Table 3.11 reports the results based on the group of  PEs in period (t-1). In columns 
(1)-(3) we include additional controls for firm characteristics and find that even after 
controls for firm ownership, firm productivity and firm size, our conclusions based on 
column (4) of  Table 3.9 still hold. We further find that workers worked in SOEs will get 
lower wages and workers worked in foreign-owned firms will get higher wages in column 
(3). In columns (4) and (5), we find a positive and significant coefficient on firm TFP, 
suggesting that high-productive firms pay higher wages. 
[Table 3.11 about here] 
  Then, in columns (4)-(7) we detect the relationship between tariff  reduction and firm 
switching from being pure ordinary exporter to any other mode of  exporting. In 
columns (4) and (5) we first examine the link between tariff  reduction and the firm’s 
decision to switch from pure ordinary exporter to pure processing exporter and column 
(4) only includes firm level output and input tariffs and column (5) includes additional 
variables to control for firm characteristics. In both columns (4) and (5) we find no 
significant coefficient on firm level output tariffs, and for input tariffs, we find a positive 
and significant coefficient on them, which suggests that pure ordinary exporters are less 
likely to switch to export through processing trade only when experience a decline in 
firm level input tariffs. We then in column (5) additionally find that the coefficient on 
firm productivity level is positive and significant and the coefficient on foreign-owned 
dummy is negative and significant, suggesting that foreign-owned firms and 
low-productive firms are less likely to switch from being pure ordinary exporters to pure 
processing exporters.135  
  Similarly, in columns (6) and (7) we investigate whether tariff  reductions can 
                                                             
135 One explanation for this is that non-exporters with low productivity level are willing to self-select 
into processing trade. But if  a firm used to be a pure ordinary exporter, even if  it experiences a 
decline in its productivity level, it would not immediately switch into processing trade in the short-run. 
It would still try to survive as a pure ordinary exporter or maybe switch to being a mixed exporter 
shortly and temporally.  
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determine the decision of  a firm to switch from a pure ordinary exporter to a mixed 
exporter and we find a negative and significant coefficient on firm level input tariffs in 
both columns (6) and (7), suggesting that a fall in firm level input tariffs will lead to a 
switch from OE to ME. Additionally, the coefficient on firm productivity level is positive 
and significant and the coefficient on the log of  firm capital is also positive and 
significant in column (7), implying that high-productive firms and firms with high capital 
are more likely to switch from being pure ordinary exporters to mixed exporters.  
  Hence, we can conclude that cutting firm-level input tariffs encourage pure ordinary 
exporters to switch to mixed exporters, but prevent them to switch to pure processing 
exporters. Therefore, input tariff  reductions encourage pure ordinary exporters to switch 
to a direction of  higher productivity level since the ranking of  productivity is that mixed 
exporters have higher productivity level than pure ordinary exporters, which is based on 
our summary analysis. However, output tariff  reductions have no impact on the decision 
of  pure ordinary exporters to switch into either pure processing exporters or mixed 
exporters. 
4.5.2.3 Mixed Exporters 
 
Finally, Table 3.12 reports the results based on the group of  MEs in period (t-1) and we 
do not find any significant coefficients on tariff  variables in columns (1)-(3). However, 
we find a negative and significant coefficient on the switcher dummy from ME to OE, 
which suggests that firms pay lower wages when it experience a export switching from 
being a mixed exporter to a pure ordinary exporter. With additional controls of  firm size, 
productivity level, we further find a positive and significant coefficient on firm 
productivity level in columns (2) and (3), which implies that firms with higher 
productivity will pay higher wages.  
[Table 3.12 about here] 
  Similarly, in columns (4)-(7) we detect the relationship between tariff  reduction and 
  150 / 256 
 
firm switching from being mixed exporters to either pure processing exporters or pure 
ordinary exporters. In columns (4) and (5) we only find a positive and significant 
coefficient on firm level input tariffs, implying that mixed exporters are less likely to 
switch to engage in processing trade only following a fall in firm level input tariffs. In 
columns (6) and (7) we investigate whether tariff  reductions can determine the decision 
of  a firm to switch from a mixed exporter to a pure ordinary exporter and we find a 
negative and significant coefficient on firm level input tariffs in both columns (6) and (7), 
suggesting that a fall in firm level input tariffs will lead to a switch from ME to OE, but 
only find a negative and significant coefficient on firm level output tariffs in column (6), 
which suggests that a fall in firm level output tariffs may also lead to a switch from ME 
to OE. Additionally, the coefficient on firm productivity level is positive and significant 
and the coefficients on all dummy variables that indicate a firm’s ownership structure are 
also positive and significant in column (7), implying that high-productive firms and firms 
that do not belong to privately-owned enterprises are more likely to switch from being 
mixed exporters to pure ordinary exporters.  
  Hence, we can conclude that cutting firm-level input tariffs encourage mixed exporters 
to switch to pure ordinary exporters, but prevent them to switch to pure processing 
exporters. Although based on the ranking productivity level of  pure ordinary exporters is 
lower than that of  mixed exporters, the willing of  firms to become producers rather than 
processors becomes even stronger after a period of  tariff  liberalization. It may reflect a 
fact that firms desire to be independent in dealing with international trade and would not 
like to share profits with others in a long-run.  
4.5.3 Robustness  
4.5.3.1 Effective Rate of Protection 
 
Then, in Tables 3A.2 we replace firm output and input tariffs with firm ERP and 
re-estimate the equation (6) as robustness check. We find a significantly negative 
coefficient on firm ERP in the first four columns and further find a significantly negative 
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coefficient on firm ERP interacted with the switcher dummy from OE to PE, which 
implies that a fall in ERP will lead to an increase in wages for both PEs and OEs without 
switching and lead to an even greater increase in wages for OEs switching into PEs. 
Moreover, we find that the coefficients on the switcher dummy from OE to PE are 
negative and significant in columns (3) and (4), which is consistent with the finding in 
column (3) of  Table 3.9. Such a negative and significant coefficient means that lower 
wages are paid for workers that work in a firm switching from a pure ordinary exporter 
to a pure processing firm. 
[Table 3A.2 about here] 
  In the last two columns for the group of  MEs in period (t-1), we find a positive and 
significant coefficient on firm ERP in both columns, a negative and significant 
coefficient on its interaction term with the switcher dummy from ME to PE and a 
positive and significant coefficient on its interaction term with the switcher dummy from 
ME to OE in column (6). Hence, a fall in firm level ERP lower firm wages of  mixed 
exporters who persist their export status, increases firm wages of  mixed exporters who 
switch to pure processing exporters and lower wages of  mixed exporters who switch to 
pure ordinary exporters. Moreover, in the last column the coefficient on the switcher 
dummy from ME to OE is significantly negative, which is consistent with finding in 
column (6) of  Table 3.9 and suggests that firms switching from being mixed exporters to 
pure ordinary exporters pay lower wages. 
4.5.3.2 Determinants of Export Switching Among All Types 
 
Following tariff  liberalization, firms may have different choices according to their current 
business status. As a result of  this, there must be more than two types of  export 
switching and hence, we use multinomial logit model to detect the effect of  decreasing 
firm tariff  rates on determining a firm’s export status and we report our findings in Table 
3A.3.  
  152 / 256 
 
[Table 3A.3 about here] 
In the first six columns we only regress the switcher types on both output and input 
tariff  reductions and in the last six columns we additionally controls for firm size, firm 
productivity and firm ownership structures. For a current pure processing exporter, no 
matter with or without firm characteristic controls, it is less likely to become a pure 
ordinary exporter after falls in input tariff  rates, which supports our previous findings in 
columns (4) and (5) of  Table 3.10. However, such a pure processing exporter is also less 
likely to become a mixed exporter after falls in output tariff  rates which is contrast to 
those found in columns (6) and (7) of  Table 3.10. For pure ordinary exporters, falling 
output and input tariffs rates has no impact on switching their status into pure processing 
exporters whilst such falls in both types of  tariffs have a negative impact on firm’s 
switching into mixed exporters and thus those tariff  reductions do not encourage pure 
ordinary exporters to engage in processing trade. Further, for those are currently engaged 
in both ordinary and processing exports, the effects seem to be complicated as 
decreasing output tariff  rates would decrease the possibility to become pure processors 
but decreasing input tariff  rates would increase the possibility to become pure processors. 
But if  mixed exporters are willing to switch into pure ordinary exporters, tariff  
liberalization only has a negative effect on such switching and may hurt their willing, 
which is the same conclusion as we concluded based on the last two columns of  Table 
3.12. 
6. Conclusions 
The effect of  trade liberalization on wages has generated a vast literature in international 
economics. No previous study has investigated the role of  export status switching and 
how switching status affect firm wages during a period of  tariffs liberalization in China. 
This paper fills this gap and we explore how firm switching between exporting types 
affects wage payment for exporting firms and the determinants of  firm switching 
between different modes of  exporting. Specifically, we investigate the role of  processing 
trade: whether China has learned from processing trade, which is another potential 
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channel for penetrating foreign markets.   
  Our empirical analysis examines the relationship between tariff  reductions and wages 
for export switching firms during the period 2002-2006, specifically taking the special 
tariff  treatment into account for processing firms. We conclude that during tariffs 
liberalization, cutting firm output has affected wages for pure processing exporters who 
do not switch export status and cutting input tariffs has affected wages for pure 
processing exporters and pure ordinary exporters who switch export status. Tariff  
reductions appear to have little impact on mixed exporters.   
  Specifically, a cut in output tariffs decreases wages for pure processing exporters who 
do not switch and pure processing exporters who switch to being pure ordinary 
exporters pay higher wages when they experience a cut in input tariffs. In contrast, a fall 
in input tariffs decreases wages for pure ordinary exporters who switch to being pure 
processing exporters. 
  One concern in our empirical analysis is the determinants for firm exporting switching. 
Whether such switching is induced by tariff  liberalization and we highlight that input 
tariff  reduction at the firm level can determine the decision of  the firms to switch 
between different modes of  exporting, which is very important for us to understand a 
firm’s exporting behavior. Most importantly, such reduction on firm level input tariffs 
always encourage exporting firms switch to another status to upgrade their productivity 
level. 
  In this chapter, we do not investigate the survival rates post switching which is an 
interesting question. The answer would depend on the link between export switching and 
changes in firm production or changes in unobserved product quality or technology. This 
remains an area for our future research. 
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Chapter 5. Conclusions 
In this chapter we provide a brief  summary of  our results and then address some of  the 
limitations with the thesis and finally provide some suggests for future research. 
5.1 Summary of Results 
 
To examine the relationship between firm performance and engagement in international 
trade we needed to combine data from the Chinese Annual Survey of  Industrial Firms 
data with detailed Custom trade data.  In practice merging those two datasets is not a 
simple process and the detailed matching process is reported in Appendix 1B of  Chapter 
2. 
Using our merged unbalanced panel, Chapter 2 tests the theoretical model of  Amiti 
and Davis (2011) and answers the question of  how changes in trade protection affect 
wages of  Chinese manufacturing firms. Using an OLS approach the results show that a 
decline in both output and input tariffs increases the wages of  firms who source raw 
materials and intermediate inputs, and sell final products in the domestic market, and a 
fall in output tariffs decreases the wages of  firms who export. Specifically, the findings 
can be interpreted as suggesting that on average, a 10% fall in output tariffs leads to a 
1.19% wage gain for non-exporting firms and a 10 % fall in output tariffs leads to a 3.72% 
wage gain for non-importing firms. Overall, the impact of  industry input tariff  
reductions on firm wages is stronger than that of  industry output tariff  reductions, at 
least three times as high as any gains from decreasing output tariffs. It is documented that 
such findings are not consistent with the predictions in Amiti and Davis (2011) which are 
based on Indonesian data are consistent with the results from Kamal et al. (2012). 
Chapter 3 investigates the relationship between firm-level tariff  reduction and the 
wages of  trading firms for the period of  2002-2006 and try to figure out the role of  
processing trade in China. The results show that a cut in firm-level output tariffs 
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increases wages for firms who use processing imports relative to those non-processing 
firms, although the same is true for firms who do not import processing inputs when 
experience a cut in firm-level input tariffs. Specifically, such findings predict that cutting 
output tariffs in the sample period contributes almost 0.49% to the wage gap between 
processing firms and non-processing firms after China joined the WTO in 2001. 
Finally, Chapter 4 explores how firm switching between different export types affects 
the wage payments of  exporting firms and examines whether tariff  reductions at the 
firm-level can determine a firm’s decision to switch between different modes of  
exporting. The results suggest that a cut in output tariffs affects wages of  pure 
processing exporters who persist in their export status and a cut in input tariffs affects 
the wages of  pure processing exporters and pure ordinary exporters both of  who switch 
their export status. Moreover, it is highlighted that input tariff  reductions at the 
firm-level can determine a firm’s decision of  switching export status and such reductions 
always encourage exporters to switch to another export status for acquiring higher 
productivity level. 
5.2 Limitations and Future Research 
One of  the limitations of  this thesis is the relatively short panel after China’s entry into 
WTO and hence it is not enough to detect the impact of  trade liberalization on Chinese 
manufacturing firms in a long run. We also lack information on the exact location of  a 
firm (longitude and latitude which tells us where a firm is located).  This prevents us 
investigating more closely the relationship between trade and geographic factors such as 
how geographical factors affect a firm’s location choice relative to transportation costs 
and the role of  networks and clusters. Ideally we would also have access to individual 
level data from laborforce surveys that we could merge into the data.  Unfortunately 
this data is not available for China.  Other extensions that we are considering include an 
analysis of  firm survival and switching as well as examining issues relating to 
multi-product firms and the role of  product quality and product upgrading.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1.1. Trade Protection in China, 2000-2006 (%) 
 
4-digit  
 
3-digit 
Year 
Output Tariff  
 
Output Tariff  
 
Input Tariff  
 
Effective Rate of Protection 
Mean S.D. 
 
Mean S.D. 
 
Mean S.D. 
 
Mean S.D. 
⑴ ⑵   ⑶ ⑷   ⑸ ⑹   ⑺ ⑻ 
2000 18.09  12.88  
 
12.66  11.96  
 
10.88  4.76  
 
9.49  29.01  
2001 16.97  11.78  
 
11.84  11.14  
 
10.13  4.46  
 
9.06  27.35  
2002 13.04  9.37  
 
9.00  8.59    7.51  3.39  
 
7.55  21.49  
2003 11.76  8.59  
 
7.91  7.72    6.73  3.07  
 
6.12  19.52  
2004 10.82  8.13  
 
7.33  7.11  
 
6.26  2.80  
 
5.55  18.24  
2005 10.27  7.82  
 
6.81  6.48  
 
5.87  2.57  
 
4.84  16.30  
2006 10.15  7.74  
 
6.78  6.58  
 
5.83  2.62  
 
4.98  17.07  
All 13.01  10.11    8.86  8.97  
 
7.57  3.94  
 
6.77  21.69  
Table 1.1 reports the mean and standard deviation of trade protection across 4-digit industries and IO sectors 
(equivalent to three-digit industry). Columns 1-2 report statistics for 4-digit industry output tariffs. Columns 3-4 report 
statistics for 3-digit industry output tariffs. Columns 5-6 report statistics for 3-digit industry input tariffs, measured in 
equation (1) of section 3.3.1, and input tariffs are constructed using the 2002 Input-Output Matrix Table for China. 
Columns 7-8 report statistics for the 3-digit industry effective rate of protection, measured in equation (2) of section 
3.3.2.  
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Table 1.2. Output and Input Tariffs in China, 2000-2006 (%) 
2-digit Industry 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 6-period Change 
Code Name Output Input Output Input Output Input Output Input Output Input Output Input Output Input Output Input 
13 Manuf. agricultural products 29.77  17.59  28.18  16.72  20.74  12.52  18.81  11.58  17.52  10.93  15.30  10.00  16.61  10.44  -13.16  -7.15  
14 Manuf. food products 26.47  17.49  24.94  16.67  20.14  12.19  18.48  11.47  16.89  10.82  16.52  9.47  16.66  10.01  -9.81  -7.48  
15 Manuf. drink products 35.32  17.17  32.64  16.29  25.02  12.48  25.74  12.21  21.67  11.24  19.40  9.95  19.30  10.57  -16.02  -6.60  
17 Manuf. textile products 21.83  16.19  20.17  15.16  16.41  11.62  14.05  10.11  12.14  8.77  10.65  7.77  10.70  7.88  -11.13  -8.30  
18 Manuf. apparel, footwear etc. 27.06  16.30  24.08  15.11  21.76  11.91  19.68  10.27  17.65  8.81  16.38  7.75  16.40  7.82  -10.66  -8.49  
19 Manuf. leather products, fur etc. 21.94  15.77  20.50  14.85  17.61  12.61  16.31  11.73  15.05  10.84  14.76  10.31  14.77  10.48  -7.17  -5.29  
20 Manuf. wood and wood products 11.86  11.61  11.21  11.01  7.61  6.74  6.82  6.35  5.82  5.88  5.37  5.52  5.45  5.45  -6.41  -6.16  
21 Furniture manufacturing 22.00  11.69  20.52  11.02  12.59  7.51  9.41  6.83  6.36  6.19  3.31  5.95  3.25  5.87  -18.75  -5.83  
22 Manuf. paper, paper products 15.95  11.46  14.82  10.63  9.52  7.30  8.05  6.62  6.69  5.93  5.80  5.32  5.75  5.32  -10.20  -6.14  
23 Printing and reproduction media  15.63  12.12  14.04  11.26  9.99  7.74  7.92  6.83  6.69  5.98  5.69  5.31  5.69  5.29  -9.93  -6.83  
24 Manuf. cultural & entertainment products  19.96  12.91  19.20  12.08  15.20  8.91  14.52  8.03  13.53  7.24  12.02  6.84  11.60  6.71  -8.36  -6.20  
25 Processing crude oil, nuclear fuel 6.76  5.20  6.17  4.79  5.56  3.62  5.50  3.52  5.54  3.17  5.52  3.13  5.03  3.01  -1.73  -2.20  
26 Manuf. chemical raw materials 11.84  9.03  10.99  8.29  9.29  6.44  9.43  6.13  9.10  5.86  7.52  5.28  7.94  5.30  -3.90  -3.72  
27 Manuf. pharmaceuticals 9.96  10.30  9.32  9.66  6.13  7.03  5.62  6.63  5.60  6.33  5.59  5.89  5.56  5.96  -4.40  -4.34  
28 Manuf. chemical fibres 16.10  11.61  15.09  10.93  10.16  7.82  7.77  7.01  5.37  6.04  5.21  5.58  5.21  5.49  -10.89  -6.12  
29 Manuf. rubber products 16.87  13.52  16.43  12.93  14.69  8.82  14.19  8.45  13.78  8.07  13.64  7.77  12.43  7.47  -4.45  -6.04  
30 Manuf. plastic products 17.46  12.73  16.40  12.06  11.73  8.85  10.46  8.21  9.21  7.53  9.11  7.10  9.01  6.86  -8.45  -5.87  
31 Manuf. non-metal products 12.50  7.68  12.31  7.12  10.59  5.62  11.39  5.42  11.20  5.21  11.09  5.06  10.94  4.95  -1.56  -2.73  
32 Manuf. ferrous metal casting 8.19  6.26  7.41  5.69  5.65  4.46  4.71  4.07  4.76  4.00  4.69  3.91  4.63  3.79  -3.57  -2.47  
33 Manuf. non-ferrous metal casting 6.57  5.09  5.53  4.40  4.53  3.57  4.50  3.51  4.53  3.49  4.51  3.40  4.33  3.28  -2.24  -1.82  
34 Manuf. metal products 14.62  8.53  13.63  7.80  12.00  6.06  11.68  5.78  11.51  5.59  11.41  5.50  11.36  5.43  -3.25  -3.10  
35 Manuf. universal equipment  14.12  10.41  13.79  9.80  10.00  7.20  9.16  6.67  8.56  6.29  8.49  6.18  8.44  6.05  -5.68  -4.36  
36 Manuf. special equipment  13.17  10.25  12.78  9.54  9.30  7.00  8.32  6.51  8.13  6.14  8.08  6.01  8.00  5.88  -5.17  -4.36  
37 Manuf. transportation equipment  22.84  10.63  20.71  9.77  15.91  7.46  14.70  7.90  13.14  7.30  11.89  6.70  10.51  6.11  -12.33  -4.51  
39 Manuf. electric machines, appliances 15.42  10.03  14.84  9.30  10.49  6.94  9.90  6.55  9.26  6.16  9.21  6.00  9.06  5.88  -6.36  -4.15  
40 Manuf. electronic equipment  16.82  12.35  15.77  11.56  9.60  7.45  8.11  6.69  7.23  6.32  6.69  6.01  6.43  5.87  -10.39  -6.48  
41 Manuf. instruments, appliances 15.66  11.02  14.64  10.30  11.22  7.13  10.29  6.57  10.01  6.25  9.93  6.08  9.75  5.96  -5.90  -5.06  
All 17.29  11.66  16.15  10.92  12.35  8.04  11.32  7.47  10.26  6.90  9.55  6.44  9.44  6.41  -7.85  -5.25  
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Table 1.3. Correlations of China's Output Tariffs and Input Tariffs 
Output Tariff                       
3-digit Input Tariff 
Level  1-year lag Level  1-year lag 
 
⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ 
Panel A: 3-digit Output Tariff 
Level  0.79  
   
1-year lag 
 
0.79  
  
Panel B: 4-digit Output Tariff 
Level  
  
# 
 
1-year lag       0.52  
 
 
 
Table 1.4. Firms in International Trade 
Year 
Percent of firms that 
export 
Percent of firms 
that import 
Percent of 
trading firms  
Percent of 
export values  
Percent of import 
values  
2000 11.58  10.43  13.68  6.72  7.82  
2001 11.58  10.06  13.81  6.45  7.59  
2002 13.67  11.54  15.90  8.77  8.60  
2003 14.38  11.51  16.40  9.30  9.09  
2004 16.14  12.47  18.29  12.22  11.32  
2005 16.84  12.42  18.72  12.19  9.71  
2006 18.00  12.63  19.88  12.88  9.39  
All 15.20  11.81  17.24  10.79  9.38  
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Table 1.5. Output Tariff Variations Across Three-digit Industries  
The Ten Most Protected Industries 
 
The Ten Least Protected Industries 
IO Sector Number IO Sector Name Mean Output Tariffs IO Sector Number IO Sector Name Mean Output Tariffs 
16 Manuf. sugar 33.45  
 
57 Manuf.ferroalloy smelting 2.71  
20 Manuf. alcohol and alcoholic beverages 32.85  
 
54 Iron-making industry 3.14  
13 Manuf. grain milling 30.57  
 
66 Manuf. railway transport equipment  4.02  
67 Manuf. automobile 23.88  
 
75 Manuf. electronic computer 4.18  
21 Manuf. other drink products 23.39  
 
58 Manuf. Non-ferrous metal smelting 4.32  
78 Manuf. household audiovisual equipment 21.30  
 
59 Non-ferrous metal rolling processing  5.58  
28 Manuf. apparel, footwear etc. 20.43  
 
37 Coking industry 5.69  
72 Manuf. home appliances 20.36  
 
77 Manuf. electronic component 5.71  
15 Processing vegetable oil  19.95  
 
36 Processing crude oil, nuclear fuel 6.10  
19 Manuf. food products and other food processing 19.83    49 Manuf. lime, plaster and cement 6.35  
Notes: Industries are defined as the most or the least protected industries based on the average output tariff rate for each industry over the period 2000-2006. 
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Table 1.6. Reductions in Trade Protection and Pre-reform Industrial Characteristics (2000) 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Wage) Ln(Output)  Ln(Labour) Ln(Value-added) Ln(Total Profit) Ln(Revenue) Skill Intensity 
Change in Trade Protection ⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ ⑸ ⑹ ⑺ 
Panel A: Change in Output Tariff (4-digit) 
 
-0.001 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.007 0.000 
 
(0.002) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.000) 
R2 0.695 0.606 0.597 0.600 0.569 0.607 0.853 
Observations 408 408 408 407 408 408 408 
Panel B: Change in Output Tariff (3-digit) 
 
-0.006 0.006 0.030 0.007 -0.011 0.004 0.001 
 
(0.007) (0.035) (0.032) (0.037) (0.045) (0.035) (0.001) 
R2 0.715 0.336 0.459 0.351 0.354 0.326 0.750 
Observations 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
Panel C: Change in Input Tariff (3-digit) 
 
-0.026** -0.021 0.052 -0.018 -0.065 -0.026 -0.004 
 
(0.011) (0.059) (0.051) (0.058) (0.073) (0.061) (0.003) 
R2 0.732 0.337 0.453 0.351 0.363 0.328 0.755 
Observations 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
Panel D: Change in Industry ERP (3-digit) 
 
-0.001 -0.001 0.006 -0.000 -0.004 -0.002 0.000 
 
(0.003) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.001) 
R2 0.710 0.335 0.449 0.350 0.354 0.326 0.752 
Observations 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; significant at *10%; **5%; ***1%. All regressions include industry fixed effects and 3-digit industry FEs are controlled in panel A whilst 
2-digit industry FEs are controlled in the rest panels. The regressions are weighted by the square root of the number of firms within any one industry. 
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Table 1.7. Current Industry Wage and Subsequent Trade Protection 
Dependent Variable: Current Trade 
Protection 
Full sample Pre-WTO (2000-2001) Post-WTO (2002-2006) 
⑴ ⑵ ⑶ 
Panel A: Output Tariff (4-digit) 
Lagged Industry average wage -0.004 0.003 -0.002 
 
(0.006) (0.024) (0.004) 
R2 0.312 0.738 0.295 
Observations 2,451 407 2,044 
Panel B: Output Tariff (3-digit) 
Lagged Industry average wage -0.026* 0.068 -0.017 
 
(0.015) (0.053) (0.013) 
R2 0.608 0.637 0.493 
Observations 414 69 345 
Panel C: Input Tariff (3-digit) 
Lagged Industry average wage -0.008 0.038** -0.004 
 
(0.005) (0.018) (0.003) 
R2 0.790 0.767 0.679 
Observations 414 69 345 
Panel D: Industry ERP (3-digit) 
Lagged Industry average wage -0.054 0.100 -0.030 
 
(0.034) (0.188) (0.031) 
R2 0.282 0.409 0.263 
Observations 414 69 345 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at 4-digit industry level; significant at 
*10%; **5%; ***1%. All regressions include 3-digit industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. The regressions are 
weighted by the number of firms within any one industry for each year. 
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Table 1.8. Estimation for Theoretical Assumptions (post-WTO) 
Dependent Variable: ln(wage) k,j,t ln(wage) k,j,t ln(wage) k,j,t ln(wage) k,j,t ln(wage) k,j,t 
  ⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ ⑸ 
Ln(Total profit) k,j,t 0.068***     
 
(0.001) 
    
Ln(Operating profit) k,j,t 0.069*** 
   
  
(0.001) 
   
FXX k,j,t 
  
0.104*** 0.085*** 0.090*** 
 
  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
FMM k,j,t 
  
0.562*** 0.508*** 0.491*** 
 
  
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
FXM k,j,t 
  
0.457*** 0.405*** 0.398*** 
 
  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
LnK k,j,t    
0.035*** 0.033*** 
    
(0.001) (0.001) 
Skill intensity j,t     
1.168*** 
     
(0.021) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.161  0.158  0.149  0.157  0.165  
Observations 772,406 730,386 772,406 772,406 772,406 
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; significant at *10%; **5%; 
***1%. Industry fixed effects are controlled at the 2-digit industry level.  
 
 
Table 1.9. Estimation for Theoretical Assumptions (post-WTO) 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Ln(Labour)k,j,t Ln(Labour)k,j,t Ln(Valu-added)k,j,t Ln(Value-added)k,j,t TFPdlk,j,t TFPdlk,j,t 
  ⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ ⑸ ⑹ 
FXX k,j,t 0.475*** 0.474*** 0.420*** 0.156*** 0.251*** 0.125*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
FMM k,j,t 0.503*** 0.509*** 1.222*** 0.444*** 0.847*** 0.459*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) 
FXM k,j,t 0.792*** 0.794*** 1.187*** 0.442*** 0.780*** 0.414*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) 
LnK k,j,t    
0.489*** 
 
0.238*** 
    
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
Skill intensity j,t  
-0.371*** 
 
0.893*** 
 
1.030*** 
  
(0.050) 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.044) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.076  0.076  0.081  0.431  0.070  0.193  
Observations 772,406 772,406 765,834 765,834 765,834 765,834 
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; significant at *10%; **5%; 
***1%. Industry fixed effects are controlled at the 2-digit industry level.  
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Table 1.10. Baseline Regressions for Tariffs and Wages (post-WTO) 
Dependent Variable: 
ln(wage) k,j,t 
OT OT × 
Exporter 
IT  IT × 
Importer 
Both Trade 
shares 
Identify FXM firms  
Dummies  Shares 
  ⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ ⑸ ⑹ ⑺ ⑻ 
Output tariff j,t-1 -0.134*** -0.143***   -0.119*** -0.116*** -0.121*** -0.116*** 
 (0.022) (0.0221)   (0.023) (0.0222) (0.023) (0.022) 
OT j,t-1× FX 
(ExportShare)k,j,t 
 0.096**   0.083** 0.241*   
  (0.041)   (0.041) (0.125)   
OT j,t-1× FXX 
(ExportShare)k,j,t 
      0.057 0.152 
       (0.048) (0.141) 
OT j,t-1× FXM 
(ExportShare)k,j,t 
      0.163*** 0.448*** 
       (0.059) (0.169) 
Input tariff j,t-1   -0.478*** -0.491*** -0.372*** -0.360*** -0.370*** -0.360*** 
   (0.087) (0.0877) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) 
IT j,t-1× FM (ImportShare)k,j,t    0.234* 0.193 -0.398   
    (0.136) (0.137) (0.816)   
IT j,t-1× FMM 
(ImportShare)k,j,t 
      0.398* 0.245 
       (0.205) (0.915) 
IT j,t-1× FMX 
(ImportShare)k,j,t 
      -0.040 -1.406 
       (0.176) (1.323) 
FX (ExportShare)k,j,t 0.002 -0.009 0.002 0.002 -0.008 -0.043**   
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.019)   
FXX (ExportShare)k,j,t       -0.005 -0.035 
       (0.007) (0.022) 
FXM (ExportShare)k,j,t       -0.008 -0.059** 
       (0.014) (0.025) 
FM (ImportShare)k,j,t 0.006 0.006 0.006 -0.012 -0.009 0.049 
 
 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.067) 
 
 
FMM (ImportShare)k,j,t       -0.026 0.015 
       (0.018) (0.082) 
FMX_ImportShare k,j,t        0.106 
        (0.097) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.111 0.111 0.110 0.111 0.111 0.111 0.111 0.111 
Observations 516,799 516,799 516,799 516,799 516,799 516,799 516,799 516,799 
Joint Significance tests for coefficients on tariffs and interaction terms 
OT for exporter 
 
 -0.047    -0.036  
  
 
 
 (0.042)   (0.043)  
  
OT for 
exporter-importer 
        0.042   0.332** 
       (0.059) (0.168)  
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; significant at *10%; **5%; ***1%. Industry fixed 
effects are controlled at the 2-digit industry level.  
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Table 1.11. Baseline Regressions for ERP and Wages (post-WTO) 
Dependent Variable: ln(wage) k,j,t 
ERP ERP × global engagement 
dummies 
Trade shares 
  ⑴ ⑵ ⑶ 
ERP j,t-1 -0.079*** -0.085*** -0.081*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
ERP j,t-1× FXX (ExportShare)k,j,t  0.025 0.076 
  (0.029) (0.083) 
ERP j,t-1× FMM (ImportShare)k,j,t  0.023 -0.082 
  (0.048) (0.195) 
ERP j,t-1× FXM k,j,t  0.130***  
  (0.036)  
ERP j,t-1× FXM_ExportShare k,j,t   0.309*** 
   (0.099) 
ERP j,t-1× FXM_ImportShare k,j,t   -0.078 
   (0.226) 
FXX (ExportShare)k,j,t 0.002 -0.002 -0.028 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.018) 
FMM (ImportShare)k,j,t 0.006 0.002 0.044 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.042) 
FXM k,j,t 0.007 -0.011  
 (0.005) (0.007)  
FXM_ExportSshare k,j,t   -0.054** 
   (0.021) 
FXM_ImportShare k,j,t   0.012 
   (0.043) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Location FE Yes Yes Yes 
Location-year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.111 0.111 0.111 
Observations 516,799 516,799 516,799 
Joint Significance tests for coefficients on ERP and interaction terms 
ERP for exporter- importer   0.045  
    (0.036)  
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; significant at *10%; **5%; 
***1%. Industry fixed effects are controlled at the 2-digit industry level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 174 - 
 
 
 
Table 1.12. Regressions for Tariffs and Wages - additional controls (post-WTO) 
Dependent Variable:  
ln(wage) k,j,t 
Ownership Size Productivity 
Drop 
switchers 
Balanced Trade 
shares 
  ⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ ⑸ ⑹ 
Output tariff j,t-1 -0.119*** -0.117*** -0.111*** -0.145*** -0.114*** -0.112*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.027) (0.029) (0.028) 
OT j,t-1× FX (ExportShare)k,j,t 0.084** 0.083** 0.083** 0.087* 0.086* 0.354** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.047) (0.051) (0.160) 
Input tariff j,t-1 -0.371*** -0.351*** -0.406*** -0.513*** -0.482*** -0.459*** 
 (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.108) (0.109) (0.109) 
IT j,t-1× FM (ImportShare)k,j,t 0.197 0.196 0.207 0.073 0.361** -0.583 
 (0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.151) (0.172) (1.120) 
FX (ExportShare)k,j,t -0.008 -0.011* -0.014** -0.016** -0.017** -0.073*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.025) 
FM (ImportShare)k,j,t -0.009 -0.012 -0.017 -0.009 -0.026* 0.037 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.093) 
SOE dummy k,j,t -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.007 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
Foreign dummy k,j,t 0.023** 0.021** 0.019** 0.027*** 0.019 0.019 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) 
HMT dummy k,j,t 0.014* 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.010 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) 
LnK k,j,t  0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 
 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
TFPdl k,j,t   0.093*** 0.097*** 0.096*** 0.096*** 
   
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.111 0.113 0.128 0.127 0.155 0.155 
Observations 516,799 516,799 513,449 445,818 211,312 211,312 
Joint Significance tests for coefficients on tariffs and interaction terms 
OT for exporter -0.035   -0.034   -0.028    0.242 
  (0.043)   (0.042)   (0.042)      (0.159) 
IT for importer     0.121  
       (0.192)  
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; significant at *10%; **5%; 
***1%. Industry fixed effects are controlled at the 2-digit industry level.  
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Table 1.13. Regressions for ERP and Wages - additional controls (post-WTO) 
Dependent Variable:  
ln(wage) k,j,t 
Ownership Size Productivity 
Drop 
switchers 
Balanced Trade 
shares 
⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ ⑸ ⑹ 
ERP j,t-1 -0.085*** -0.081*** -0.078*** -0.085*** -0.091*** -0.087*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
ERP j,t-1× FXX (ExportShare)k,j,t 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.027 -0.009 0.010 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.034) (0.036) (0.106) 
ERP j,t-1× FMM (ImportShare)k,j,t 0.024 0.023 0.032 0.012 0.034 -0.021 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.054) (0.062) (0.266) 
ERP j,t-1× FXM k,j,t 0.131*** 0.129*** 0.122*** 0.104*** 0.132***  
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.040) (0.043)  
ERP j,t-1× FXM_ExportShare k,j,t     0.348*** 
      (0.128) 
ERP j,t-1× FXM_ImportShare k,j,t     -0.225 
      (0.318) 
FXX (ExportShare)k,j,t -0.002 -0.005 -0.009 -0.011 -0.008 -0.037 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.025) 
FMM (ImportShare)k,j,t 0.002 -0.001 -0.008 -0.008 -0.011 0.008 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.057) 
FXM k,j,t -0.011 -0.017** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023**  
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)  
FXM_ExportSshare k,j,t      -0.066** 
      (0.027) 
FXM_ImportShare k,j,t      -0.005 
      (0.065) 
SOE dummy k,j,t -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.007 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
Foreign dummy k,j,t 0.023** 0.021** 0.019** 0.027*** 0.019 0.019 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) 
HMT dummy k,j,t 0.014* 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.011 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) 
LnK k,j,t  0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 
 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
TFPdl k,j,t   0.093*** 0.096*** 0.096*** 0.096*** 
 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.111 0.113 0.128 0.127 0.155 0.155 
Observations 516,799 516,799 513,449 445,818 211,312 211,312 
Joint Significance tests for coefficients on tariffs and interaction terms 
ERP for exporter-importer  0.046  0.048 0.043 0.019  0.041  
  (0.036)    (0.036)    (0.036)  (0.040)  (0.043)  
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; significant at *10%; **5%; 
***1%. Industry fixed effects are controlled at the 2-digit industry level.  
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Table 1.14. IV Regressions for Tariffs and Wages (post-WTO) 
Dependent Variable: 
 ln(wage) k,j,t 
Ownership Size 
Productivit
y 
Drop 
switchers 
Balanced Trade 
shares 
  ⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ ⑸ ⑹ 
Output tariff j,t-1 -0.533** -0.530** -0.527** -0.738** -0.537*** -0.512*** 
 (0.215) (0.215) (0.213) (0.324) (0.203) (0.197) 
OT j,t-1× FX (ExportShare)k,j,t 0.268** 0.264** 0.273*** 0.286** 0.255** 0.418 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.105) (0.119) (0.103) (0.284) 
Input tariff j,t-1 0.262 0.268 0.053 -0.039 0.209 0.308 
 (0.804) (0.804) (0.802) (1.182) (0.849) (0.870) 
IT j,t-1× FM (ImportShare)k,j,t 0.408 0.420 0.528* 0.156 0.212 2.245 
 (0.318) (0.317) (0.314) (0.341) (0.333) (1.550) 
FX (ExportShare)k,j,t -0.028** -0.030** -0.033** -0.035** -0.030** -0.043 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.040) 
FM (ImportShare)k,j,t -0.017 -0.020 -0.030 -0.009 -0.010 -0.146 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.120) 
SOE dummy k,j,t -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.000 0.008 0.008 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Foreign dummy k,j,t -0.000 -0.002 0.002 0.018 -0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
HMT dummy k,j,t 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.017 0.011 0.011 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
LnK k,j,t  0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 
 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
TFPdl k,j,t   0.088*** 0.092*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 
 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Panel A: Instruments tests 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 917.293† 917.327† 912.106† 598.401† 759.377† 610.27† 
Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic 267.47  267.50  265.91  164.45  245.99  208.15  
Stock-Yogo critical values (5%) 11.04 11.04 11.04 11.04 11.04 11.04 
Hansen J statistic 0.19  0.26  0.12  2.52  1.76  2.34  
p-value 0.91  0.88  0.94  0.28  0.42  0.31  
Panel B: Joint Significance tests for coefficients on tariffs and interaction terms 
OT for exporter -0.265*  -0.266* -0.254*  -0.451*  -0.282**  
  (0.141) (0.141) (0.140) (0.240) (0.136)    
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 165,658 165,658 164,608 135,295 145,183 145,183 
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; significant at *10%; **5%; 
***1%. † indicates significance of the p-value at the 1% level. Industry fixed effects are controlled at the 2-digit industry 
level. Output and input tariffs are instrumented by lagged one-year difference in output and input tariffs and their 
interaction terms with exporter dummy and importer dummy (interacted with export share and import share in the last 
column). 
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Table 1.15. Regressions for Tariffs and Wages - Heterogeneous Choices (post-WTO) 
Dependent Variable:  
ln(wage) k,j,t 
Always 
trade 
Trade in 
2002 
Trade at 
entry 
 Drop 
switchers 
Trade 
shares 
Identify exit 
  ⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ ⑸ ⑹ 
Output tariff j,t-1 -0.114*** -0.109*** -0.110*** -0.111*** -0.107*** -0.101*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.025) (0.022) (0.026) 
OT j,t-1× FX (ExportShare)k,j,t 0.252*** 0.083 0.084 0.203** 0.266 0.095* 
 (0.078) (0.075) (0.070) (0.100) (0.214) (0.050) 
Input tariff j,t-1 -0.399*** -0.423*** -0.427*** -0.433*** -0.401*** -0.236** 
 (0.088) (0.089) (0.089) (0.098) (0.088) (0.100) 
IT j,t-1× FM (ImportShare)k,j,t 0.106 0.506** 0.552*** 0.032 0.444 0.0237 
 (0.299) (0.202) (0.198) (0.370) (1.056) (0.155) 
FX (ExportShare)k,j,t -0.005 -0.005 -0.005  -0.013 -0.020** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.011) (0.008) 
FM (ExportShare)k,j,t -0.001 -0.004 -0.004  -0.001 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.026) (0.013) 
SOE dummy k,j,t -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.007 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Foreign dummy k,j,t 0.019** 0.019** 0.019** 0.015 0.019** 0.004 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) 
HMT dummy k,j,t 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.003 0.011 0.002 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) 
LnK k,j,t 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
TFPdl k,j,t 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.090*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Exitk,j,t      -0.006* 
 
     (0.003) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.128 0.128 0.128 0.126 0.128 0.086 
Observations 513,449 513,449 513,449 441,878 513,449 366,441 
Joint Significance tests for coefficients on tariffs and interaction terms 
OT for exporter  0.138*     0.091   
  (0.077)   (0.098)   
IT for importer  0.083 0.125    
    (0.209)  (0.205)    
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; significant at *10%; **5%; 
***1%. Industry fixed effects are controlled at the 2-digit industry level.  
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Table 1.16. Regressions for ERP and Wages - exiting firms (post-WTO) 
Dependent Variable:  
ln(wage) k,j,t 
Post-WTO  Balanced 
 
Exit 
ERP × 
Exit  
ERP × Types   
Exit 
ERP × 
Exit  
ERP × 
Types  
  ⑴ ⑵ ⑶   ⑷ ⑸ ⑹ 
ERPj,t-1 -0.064*** -0.057*** -0.063***  -0.071*** -0.066*** -0.072*** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
ERP j,t-1× FXX k,j,t 0.041  0.033  0.019  0.017 
 (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.039)  (0.039) 
ERP j,t-1× FMM k,j,t 0.006  0.003  0.038  0.039 
 (0.059)  (0.059)  (0.067)  (0.067) 
ERP j,t-1× FXM k,j,t 0.122***  0.119***  0.145***  0.138*** 
 (0.043)  (0.042)  (0.047)  (0.047) 
ERP j,t-1× Exit k,j,t  0.055***    0.093**  
  (0.020)    (0.042)  
ERP j,t-1× FXX k,j,t × Exit k,j,t   0.141**    0.195** 
   (0.065)    (0.097) 
ERP j,t-1× FMM k,j,t × Exit k,j,t   0.067    -0.037 
   (0.122)    (0.311) 
ERP j,t-1× FXM k,j,t × Exit k,j,t   0.169*    0.461*** 
   (0.093)    (0.126) 
ERP j,t-1× DOM k,j,t × Exit k,j,t   0.050**    0.076* 
   (0.020)    (0.044) 
FXX k,j,t -0.017** -0.010* -0.017**  -0.013 -0.010 -0.013 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) 
FMM k,j,t -0.005 -0.004 -0.005  -0.009 -0.003 -0.009 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.013)  (0.015) (0.011) (0.015) 
FXM k,j,t -0.022** -0.003 -0.021**  -0.021** 0.001 -0.021** 
 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009)  (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) 
Exit k,j,t -0.006* -0.015*** -0.015***  -0.019*** -0.032*** -0.032*** 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)   (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
SOE dummy k,j,t -0.007 -0.007 -0.007  -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Foreign dummy k,j,t 0.004 0.004 0.004  0.019 0.019 0.019 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
HMT dummy k,j,t 0.002 0.002 0.002  0.007 0.006 0.007 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
LnK k,j,t 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035***  0.035*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
TFPdl k,j,t 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.090***  0.090*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Adjusted R2 0.086 0.086 0.086  0.102 0.102 0.102 
Observations 366,441 366,441 366,441   188,632 188,632 188,632 
Joint Significance tests for coefficients on tariffs and interaction terms 
ERP for exporter-importer  0.058     0.074    0.455*** 
 (0.043)       (0.047)  (0.148) 
ERP for exiting firm   -0.002     0.028  
  (0.025)    (0.045)  
ERP for pure domestic firm   -0.075**      
    (0.037)     
Notes: Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; significant at *10%; **5%; ***1%. 
 2-digit industry FE, year FE, location FE and location-year FE are controlled. 
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Table 1.17. Channels (post-WTO) 
Regressand: ln(wage) k,j,t 
Change in 
labordemand 
Import scope Change in labordemand Import scope 
⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ 
Output tariff j,t-1 -0.104*** -0.104***   
 (0.025) (0.025)   
OT j,t-1× FX k,j,t 0.114** 0.115**   
 (0.049) (0.049)   
Input tariff j,t-1 -0.158 -0.157   
 (0.099) (0.099)   
IT j,t-1× FM k,j,t 0.073 0.075   
 (0.151) (0.151)   
ERP j,t-1   -0.062*** -0.062*** 
   (0.016) (0.016) 
ERP j,t-1× FXX k,j,t 
 
 0.055 0.056 
 
 
 (0.035) (0.035) 
ERP j,t-1× FMM k,j,t   0.003 0.002 
   (0.056) (0.056) 
ERP j,t-1× FXM k,j,t   0.140*** 0.141*** 
   (0.043) (0.043) 
Ln(Import scope) k,j,t  0.008*  0.008* 
 
 (0.004)  (0.004) 
D1. Ln(Labour) k,j,t -0.177*** -0.177*** -0.177*** -0.177*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Exit k,j,t -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
SOE dummy k,j,t -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Foreign dummy k,j,t 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
HMT dummy k,j,t 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Continued) 
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Table 1.17. Continued 
Regressand: ln(wage) k,j,t 
Change in 
labordemand 
Import scope Change in labordemand Import scope 
⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ 
LnK k,j,t 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
TFPdl k,j,t 0.094*** 0.094*** 0.094*** 0.094*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
FX k,j,t -0.023*** -0.024***   
 (0.008) (0.008)   
FM k,j,t -0.001 -0.008   
 (0.013) (0.014)   
FXX k,j,t   -0.020*** -0.021*** 
   (0.008) (0.008) 
FMM k,j,t   -0.004 -0.011 
   (0.013) (0.013) 
FXM k,j,t   -0.023** -0.030*** 
 
  (0.009) (0.010) 
Joint Significance tests for coefficients on tariffs and interaction terms 
OT for exporter 0.010 0.011   
 (0.050) (0.050)   
ERP for exporter-importer   0.078*  0.079* 
       (0.044) (0.044) 
Observations 366,441 366,441 366,441 366,441 
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; significant at *10%; **5%; 
***1%. 2-digit industry FE, year FE, location FE and location-year FE are controlled. Adjusted R2 are all equal to 
0.123 and to save space, we do not report them here.    
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Table 2.1. Summary of Processing Firms in China, 2000-2006 
Variable 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Basic: 
       
Number  8,164 7,482 9,485 10,378 15,400 15,890 18,549 
Proportion of processing firms (P/P+O) 0.48  0.42  0.42  0.40  0.38  0.38  0.37  
Ownership structure: 
       
SOE 0.06  0.06  0.04  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.01  
Foreign 0.29  0.28  0.32  0.32  0.30  0.34  0.35  
HMT 0.36  0.36  0.35  0.36  0.40  0.35  0.35  
Others 0.29  0.30  0.28  0.29  0.28  0.29  0.29  
Performance: 
       
Size  569  587  570  574  544  579  591  
Size premium  0.93  1.05  1.15  1.29  1.62  1.69  1.84  
Value-added per worker (1,000 RMB) 71.55  79.97  82.97  91.09  87.62  97.50  116.71  
VA premium 0.49  0.55  0.54  0.57  0.57  0.57  0.61  
TFP 6.36  6.47  6.47  6.60  6.26  6.63  6.83  
TFP premium 1.01  1.01  1.01  1.01  0.98  1.01  1.03  
Wage (1,000 RMB) 14.21  14.98  15.39  15.90  16.91  18.30  21.75  
Wage premium  1.04  1.04  1.02  1.03  1.02  1.05  1.15  
Notes: Here P denotes processing firms, O denotes ordinary trading firms, size denotes the number of employees and 
wage denotes the unit wage for each worker. Hence, wage=total wage bill/total employment; Variable premium=mean 
value of the Variable for processing firms/mean value of the Variable for ordinary trading firms. 
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Table 2.2. China's Output and Input Tariffs by Year (%) 
 
Firm output 
tariffs  
Firm input 
tariffs  
Industry output 
tariffs   
Industry input 
tariffs  
 
Mean S.D. 
 
Mean S.D. 
 
Mean S.D. 
 
Mean S.D. 
Year ⑴ ⑵   ⑶ ⑷   ⑸ ⑹   ⑺ ⑻ 
2000 18.97  8.76  
 
4.05  7.21  
 
18.49  6.50  
 
12.32  3.56  
2001 17.05  8.69  
 
4.07  6.92  
 
17.08  5.92  
 
11.40  3.43  
2002 12.94  7.78  
 
2.73  4.63  
 
13.43  5.45  
 
8.58  2.70  
2003 11.61  7.28  
 
2.51  4.31  
 
12.18  4.92  
 
7.84  2.28  
2004 10.35  6.86  
 
2.36  4.10  
 
10.89  4.29  
 
7.15  1.91  
2005 9.63  6.56  
 
2.24  3.80  
 
10.29  4.04  
 
6.67  1.63  
2006 9.39  6.67  
 
2.12  3.72  
 
10.13  4.04  
 
6.59  1.68  
All 11.61  7.84  
 
2.61  4.69  
 
12.10  5.45  
 
7.90  2.92  
Notes: Industry-level output and input tariffs are calculated at IO-sector level, which is equivalent to 3-digit 
industry level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.3. Correlations of China's Output and Input Tariffs 
 
Firm output 
tariffs 
Firm input 
tariffs 
Industry output 
tariffs  
Industry input 
tariffs   
Firm output tariffs 1.000  
   
Firm input tariffs 0.004  1.000  
  
Industry output tariffs  0.623  0.065  1.000  
 
Industry input tariffs  0.515  0.074  0.763  1.000  
Notes: Industry-level output and input tariffs are calculated at IO-sector level, which is equivalent to 3-digit 
industry level. 
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Table 2.4. Firm Average Wage and Subsequent Trade Protection 
Dependent Variable: Firm-level Trade Protection 
Full sample Pre-WTO (2000-2001) Post-WTO (2002-2006) 
⑴ ⑵ ⑶ 
Panel A: Firm Output Tariff 
Lagged firm average wage 0.0006* 0.0001 0.0000 
 
(0.0003) (0.0013) (0.0002) 
R2 0.491 0.496 0.321 
Observations 65,097 5,333 59,764 
Panel B: Firm Input Tariff 
Lagged firm average wage -0.0002 0.0170*** 0.0000 
 
(0.0002) (0.0013) (0.0001) 
R2 0.183 0.155 0.098 
Observations 65,097 5,333 59,764 
Panel C: Firm ERP 
Lagged firm average wage 0.1610 0.8330 0.0231 
 
(0.2390) (1.2050) (0.2090) 
R2 0.001 0.046 0.008 
Observations 65,097 5,333 59,764 
Panel D: Firm ERP_2 
Lagged firm average wage 0.0993 0.8200 -0.0898 
 
(0.3210) (1.2080) (0.3340) 
R2 0.000 0.047 0.000 
Observations 65,097 5,333 59,764 
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; significant at *10%; **5%; ***1%. All regressions include 3-digit industry fixed effects and year fixed effects.  
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Table 2.5. Regressions for Tariffs and Wages (post-WTO)  
Dependent Variable: ln(wage) k,j,t 
Industry level  Firm level 
Tariffs Tariff × Dummy Tariff × Intensity  Tariffs Tariff × Dummy Tariff × Intensity 
  ⑴ ⑵ ⑶   ⑷ ⑸ ⑹ 
Output tariff (OT) ,j.t-1 0.033 0.110*** 0.089**  0.096*** 0.083*** 0.097*** 
 (0.036) (0.042) (0.041)  (0.025) (0.031) (0.030) 
OT j,t-1× Processing Dummy (Intensity)k,j,t  -0.209*** -0.214**   0.029 -0.010 
  (0.068) (0.084)   (0.047) (0.053) 
Input tariff (IT) j,t-1 0.092 -0.120 -0.057  -0.136** -0.163** -0.157** 
 (0.068) (0.082) (0.079)  (0.062) (0.068) (0.065) 
IT j,t-1× Processing Dummy (Intensity)k,j,t  0.551*** 0.520***   0.119 0.164 
  (0.130) (0.160)   (0.113) (0.169) 
Processing Dummy (Intensity) k,j,t -0.008 -0.020*** -0.011  -0.008 -0.013* -0.002 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)  (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Location FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Location-year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.120 0.120 0.120  0.120 0.120 0.120 
Observations 115,179 115,179 115,179 
 
115,179 115,179 115,179 
Joint Significance tests for coefficients on tariffs and interaction terms 
Output Tariff    -0.099*  -0.125*    0.112***  0.087**  
   (0.058)   (0.073)    (0.038) (0.044) 
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; significant at *10%; **5%; ***1%. Industry fixed effects are controlled at the 3-digit industry level.  
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Table 2.6. Heckman Two-Stage Selection Estimates 
Dependent Variable:  
1st Stage 
 
2nd Stage 
Processing Dummy k,j.t   Processing Intensity k,j.t 
Lagged Firm age k,j,t 0.001** (0.001)    
Lagged ST liability k,j,t 0.094*** (0.024)  
0.064*** (0.009) 
Lagged Ln(Value added per worker) k,j,t -0.046*** (0.006)  
-0.061*** (0.002) 
Lagged LnK k,j,t 0.200*** (0.004)  
-0.002 (0.004) 
Lagged Govt share k,j,t -0.119*** (0.032)  
-0.056*** (0.012) 
Lagged Foreign share k,j,t 1.176*** (0.017)  
0.169*** (0.021) 
Lagged HMT share k,j,t 1.266*** (0.016)  
0.250*** (0.022) 
Inverse mills ratio - 
  
0.320*** (0.028) 
Industry FE Yes 
 
Yes 
Year FE Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations 69,098   69,098 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. The 3-digit industry fixed effects 
and year fixed effect are controlled in the regression.  
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Table 2.7. Preliminary Regressions for Tariffs and Wages (post-WTO)  
Dependent Variable: ln(wage) k,j,t Industry Tariffs Firm Tariffs 
  ⑴ ⑵ 
Industry Output tariff ,j.t-1 0.127* 
 
 (0.066) 
 
Industry OT j,t-1× Predicted Processing Intensity k,j,t -0.311** 
 
 (0.152) 
 
Industry Input tariff j,t-1 -0.330** 
 
 (0.134) 
 
Industry IT j,t-1× Predicted Processing Intensity k,j,t 0.039 
 
 (0.362) 
 
Firm Output tariff k,j,t-1  0.070 
  (0.054) 
Firm OT k,j,t-1× Predicted Processing Intensity k,j,t  -0.327*** 
  (0.122) 
Firm Input tariff k,j,t-1  -0.379*** 
  (0.122) 
Firm IT k,j,t-1× Predicted Processing Intensity k,j,t  0.438 
  (0.309) 
Predicted Processing Intensity k,j,t 0.100*** 0.075*** 
 (0.021) (0.013) 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Location FE Yes Yes 
Location-year FE Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.121 0.121 
Observations 115,179 115,179 
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** at 5% and 
*** at 1%. All regressions use adjusted processing intensity predicted by Heckman two-stage selection model and firm 
output and input tariffs are lagged by one period. Industry fixed effects are controlled at the 3-digit industry level.  
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Table 2.8. Regressions for Tariffs and Wages with Additional Controls (post-WTO)  
Dependent Variable: ln(wage) k,j,t 
With 
ownership With TFP With size  With leverage With debt 
  ⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ ⑸ 
Firm Output tariff k,j,t-1 0.068 0.053 0.036 0.030 0.104* 
 
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.056) (0.061) 
Firm OT k,j,t-1× Predicted Processing 
Intensity k,j,t 
-0.327*** -0.285** -0.274** -0.264** -0.390*** 
(0.122) (0.123) (0.123) (0.124) (0.131) 
Firm Input tariff k,j,t-1 -0.379*** -0.371*** -0.380*** -0.383*** -0.339*** 
 
(0.122) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) 
Firm IT k,j,t-1× Predicted Processing 
Intensity k,j,t 
0.436 0.430 0.445 0.451 0.367 
(0.310) (0.315) (0.314) (0.314) (0.315) 
Predicted Processing Intensity k,j,t 0.076*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.084*** 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) 
TFPdl k,j,t 
 
0.071*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 
  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ln K k,j,t 
  
0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
   
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Leverage k,j,t-1 
   
0.001 
 
    
(0.002) 
 Total debt ratio k,j,t-1 
    
-0.026*** 
     
(0.009) 
SOE k,j,t -0.010 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Foreign owned k,j,t 0.022** 0.022** 0.021** 0.021** 0.021** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
HMT owned k,j,t 0.018* 0.018* 0.017 0.017 0.017 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.121 0.132 0.133 0.133 0.133 
Observations 115,179 114,230 114,230 114,230 114,230 
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** at 5% and 
*** at 1%. All regressions use adjusted processing intensity predicted by Heckman two-stage selection model and firm 
output and input tariffs are lagged by one period. Industry fixed effects are controlled at the 3-digit industry level.  
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Table 2.9. Channels (Post-WTO) 
Dependent Variable:  
ln(total profit) k,j,t 
 
ln(wage) k,j,t 
 
With 
Multi-products  
With firm 
R&D  
    ⑴ 
 
⑵ 
 
⑶ 
Firm Output tariff k,j,t-1 0.385** 
 
0.105* 
 
0.157** 
 
(0.153) 
 
(0.061) 
 
(0.073) 
Firm OT k,j,t-1× Predicted Processing Intensity k,j,t -0.492 
 
-0.390*** 
 
-0.437*** 
 
(0.344) 
 
(0.131) 
 
(0.154) 
Firm Input tariff k,j,t-1 0.0287 
 
-0.339*** 
 
-0.480*** 
 
(0.292) 
 
(0.123) 
 
(0.159) 
Firm IT k,j,t-1× Predicted Processing Intensity k,j,t 0.231 
 
0.363 
 
0.631 
 
(0.653) 
 
(0.315) 
 
(0.401) 
Predicted Processing Intensity k,j,t -0.133*** 
 
0.083*** 
 
0.071*** 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.017) 
Ln (Export scope) k,j,t 
  
-0.002 
  
   
(0.003) 
  Ln (Ordinary import scope) k,j,t 
  
-0.003 
  
   
(0.003) 
  Ln (R_D) k,j,t 
    
-0.000 
     
(0.001) 
TFPdl k,j,t 0.506*** 
 
0.071*** 
 
0.071*** 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.004) 
Ln K k,j,t 0.275*** 
 
0.033*** 
 
0.035*** 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
Total debt ratio k,j,t-1 0.244*** 
 
-0.026*** 
 
-0.017* 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.010) 
SOE k,j,t -0.107*** 
 
-0.007 
 
0.000 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.0133) 
 
(0.016) 
Foreign owned k,j,t 0.0121 
 
0.021** 
 
0.012 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.011) 
HMT owned k,j,t 0.031 
 
0.017 
 
0.013 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.011) 
Adjusted R2 0.145 
 
0.133 
 
0.127 
Observations 114,230 
 
114,230 
 
100,840 
Joint Significance tests for coefficients on trade protections and interaction terms 
Firm Output Tariff  -0.106 
 
-0.285*** 
 
-0.280*** 
 
 (0.247) 
 
 (0.092) 
 
(0.107) 
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** at 5% and 
*** at 1%. All regressions use adjusted processing intensity predicted by Heckman two-stage selection model. 
Three-digit industry FE, year FE, location FE and location-year FE are controlled.  
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Table 3.1. Firm Trade Modes in China 
Trade Status Trade Status 
Firm Group 
No. 
Firm Group Description Type Type Name 
Non-trading 
Firms 
Domestic sourcing and selling only ① Firms with no exports and no imports I Non-Exporter (NE) 
Trading Firms 
Exporter only ② Firms with ordinary exports only II 
Pure Ordinary Exporter 
(OE) 
Importer only ③ Firms with ordinary imports only I Non-Exporter (NE) 
Both exporter and importer 
④ Firms with ordinary exports and ordinary imports II 
Pure Ordinary Exporter 
(OE) 
⑤ Firms with ordinary exports, processing exports and processing imports  III Mixed Exporter (ME) 
⑥ 
Firm with ordinary exports, ordinary imports, processing exports and processing 
imports 
III Mixed Exporter (ME) 
⑦ Firms with processing exports and processing imports IV 
Pure Processing Exporter 
(PE) 
⑧ Firms with ordinary imports, processing exports and processing imports IV 
Pure Processing Exporter 
(PE) 
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Table 3.2. Definition of Firm Types 
Type Type Name Definition 
I Non-Exporter (NE) Total Exports=0  
II Ordinary Exporter (OE) ProExp_share=0 
III Mixed Exporter (ME) 0﹤ProExp_share﹤1 
IV Processing Exporter (PE) ProExp_share=1 
Note: Total Exports=Ordinary Exports+Processing Exports, and the share of processing exports in total exports 
(ProExp_share)=Processing Exports/Total Exports=Processing Exports/(Ordinary Exports+Processing Exports). 
 
Table 3.3. The Percentage of Firms Across Trade Types (%) 
Trade Mode 
Year 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 All 
Non-Exporter 88.99  88.98  87.15  86.45  85.10  84.40  83.37  85.74  
Ordinary Exporter 5.28  6.18  7.30  8.31  9.53  10.17  11.32  8.91  
Mixed Exporter 3.50  3.12  3.69  3.49  3.51  3.60  3.63  3.53  
Processing Exporter 2.23  1.72  1.86  1.74  1.86  1.83  1.68  1.82  
Total Observations 93,039 99,209 111,979 130,241 177,009 187,785 215,167 1,014,429 
 
Table 3.4. The Percentage of Total Outputs Across Trade Types (%) 
Trade Mode 
Year 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 All 
Non-Exporter 70.37 69.19 66.85 66.21 61.56 63.35 60.47 63.97 
Ordinary Exporter 12.27 13.68 14.96 16.02 17.65 16.14 18.4 16.37 
Mixed Exporter 12.59 13.53 14.04 13.64 15.31 14.71 15.9 14.67 
Processing Exporter 4.77 3.59 4.16 4.12 5.48 5.81 5.22 4.98 
Total Outputs  545,443 594,308 755,740 997,001 1,270,124 1,563,768 1,981,051 7,707,435 
Notes: Total outputs are in a unit of 10 million RMB. 
 
 
Table 3.5. The Percentage of Total Exports Across Trade Types (%) 
Export Mode 
Year 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 All 
Ordinary Exporter 12.78  17.37  16.63  18.72  19.36  19.09  22.16  19.45  
Mixed Exporter 59.49  59.61  60.12  60.26  56.60  54.73  54.37  56.46  
Processing Exporter 27.73  23.01  23.25  21.03  24.04  26.19  23.47  24.08  
Total Exports 387,929 398,976 666,935 931,066 1,536,172 1,921,790 2,522,553 8,365,420 
Notes: Total exports are in a unit of 1 million RMB. 
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Table 3.6. Percentage of Exporters according to Share of Exports in Outputs 
 
Percentage of Exporters 
Export Share 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 All 
below 10% 39.83  40.67  35.78  34.13  31.02  30.80  32.08  33.44  
10% - 20% 11.63  12.74  11.90  12.01  12.27  12.40  12.11  12.18  
20% - 30% 7.49  8.42  8.47  9.19  8.80  8.77  9.06  8.75  
30% - 40% 6.26  6.96  6.41  6.79  7.09  7.50  7.60  7.13  
40% - 50% 5.09  5.71  5.72  6.12  6.06  6.57  6.22  6.08  
50% - 60% 5.02  5.59  5.44  5.33  5.43  5.85  5.64  5.54  
60% - 70% 4.61  4.64  4.74  4.93  5.45  5.65  5.60  5.27  
70% - 80% 4.66  4.43  5.23  5.33  5.41  5.60  5.66  5.36  
80% - 90% 5.18  4.81  5.83  5.78  6.16  6.49  6.48  6.06  
above 90% 10.25  6.04  10.47  10.39  12.31  10.37  9.57  10.20  
Observations 10,245 10,937 14,389 17,643 26,379 29,293 35,781 144,667 
 
Table 3.7. Summary of Different Trade Modes of Firms 
Variable 
NE 
 
OE 
 
ME 
 
PE 
Mean  S.D.   Mean S.D.   Mean S.D. 
 
Mean S.D. 
Output 56.69  466.95  
 
139.63  873.76  
 
315.73  1848.13  
 
207.87  1086.52  
Age 9.23  10.58  
 
9.34  10.57  
 
9.08  8.76  
 
8.29  5.48  
Employment 213.75  931.06  
 
411.76  1127.54  
 
680.53  1598.84  
 
587.11  1062.21  
TFPdl 6.29  1.11  
 
6.74  1.13  
 
7.01  1.17  
 
6.64  1.17  
Value-added per worker 87.35  222.45  
 
100.68  202.44  
 
117.11  243.70  
 
88.95  534.45  
Profit per worker  17.89  79.22  
 
26.57  84.78  
 
35.10  98.01  
 
23.03  157.68  
Wage per worker 11.50  26.65  
 
15.68  14.43  
 
18.69  16.83  
 
16.59  16.97  
SOE 0.07  0.25  
 
0.05  0.21  
 
0.03  0.18  
 
0.02  0.13  
Foreign 0.03  0.16  
 
0.15  0.36  
 
0.36  0.48  
 
0.27  0.44  
HMT 0.04  0.19  
 
0.12  0.32  
 
0.27  0.45  
 
0.57  0.50  
Others 0.87  0.34  
 
0.69  0.46  
 
0.33  0.47  
 
0.15  0.36  
Exit  0.18  0.38  
 
0.14  0.35  
 
0.22  0.41  
 
0.27  0.45  
Total exports  - - 
 
18.00  119.09  
 
131.88  1202.93  
 
109.13  803.38  
Export scope - - 
 
5.55  8.12  
 
9.41  12.34  
 
5.07  6.69  
Total Imports - - 
 
8.50  153.30  
 
84.85  877.35  
 
73.99  519.83  
Import scope - - 
 
5.34  17.87  
 
32.45  50.09    23.93  29.88  
Notes: All value variables are in a unit of 1 million RMB except for average value-added/profit/wage which are in a 
unit of 1,000 RMB. 
 
Table 3.8. Transitions of Trade Modes 
Trade Modes Period (t+1) 
Period t NE PE OE ME 
NE 96.25  0.20  3.11  0.44  
PE 8.78  76.08  0.75  3.20  
OE 13.97  0.08  82.24  1.28  
ME 7.00  0.63  3.26  79.55  
Notes: trade modes are ordered by mean TFP level (low to high). 
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Table 3.9. Firm Wages and Export Switching 
Dependent 
Variable: 
D1.ln(wage) k,j,t 
PE   OE   ME 
Tariffs Tariff 
Interactions 
 Tariffs Tariff 
Interactions 
 Tariffs Tariff 
Interactions 
⑴ ⑵   ⑶ ⑷   ⑸ ⑹ 
D1.Output tariff ,j.t-1 1.950* 2.139*  -0.001 -0.032  -0.288 -0.204 
 
(1.101) (1.126)  (0.318) (0.317)  (0.481) (0.486) 
D1.OT 
k,j,t-1×PE_to_OE 
 -0.456       
 (7.958)       
D1.OT 
k,j,t-1×PE_to_ME 
 -2.809       
 (2.965)       
D1.OT 
k,j,t-1×OE_to_PE 
    3.544    
    (5.909)    
D1.OT 
k,j,t-1×OE_to_ME 
    2.577    
    (2.715)    
D1.OT 
k,j,t-1×ME_to_PE 
       -6.606 
       (5.072) 
D1.OT 
k,j,t-1×ME_to_OE 
       -0.766 
       (2.009) 
D1.Input tariff ,j.t-1 -1.073 1.757  -1.539 -0.674  -0.125 -0.242 
 
(2.810) (3.685)  (2.858) (0.586)  (0.321) (0.322) 
D1.IT 
k,j,t-1×PE_to_OE 
 -173.600***       
 (51.650)       
D1.IT 
k,j,t-1×PE_to_ME 
 -8.826       
 (6.987)       
D1.IT 
k,j,t-1×OE_to_PE 
    49.420***    
    (16.990)    
D1.IT 
k,j,t-1×OE_to_ME 
    -1.235    
    (2.116)    
D1.IT 
k,j,t-1×ME_to_PE 
       4.850 
       (4.127) 
D1.IT 
k,j,t-1×ME_to_OE 
       4.694 
       (7.694) 
PE_to_OE 0.127 -0.115       
 
(0.148) (0.101)       
PE_to_ME 0.011 -0.088       
 
-0.07 (0.089)       
OE_to_PE    -0.259*** -0.144    
 
   (0.076) (0.109)    
OE_to_ME    -0.017 0.0145    
 
   (0.042) (0.048)    
ME_to_PE       -0.001 -0.083 
 
      (0.105) (0.149) 
ME_to_OE       -0.140*** -0.125* 
 
      (0.054) (0.072) 
R2 0.019 0.023  0.004 0.004  0.010 0.011 
Observations 2,047 2,047   10,883 10,883   5,253 5,253 
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; significant at *10%; **5%; 
***1%. Year fixed effects, location fixed effects and location-year fixed effects are controlled in all regressions.  
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Table 3.10. Firm Wages and Export Switching of Pure Processing Exporters 
Dependent Variable:  
 D1.ln(wage) k,j,t  
PE_to_OE 
 
PE_to_ME 
With 
ownership 
With 
productivity 
With size   Tariffs Firm 
controls 
 Tariffs Firm 
controls   
  ⑴ ⑵ ⑶   ⑷ ⑸   ⑹ ⑺ 
D1.Output tariff ,j.t-1 2.057* 1.943* 1.856*  7.424 6.892  1.824 1.666 
 
(1.127) (1.144) (1.125)  (4.532) (4.533)  (1.554) (1.560) 
D1.OT 
k,j,t-1×PE_to_OE 
-0.399 0.452 0.733  
  
 
  
(8.238) (8.968) (9.777)  
  
 
  
D1.OT 
k,j,t-1×PE_to_ME 
-2.660 -2.457 -2.553      
 
(2.952) (3.005) (3.000)      
 
D1.Input tariff ,j.t-1 1.842 2.253 2.334  -17.820*** -21.210***  -11.400*** -13.150*** 
 
(3.693) (3.735) (3.737)  (4.560) (4.785)  (3.189) (3.285) 
D1.IT 
k,j,t-1×PE_to_OE 
-181.500*** -175.300*** -167.800***      
 
(51.160) (55.500) (58.670)      
 
D1.IT 
k,j,t-1×PE_to_ME 
-8.721 -9.322 -9.407       
(6.878) (6.920) (6.927)       
PE_to_OE -0.147 -0.136 -0.116       
 
(0.114) (0.124) (0.134)       
PE_to_ME -0.087 -0.091 -0.092       
 
(0.089) (0.091) (0.091)       
D1.TFPdl k,j,t  0.008 0.013  
 -0.096   -0.014 
 
 (0.021) (0.021) 
 
 (0.127)   (0.032) 
D1.Ln K k,j,t 
  0.068 
  
-0.199***   0.003 
 
  (0.046) 
  
(0.074)   (0.053) 
D1.SOE k,j,t 0.048 0.019 0.029   -1.096**   0.243 
 
(0.050) (0.061) (0.060)   (0.469)   (0.282) 
D1.Foreign owned k,j,t 0.141 0.154 0.156   0.422   0.260** 
 
(0.100) (0.108) (0.107)   (0.278)   (0.127) 
D1.HMT owned k,j,t 0.167** 0.183** 0.187**   0.500   0.085 
 
(0.085) (0.091) (0.090)   (0.341)   (0.118) 
Observations 3,557 3,485 3,485   4,659 4,491   4,749 4,580 
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; significant at *10%; **5%; ***1%. Year fixed 
effects, location fixed effects and location-year fixed effects are controlled in all regressions.  
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Table 3.11. Firm Wages and Export Switching of Pure Ordinary Exporters 
Dependent Variable:  
 D1.ln(wage) k,j,t  
OE_to_PE 
 
OE_to_ME 
With 
ownership 
With 
productivity 
With size   Tariffs Firm 
controls 
 Tariffs Firm 
controls   
  ⑴ ⑵ ⑶   ⑷ ⑸   ⑹ ⑺ 
D1.Output tariff ,j.t-1 -0.032 -0.017 -0.024  2.281 2.292  0.806 0.867 
 
(0.319) (0.326) (0.325)  (1.990) (1.987)  (0.676) (0.684) 
D1.OT 
k,j,t-1×OE_to_PE 
3.573 -0.288 0.333  
  
 
  
(5.914) (5.713) (5.675)  
  
 
  
D1.OT 
k,j,t-1×OE_to_ME 
2.700 2.639 2.611      
 
(2.714) (2.712) (2.715)      
 
D1.Input tariff ,j.t-1 -0.664 -0.632 -0.639  5.507* 6.017**  -1.310* -1.334* 
 
(0.596) (0.602) (0.602)  (2.865) (2.451)  (0.701) (0.704) 
D1.IT 
k,j,t-1×OE_to_PE 
49.490*** 42.140*** 43.240***      
 
(16.980) (14.990) (14.730)      
 
D1.IT 
k,j,t-1×OE_to_ME 
-1.302 -1.274 -1.254       
(2.119) (2.097) (2.100)       
OE_to_PE -0.143 -0.220** -0.207**       
 
(0.109) (0.097) (0.096)       
OE_to_ME 0.016 0.007 0.008       
 
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048)       
D1.TFPdl k,j,t  0.064*** 0.065***  
 0.191***   0.063*** 
 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
 
 (0.056)   (0.024) 
D1.Ln K k,j,t 
  0.018 
  
0.048   0.064** 
 
  (0.012) 
  
(0.144)   (0.026) 
D1.SOE k,j,t -0.049* -0.036 -0.036   0.022   -0.012 
 
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030)   (0.029)   (0.083) 
D1.Foreign owned k,j,t 0.044* 0.045* 0.043   -0.312**   0.021 
 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)   (0.153)   (0.092) 
D1.HMT owned k,j,t 0.033 0.030 0.028   0.234   0.064 
 
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025)   (0.157)   (0.101) 
Observations 20,006 19,848 19,848   20,872 20,675   24,985 24,735 
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; significant at *10%; **5%; ***1%. Year fixed 
effects, location fixed effects and location-year fixed effects are controlled in all regressions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 195 
 
 
Table 3.12. Firm Wages and Export Switching of Mixed Exporters 
Dependent Variable:  
 D1.ln(wage) k,j,t  
ME_to_PE 
 
ME_to_OE 
With 
ownership 
With 
productivity 
With size   Tariffs Firm 
controls 
 Tariffs Firm 
controls   
  ⑴ ⑵ ⑶   ⑷ ⑸   ⑹ ⑺ 
D1.Output tariff ,j.t-1 -0.209 -0.231 -0.230  0.220 0.172  -1.703* -1.611 
 
(0.486) (0.498) (0.496)  (1.485) (1.482)  (1.018) (1.013) 
D1.OT 
k,j,t-1×ME_to_PE 
-6.540 -6.578 -6.377  
  
 
  
(5.079) (5.491) (5.575)  
  
 
  
D1.OT 
k,j,t-1×ME_to_OE 
-0.738 -0.850 -0.751      
 
(2.006) (1.995) (1.976)      
 
D1.Input tariff ,j.t-1 -0.244 -0.250 -0.256  9.587*** 9.657***  -1.644* -1.767* 
 
(0.322) (0.333) (0.333)  (2.807) (2.819)  (0.973) (0.998) 
D1.IT 
k,j,t-1×ME_to_PE 
4.724 5.334 5.361      
 
(4.146) (4.145) (4.127)      
 
D1.IT 
k,j,t-1×ME_to_OE 
4.630 4.506 4.378       
(7.696) (7.747) (7.726)       
ME_to_PE -0.083 -0.080 -0.075       
 
(0.149) (0.153) (0.152)       
ME_to_OE -0.124* -0.135* -0.133*       
 
(0.072) (0.072) (0.072)       
D1.TFPdl k,j,t  0.052*** 0.053***  
 0.004   0.054* 
 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
 
 (0.041)   (0.032) 
D1.Ln K k,j,t 
  0.035 
  
0.055   -0.064 
 
  (0.022) 
  
(0.069)   (0.044) 
D1.SOE k,j,t -0.009 -0.003 -0.003   -0.288   0.388** 
 
(0.055) (0.056) (0.056)   (0.186)   (0.164) 
D1.Foreign owned k,j,t 0.007 0.010 0.011   -0.157   0.198* 
 
(0.044) (0.045) (0.045)   (0.156)   (0.110) 
D1.HMT owned k,j,t -0.017 -0.017 -0.015   0.010   0.195* 
 
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045)   (0.153)   (0.110) 
Observations 10,168 10,065 10,065   11,145 10,999   11,347 11,198 
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; significant at *10%; **5%; ***1%. Year fixed 
effects, location fixed effects and location-year fixed effects are controlled in all regressions.  
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Figures  
Figure 1.1: Trend of  Chinese Applied Tariff  Rates (%), 1992-2011 
 
Source: World Bank staff  estimates using the World Integrated Trade Solution system, based on data from 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development's Trade Analysis and Information System 
(TRAINS) database and the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Integrated Data Base (IDB) and 
Consolidated Tariff  Schedules (CTS) database. 
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Figure 2.1. Trends of  Output Tariff, Input Tariff, ERP and Firm Average Wage 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Trends of  Chinese 2-digit Industrial Output Tariffs, 2000-2006  
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Figure 2.3. Trends of  Chinese 2-digit Industrial Input Tariffs, 2000-2006 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Trends of  Chinese 2-digit Industrial ERP, 2000-2006  
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Figure 2.5. Output Tariffs Vary Across 3-digit Industries, 2000-2006  
 
 
 
Figure 2.6. Input Tariffs Vary Across 3-digit Industries, 2000-2006  
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Figure 2.7. ERP Vary Across 3-digit Industries, 2000-2006  
 
 
 
Figure 2.8. Correlation between Output Tariffs and Input Tariffs, 2000-2006 
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Figure 2.9. Share of  Firms 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.10.Employment Share 
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Figure 2.11.Value Added Share 
 
 
 
Figure 2.12. Tariff  Changes in Percentage of  HS Products, 2000-2006 
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Figure 2.13. Change in Output Tariffs Relative to Initial Levels, 2000-2006 (3-digit Industry) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.14. Change in Output Tariffs Relative to Initial Levels, pre-WTO (3-digit Industry) 
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Figure 2.15. Change in Output Tariffs Relative to Initial Levels (2001), post-WTO (3-digit 
Industry) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.16. Trends in Tariffs for the Most Protected Industries, 2000-2006 
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Figure 2.17. Trends in Tariffs for the Least Protected Industries, 2000-2006 
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Figure 3.1. The Trends of  Firm Wages and Firm Tariffs, 2000-2006 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Processing Exports in China 
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Figure 3.3 Processing Imports in China 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Chinese Processing Firms in Two-digit Industry, 2000-2006 
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Appendix 1A Data Preparation  
1A.1 Firm-level Production Data (CASIF) 
 
Table 1A.1 shows the number of  industrial firms and the number of  valid variables in 
this Chinese Annual Survey of  Industrial Firms (CASIF).136 It is clear that the quantity 
of  above-scale firms is growing through 2000 to 2006, rising from 162,885 to 301,961. In 
2006, the number of firms is almost double that of 2000. In this firm-level production 
dataset, each firm is required to report its main industry and all the industries are coded 
by a unique coding system which is under the National Standards of  China (GB/T). 
Under this coding system, each industry is identified by a 4-digit Chinese Industry 
Classification (CIC) code. 
[Table 1A.1 about here] 
For our research purposes we only focus on manufacturing firms. This means some 
data cleaning is required. First, based on the two-digit industry code (the industry is 
coded within 4-digit in the sample), we exclude several industries and two sectors from 
this sample.137 One is the mining sector, including codes 06, 07, 08, 09, 10 and 11; the 
other is the sector of  production and supply of  electric power, gas and water, which 
includes the codes 44, 45 and 46; in addition, tobacco (CIC: 16), handicrafts (CIC:42) and 
recycling (CIC: 43) industries are excluded.138 Secondly, a change has occurred in the 
coding rule since 2003 and a new 4-digit GB/T code is used for coding industries from 
2003 onwards As a result, the industry codes in our sample period are not consistent. 
This means we need to adjust the industry codes by using the industry concordance table 
constructed by Brandt et al. (2012). The adjusted industry codes are still 4-digit in length. 
After this adjustment, industries 1711, 1712, 1713, 1714, 2220, 3648, 3783, 4183 and 
4280 that appeared before 2003 are further excluded, because industries with those codes 
above were re-classified as service industries in 2003, and hence do not belong to the 
                                                             
136 The valid variable is a variable with values. If  a variable is full of  missing values, we consider 
it to be invalid. 
137 The two-digit industry codes are derived from the adjusted four-digit industry code. 
138 Followed by Upward et al. (2013), the production and sales of  tobacco is still highly regulated 
by the Chinese government, the product values of  the handicrafts are extremely heterogeneous across 
the industry as some of  them are incredible artworks, and after 2003 recycling industry are divided 
into many other four-digit industries. 
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manufacturing sector. The final result is a sample of  424 adjusted industries.139  
1A.2 Product-level Transaction Data (GACC) 
 
Table 1A.2 shows the number of  firms and the number of  valid variables in the 
product-level trade dataset. Table 1A.2 also shows that extremely strong growth in the 
quantity of  firms engaged in international trade between 2000 and 2006. As shown, the 
number of  exporting or importing firms in 2000 is 82,064 but is 2.5 times higher in 2006, 
at 208,418.140 The last two rows report the number of  repeated firms; the firms with the 
same Customs ID but are different in all other characteristics. To match as many firms 
with the production data as possible we keep these repeated firms in the next part of  the 
matching process. 
[Table 1A.2 about here] 
Before we take the next step of  matching the Customs data with the Industrial data, 
we first clean the customs data and aggregate it from monthly records into yearly records 
in order to match with the industrial data which is collected annually. First, we exclude 
the service trade from the raw CCTS data. This means dropping the transaction records 
containing the two-digit HS codes 98 and 99 following Upward et al. (2013). Next, 
according to the unique 10-digit firm ID code, we aggregate each firm’s yearly export 
values and import values. Because we subsequently use the firm’s name as a link to match 
its trade information with its financial information in the industrial dataset, we drop the 
repeated aggregated values not only by firm code set by CCTS, but also by firm’s name.141 
In such a situation, we make sure that the clean CCTS dataset includes all the names that 
each firm uses. Sometimes, in the transaction records, even though two records have the 
same firm code, they may have different firm names. Keeping all the used names of  
firms increases the matching success rate. 
1A.3 Matching the Production Data with the Transaction Data 
 
Combining the suggestions from Upward et al. (2013) and Yu (2015), we use common 
                                                             
139 In the original data we had 535 industries for 2000-2002 based on GB/T 4754-1994 coding 
system and 480 industries for 2003-2006 based on GB/T 4754-2002 coding system. 
140 In Table 1A.2 we report two different numbers of  firms for year 2005 and 2006. For 
comparison, we use the quantity of  non-repeated firms in 2006. 
141 In certain years, there are repeated firms as mentioned before. We keep the different names 
to provide a better chance to match firms in CASIF. However, this would not cause a problem that a 
firm in CASIF may merge with repeated firm IDs in CCTS due to the names, because in each year a 
unique firm in CASIF only reports one name. 
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variables such as firm’s name, contact person’s name, telephone number and postcode, to 
identify a unique firm. Our matching process is described below. 
1A.3.1 Matching Method I: by exact firm name 
 
In the first step, a firm is matched if  and only if  it has the identified name in both 
datasets for a given year. This is the simplest and most direct way of  matching. The 
matching result for each year is shown in Table 1A.3. However, the matched firms for 
each year account for just one fourth of  the quantity of  firms in the Trade dataset, and 
even fewer for the industrial firm dataset, with only around one fifth of  the total number 
of  firms for each year matched. Next, we check the location consistent for those 
matched firms using two indices, province consistency and postcode consistency, which 
are variables included in both datasets. The administrative region code in the CASIF is a 
6-digit code (but for years 2004 and 2005, the region code is 12-digit) and we take the 
first two digits to check with the first two digits of  firm code in the CCTS.142 Under the 
label “Province/Postcode Inconsistency”, the number 0 means that the location 
information in both are the same, while the number 1 means the location information is 
not consistent. 
[Table 1A.3 about here] 
  Using this matching approach, approximately 19% of  the observations in CASIF are 
matched during our sample period. The success rate of  matching in 2000-2002 is around 
13% rising to 21% in 2003-2006. At the firm-level the matched observations account for 
almost 31% of  the total observations in CCTS, whereas the success rate of  matching in 
2000-2003 is around 25% and the rate in 2004-2006 is around 33%. 
1A.3.2a Matching Method IIA: by the last 7-digit telephone number combined with the 
name of the contact person 
 
In order to increase the number of  matched firms further, we utilize a firm’s contact 
telephone number combined with the value of  the firm’s contact person as our second 
matching approach. During our sample period the telephone number in some provinces 
had one more digit added at the beginning of  the number to extend its length from 
7-digits to 8-digits. Hence we use the last 7-digits of  the telephone number to identify the 
                                                             
142 As mentioned in Upward et al. (2013), the location information from those two data sources, 
CASIF and CCTS, are only consistent at the province level. The first two digits of  a region code in 
CASIF represents for a province and the first two digits of  a firm ID code in CCTS represents for a 
province. 
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firms that appear in both datasets.  
To ensure that this second matching method is accurate, we use the combination of  
the last 7-digit telephone number and the contact person’s name in part A. We report this 
matching result and the location check in Table 1A.4. For comparison we also use the 
combination of  the full-length telephone number and the contact person’s name in part 
B which is the next stage of  the process. 
[Table 1A.4 about here] 
This part of  the matching process accounts for approximately 5% of  the total 
observations in CASIF in our sample period and in each year the success rate of  
matching is also around 5%. Further, the matched observations account for nearly 8% of  
the total observations in CCTS at the firm-level, whereas the yearly success rate of  
matching is around 8% (6% in 2003). The success rate of  matching based on two 
datasets is much lower than the rate of  the previous matching approach. 
1A.3.2b Matching Method IIB: by full telephone number combined with the contact 
person’s name 
 
We also check another matching method in the second step of  this part of  the matching 
process. Now we use the full telephone number instead of  last 7-digit telephone number 
combined with the contact person’s name. However, the matched result based on this 
method is relatively small. The number of  matched firms in each year is smaller than the 
one shown in Table 1A.4. To save space we do not provide the table of  matching result 
here. 
The result of  having fewer matched firms following matching method IIB, satisfies 
our assumption that using the last 7-digit length of  the telephone number is more 
accurate to identify the same firms common in both datasets, compared to the full length 
of  the phone number. 
1A.3.3a Matching Method IIIA: by the last 7-digit telephone number combined with 
postcode 
 
The next stage in our effort to match as many firms as possible was to try to match firms 
in the two datasets by the set of  last 7-digit telephone number plus postcode as part A of  
our third matching approach. The result is described in Table 1A.5. Using postcode as 
one of  the keys in the third matching approach means each matched firm must have 
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consistent postcodes. Hence values of  the dummy variable “postcode inconsistency” for 
matched firms in each year are certainly all equal to zero as reported in Table 1A.5. 
[Table 1A.5 about here] 
  In this part, the matched observations account for approximately 6% of  the total 
observations in CASIF in our sample period and in each year the success rate of  
matching is also around 6%. Further, the matched observations account for nearly 10% 
of  the total observations in CCTS at the firm-level, whereas the yearly success rate of  
matching is also around 10%. Both success rates of  matching based on two datasets here 
are equivalent to the rates reported in part A of  the second matching approach, but 
much lower than the rates of  the first matching approach again. 
1A.3.3b Matching Method IIIB: by full telephone number combined with postcode 
 
Similarly, in the third matching step we use the full length of  the telephone number, not 
just the last 7-digit of  telephone number and combine with postcode as our matching 
method IIIB for comparison. Again, the quantity of  matched firms based on this part B 
is smaller than the one based on part A in each year. 
1A.3.4 Final Matched Result 
 
Finally, we sum the matched results in each matching step, and then drop the repeated 
firms to get a more comprehensive matched result. We use the combination of  firm ID 
in CCTS, 4-digit CIC industry code and the region code as our condition to drop the 
repeated firms in each year. The reason we do not use the firm ID in CASIF as the key 
to drop repeated firms is that we have found that firms with the same ID in CASIF may 
have different firm IDs in CCTS. Using the firm ID in CASIF as a hint to drop repeated 
firms may be erroneous as we may drop unrepeated firms. Hence we choose the firm ID 
in CCTS as the key to drop repeated firms.  
Since the previous matching methods from part A gets a larger number of  matched 
firms compared with part B, we choose the matched firms that appeared in part A to 
generate our final result. We report the final matched result in Table 1A.6 and check the 
location consistency again. Further, we calculate the consistency rate and get a value that 
is nearly 99 percent accurate for province consistency, while in another location index; 
the rate of  postcode consistency is about 80 percent of  the total. The consistency rates 
are both high and this finding convinces us of  the success of  our matching process.  
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[Table 1A.6 about here] 
  Finally, we make a comparison between our matching methods with others and 
report the results in Table 1A.7. Column (1) reports the yearly and total quantity of  
matched observations, whereas column (2) and (4) report the quantity of  matched 
observations from Upward et al. (2013) and Yu (2015) separately.143 We also calculate the 
comparison rates based on our matching results and others and report in both column (3) 
and (5). Although in some certain years matched observations in Upward et al. (2013) are 
greater than ours, in total we obtain a slightly larger matched sample, with a positive 
comparison rate of  1.26%, whether yearly or total we obtain a greater sample than Yu 
(2015), with an additional 42,971 matched observations in total. Finally, our matched 
sample contains approximately one fifth of  observations in CASIF and nearly one third 
of  observations in CCTS. Thus is close to Upward et al. (2013) who find 17% of  firms in 
CASIF and 20% of  registered firms in CCTS are included in their matched data. These 
findings convince us of  the success of  our matching process. 
[Table 1A.7 about here] 
1A.4 Exclusion of Trading Agents 
 
As mentioned by Manova and Zhang (2009, 2012), there exist some firms whose 
principal business is not based on production, but mostly provide various kinds of  
trading services, such as exporting or importing products for other firms, or services like 
temporarily storing or shipping products for other firms. These firms are referred to as 
trading agents, or intermediary firms by Ahn et al. (2011), and are not engaged in 
production but involved in the international trade sector. It is the reaction of  production 
firms in the manufacturing sector to tariff  changes as a result of  trade liberalization that 
we aim to observe. Hence, we need to exclude these trading agent firms from our 
sample. 
  There are no official indicators to identify these trading agents. In practice, Ahn et al. 
(2011) used four key words to identify trading agents while Upward et al. (2013) provide a 
more comprehensive list of  key words which are typically used by various kinds of  
trading agents in their work. We follow their method and combine their lists to identify 
                                                             
143 In Yu (2014), the author reports his different matching results in two columns, as one is 
based on raw firms and the other is based on filtered firms. Here we choose the result based on raw 
firms for comparison because our matching results are without deep cleaning at this stage. 
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Chinese trading agents then drop these trading agent firms from our sample.  
  In both industrial firms’ dataset and customs trade dataset, the Chinese manufacturing 
firms report their names in Chinese words. Hence, we exclude the firms in both datasets 
whose names include such Chinese key words as shown in Table 1A.8, which provides 23 
key words in total. Besides, we report the quantity of  trading agents identified by our 
rules in Table 1A.9 and find that 1497 observations have been excluded from our sample 
in this stage.144 
[Table 1A.8 about here] 
[Table 1A.9 about here] 
1A.5 Processing Trade Identification 
 
Processing trade plays an important role in the international trade of  China and firms 
engaged in processing trade enjoy special tariff  treatment, which is different from that of  
other firms engaged in trade. To avoid our empirical results being biased by this type of  
trade we need to identify those firms involved in processing trade. 
  In the Customs trade data, there exists a variable to describe the trade types and each 
type is a 2-digit code. In 2012, the General Administration of  Customs reports 16 
specific types of  processing trade in China. Our clean sample only contains just 12 and 
we list them in Table 1A.10. Hence, if  a matched firm contains trading information 
including any of  these types of  processing trade in Table 1A.10, we treat it as a 
processing firm.  
[Table 1A.10 about here] 
1A.6 Data Cleaning 
 
In order to obtain a more suitable sample for our analysis, we further clean the matched 
data. Firms with variables exhibiting the characteristics listed as below are also excluded 
from our sample: 
1. Firms with missing location information, specifically without region code. 
                                                             
144 The number of  trading agents is lower than the number reported in Upward et al. (2013) as 
the identification is based on different datasets. Ours is based on the matched sample, which is a small 
part of  entire CCTS, whereas his is based on full set of  CCTS. We also check the identification 
number based on full CCTS and find the same result as his work provided. 
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2. Firms report missing, zero or negative values for any of the financial variables 
related to final outputs, intermediate inputs, sales, revenue, profits, total capital and 
wage payment. 
3. Firms report missing or negative values for any of the financial variables related to a 
firm’s ownership structure, e.g. a firm with a negative value for its foreign capital is 
invalid, but a firm with zero foreign capital is valid, which could be explained by the 
lack of foreign investment. However, as mentioned in rule 2, a firm with zero total 
capital should not be treated as valid. 
4. Firms with missing or negative values of exporting final outputs and importing 
intermediate inputs. 
5. Firms whose production sales are less than the export value.  
6. Firms whose total values of inputs used in production are less than the import value 
of intermediate inputs. 
7. Firms with missing values of employment and have less than eight employees. 
8. Firms who report missing values for any of the financial variables related to assets. 
9. Firms whose liquid assets are higher than total assets; or firms whose total fixed 
assets are higher than total assets; or firms whose net fixed assets are higher than 
total assets.  
10. Firms whose birth year or established year is missing and invalid. 
11. Firms ID based on the industrial dataset system is missing. 
12. Processing firms with non-zero values of processing export or processing import. 
  After this exhaustive data matching and cleaning exercise we are left with 953,609 
observations in total.  
1A.7 Deflators and Identification of Unique Firms 
 
We use output and input deflators from Brandt et al. (2012), which are based on the 
4-digit industry level, to deflate the values of  all monetary variables in our sample.145 In 
addition, we use their method to track the firms across time as we will discuss a firm’s 
change in performance over time. According to the tracking approach, we provide each 
unique firm with a new identification code so we can recognize them across time. In the 
end we have an unbalanced panel with 953,609 observations and 332,958 unique firms 
for 2000-2006. 
                                                             
145 Brandt et al. (2012) first construct output deflators by using “reference price” which is from 
China’s Statistical Yearbook and then construct input deflators by using the 2002 IO table for China 
and their measured output deflators. 
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Appendix 1B Estimation of Total Factor Productivity (TFP)  
Total factor productivity (TFP) is measured by following the De Loecker (2007) method 
and the modification conducted by Elliott et al. (2015). De Loecker (2007) extends the 
model of  Olley and Pakes (1996) by introducing two key elements into the production 
function: one is a firm’s export status and the other is different market structures 
conditional on firm’s engagement in foreign trade.  
Following De Loecker (2007), Elliott et al. (2015) modify and extend the structural 
model by further adding a firm’s import status. introducing firm activities of  both 
exporting and importing into this structural model. A vast of  literature document that 
selling final outputs oversea and sourcing raw materials and intermediate inputs from 
foreign markets are equally important for firm productivity, and high-productive firms 
are more willing to self-select into global markets (Van Biesebroeck, 2005; Das et al., 2007; 
Kasahara and Lapham, 2013), therefore, when measuring or calculating a firm’s 
productivity level, taking its choice of  exporting or importing into account is necessary 
but those trade activates should be treated as endogenous variables.  
Since Olley and Pakes (1996) assume that firms are risk-neutral and always expect to 
maximize their profits in period t and period (t+1), their production function is built as 
belows: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡                                   (B. 1) 
  y, k, and l are the natural logarithm value of  firm added-value, firm total capital and 
firm total employment respectively. Here i denotes a firm and t denotes a specific year, ω 
controls for productivity shock which may affect a firm’s choice into global engagement 
and η is an i.i.d component which may not affect a firm’s choice of  inputs used for 
manufacturing production.   
  In each period t, firm i need to make a series of  decisions as follows at the starting 
point of  production: (1) exit or continue to produce final products, which is determined 
by comparing the continuation value with the currently sell-off  value. If  the former is 
higher than the latter, firm i keeps producing, otherwise it exits; (2) the unit of  labor and 
the amount of  investment used in current production after firm i chooses to stay. Since 
𝑘𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿)𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑖𝑡 , it is well believed that accumulated capital can make current 
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investment become productive in the next time period.  
  The investment demand function includes considerations of  firm capital k, its 
productivity level ω and two trading dummies but only considering in one-direction, 
exporting FXit or importing FMit:  
𝑖𝑖𝑡 = 𝑖𝑡(𝑘𝑖𝑡 , 𝜔𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑀𝑖𝑡 )                               (B. 2) 
  It is hard to have available and appropriate investment data at the firm level and in 
empirical studies a large quantity of  firms are lack of  information on investments or 
occur zero-investment. To solve the problem of  firms who have zero-investment, a 
modification approach introduced by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) can be used by taking 
each firm’s total intermediates (m) as a proxy for investment and hence, equation (B.2) 
turns to be: 
𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝑚𝑡(𝑘𝑖𝑡 , 𝜔𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑀𝑖𝑡 )                               (B. 3) 
  Elliott et al. (2015) then obtain the function of  productivity shock ωit by inverting the 
demand function:  
𝜔𝑖𝑡 = 𝜔𝑡(𝑘𝑖𝑡 , 𝑚𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑀𝑖𝑡 )                               (B. 4) 
  After substituting equation (B.4) into equation (B.1), the production function now 
turns to be: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙𝑡(𝑘𝑖𝑡 , 𝑚𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑀𝑖𝑡 ) + 𝜂𝑖𝑡                                   (B. 5) 
  where 𝜙𝑡(𝑘𝑖𝑡 , 𝑚𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑀𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡(𝑘𝑖𝑡 , 𝑚𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑀𝑖𝑡 ) . 
  Then, by substituting a third-order polynomial in four variables, 𝑘𝑖𝑡 , 𝑚𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑋𝑖𝑡  and 
𝐹𝑀𝑖𝑡 to approximate 𝜙𝑡(. ) , 𝛽𝑙  can be estimated from equation (B.5) by using OLS 
approach in the first stage and it is consistent. To capture the effects of  firm ownership 
and year fixed effects, dummy variables to describe firm ownership structure and year 
dummy variables are additional included and the estimation is based on 4-digit CIC 
industry level. In the second stage, the coefficient on capital 𝛽𝑘 is estimated in the 
following description. 
  The decision for surviving is dependent on firm trading status of  exporting and 
importing through two channels: productivity shocks and the accumulated process of  
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capital, in order to avoid the bias of  selection. If  the function of  indicator 𝜒𝑖𝑡  is defined 
to be equal to 1, for example, if  firm i stays in production at t and zero otherwise, then 
the probability of  surviving is determined by the information set J at time t as follows:  
𝑃𝑟{𝜒𝑖(𝑡+1) = 1|𝐽𝑖𝑡} = 𝑃𝑟 {𝜔𝑖(𝑡+1) ≥ ω𝑖(𝑡+1)(𝑘𝑖(𝑡+1), 𝐹𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑀𝑖𝑡 ) |𝜔𝑖(𝑡+1)(𝑘𝑖(𝑡+1), 𝐹𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑀𝑖𝑡 ), 𝜔𝑖𝑡}
= 𝜓 {𝜔𝑖(𝑡+1)(𝑘𝑖(𝑡+1), 𝐹𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑀𝑖𝑡 ), 𝜔𝑖𝑡} = 𝜓{𝑘𝑖𝑡 , 𝑚𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑀𝑖𝑡 }
≡ 𝑃𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                               (B. 6) 
  Then productivity is assumed to follow a first order Markov process: 
𝜔𝑖(𝑡+1) = 𝛦[𝜔𝑖(𝑡+1)|𝜔𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝜒𝑖(𝑡+1) = 1] + 𝜉𝑖(𝑡+1)                                 (B. 7) 
  where 𝜉𝑖(𝑡+1) is the innovation on productivity in period (t+1) that is dependent on 
these variables, productivity in the current period t, trading status (export and import) 
and survival in the next period (t+1). 
  Let us consider the expectation of  𝑦𝑖(𝑡+1) − 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖(𝑡+1)  conditional on survival and 
information at time t:  
𝛦[𝑦𝑖(𝑡+1) − 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖(𝑡+1)|𝑘𝑖(𝑡+1), 𝜒𝑖(𝑡+1) = 1] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖(𝑡+1) + 𝛦[𝜔𝑖(𝑡+1)|𝜔𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝜒𝑖(𝑡+1) = 1]
≡   𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖(𝑡+1) + 𝑔(𝜔𝑖(𝑡+1), ω𝑖𝑡)                                                                                 (B. 8) 
  Given the density of  𝜔𝑖(𝑡+1) conditional on 𝜔𝑖𝑡  is positive in each region, 𝜔𝑖(𝑡+1) can 
be expressed as a function of  𝑃𝑖𝑡  and 𝜔𝑖𝑡  from equation (B.6). Hence, 𝑔(. ) can be 
written as a function of  𝑃𝑖𝑡  and 𝜔𝑖𝑡. 
  The equation (B.9) could be derived from equation (B.1) by substituting 𝑃𝑖𝑡  and 𝜔𝑖𝑡  
into 𝑔(. ) as follows:  
  
𝑦𝑖(𝑡+1) − 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖(𝑡+1) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖(𝑡+1) + 𝛦[𝜔𝑖(𝑡+1)|𝜔𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝜒𝑖(𝑡+1) = 1] + 𝜉𝑖(𝑡+1) + 𝜂𝑖𝑡  
= +𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖(𝑡+1) + 𝑔(𝛲𝑖𝑡 , 𝜔𝑖𝑡) + 𝜉𝑖(𝑡+1)
+ 𝜂𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                (B. 9) 
  Using 𝜔𝑖𝑡 = 𝜙𝑡(𝑘𝑖𝑡 , 𝑚𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑀𝑖𝑡 ) − 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 from equation (B.5), on the right-hand side 
in equation (B.9) the first three terms can be re-written as a function of  (𝜙𝑡 − 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡) and 
𝑃𝑖𝑡  as follows: 
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𝑦𝑖(𝑡+1) − 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖(𝑡+1) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖(𝑡+1) + 𝑔(𝛲𝑖𝑡 , 𝜙𝑡 − 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡) + 𝜉𝑖(𝑡+1)
+ 𝜂𝑖𝑡                                                                                                   (B. 10) 
  Similarly, 𝛽𝑘 can be estimated from equation (B.10) by using nonlinear least squares 
approach and substituting the coefficient on labor𝛽𝑙 that is estimated in the first stage 
and the probability of  surviving 𝑃𝑖𝑡  that is estimated in equation (B.6). Since in the first 
stage, 𝑔(𝛲𝑖𝑡 , 𝜙𝑡 − 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡) is a approximated function by using a higher order polynomial 
expansion in 𝑃𝑖𝑡  and (𝜙𝑡 − 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡). 
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Appendix 2A Measures of Industrial Trade Protections in 
China 
2A.1 Industry-level Tariffs 
We follow Amiti and Konings (2007) for the measurement of  tariff  rates. To do this we 
construct output and input tariffs in China using IO (Input/Output) sector categories, 
which are equivalent to the 3-digit Chinese Industry Classification (CIC) level. Output 
tariffs are constructed by taking the simple average of  the tariffs at the Harmonized 
System (HS) six-digit code level within each IO sector. For each IO sector, the input 
tariff  is measured by using an input-cost share as the weight to aggregate those IO sector 
output tariffs. The measurement is as follows: 
tariffoutputstariffinput jt
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We use the shares from the input-output table of  China in 2002 as the weights
s ij 2002, , which are the input-cost proportions of  industry i in producing total outputs in 
industry j, based on 2002 firm-level data, sum up to the 3-digit industry level (IO 
sector-level) by National Bureau of  Statistics of  China (NBSC).146 Here, i or j denotes an 
industry, t denotes a different year and k denotes a firm. The measurement of  input 
tariffs is such that if  for example, industry j incurs 80% of  its cost in cotton and 20% in 
wool, then cotton tariffs get a 80% weight and wool tariffs a 20% weight, and the input 
tariff  for industry j is calculated as the sum of  output tariffs on both cotton and wool, 
with a 70% weight giving to output tariff  in cotton and a 30% weight giving to output 
tariff  in wool. 
To measure the IO sector output tariff  rates, we first need to know the product line 
for each sector. However, the direct connection between IO sectors and HS codes is not 
                                                             
146 Firm’s inputs/outputs and compilation of  the input-output tables for China is conducted by 
NBSC every five years. There are five IO tables for China, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007. Since our 
sample period is 2000 to 2006, we choose the 2002 IO table and use its input-cost shares as the 
weights to calculate our 3-digit industry input tariffs during the sample period.  
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readily available. There are two possible methods to address this problem: one is to rely 
on the linkage between the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) coding 
system and CIC coding system and to utilize multiple concordance tables to indirectly 
obtain an IO-HS concordance table.147 The other possible solution is to rely on the 2007 
IO-HS concordance table as China Customs reports the product line within each IO 
sector directly. However, both products and sectors are based on the China’s new coding 
system, HS2007 and IO2007. For our sample period, some additional adjustment is 
needed.148 Our strategy is to combine both approaches to drop the repeated products of  
each sector to derive our comprehensive IO-HS concordance table, which is based on 
the HS 6-digit product level. 
As a first step for method 1, we adjust the IO sectors with the 4-digit CIC industry 
codes. Specifically, we match 122 IO sectors with 861 CIC industries (2000-2002) and 
with 913 CIC industries (2003-2006) separately.149 Secondly, we convert the CIC coding 
system into the ISIC coding system and further connect our IO sectors with ISIC 
industries. 150  Then using the ISIC/Rev.3-HS concordance tables we link the ISIC 
industry codes with China’s HS 6-digit products.151 Finally we find the correspondence 
between the IO sectors and the HS 6-digit products according to method 1. Later we 
convert the 2007 IO-HS concordance table into a new version to correspond to our time 
period as outlined in method 2. Eventually, by integrating the results from methods 1 and 
2, we acquire our own IO-HS concordance tables, which cover almost 7,000 HS 6-digit 
                                                             
147 These multiple concordance tables we utilized are: ISIC/Rev.3-HS1996, ISIC/Rev.3-HS2002, 
GB/T4754-2002-ISIC/Rev.3, GB/T4754-2002-IO2002 and GB/T-4754-2002- GB/T4754-1994. 
148 Here we need concordance tables HS1996-HS2007, HS2002-HS2007 and IO2002-IO2007. 
149 During the sample period there are two versions of  industry classification, so we adjust the 
IO sectors with both of  them separately. In 2000-2002 the industry classification is based on old 
coding system, GB/T4754-1994, therefore there are 861 industries in total. After 2002 the new coding 
system, GB/T4754-2002, is introduced to classify industry, hence there are 913 industries in total. As 
in Brandt et al. (2012), they only concordance the manufacturing industries with the IO sectors 
therefore 71 IO sectors are reported in their IO-CIC concordance table. Based on their work, we 
extend the adjustment as our IO-CIC concordance table including all 122 sectors appeared in 2002 
input-output table, which includes all the industries not only manufacturing industries. 
150 NBSC report the concordance table between GB/T4754-2002 and ISIC/Rev.3. In practice a 
CIC code may correspond to three ISIC codes. For example, Manufacture of  Stationery (CIC: 2411) 
is concorded with Manufacture of  Plastic Products (ISIC: 2520), Manufacture of  Other Metal 
Products (ISIC: 2899) and Manufacture of  Others (ISIC: 3699). In this case we give a 1/3 weight to 
each ISIC industry and sum up those 3 ISIC output tariffs if  we would like to get the CIC output 
tariff  in Manufacture of  Stationery. Later when we calculate the IO sector output tariffs, we treat each 
product’s tariff  under each ISIC industry equally. 
151 The tariffs of  6-digit products obtained from the WITS around our sample are based on 
different HS versions. Tariffs in 2000 and 2001 use the HS1996 coding system while tariffs in 
2002-2006 use the HS2002 coding system. So we use two concordance tables: ISIC/Rev.3-HS1996 
and ISIC/Rev.3-HS2002. 
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products within 122 IO sectors.152 
With our own IO-HS table, we use China’s HS 6-digit effectively applied tariffs and 
take a simple average to obtain IO sector output tariff  rates.153 Based on IO sector 
output tariffs, we turn to calculating IO sector input tariff  rates. To measure IO sector 
input tariffs we use the input-cost shares from the 2002 input-output table as a weight to 
average the IO sector output tariffs as calculated previously. Since we assume in our 
sample period each IO sector does not change its cost distribution for each production 
line, we fix the input-cost shares. That is, we implicitly assume that technology remains 
constant. Further, since we use industry input-shares for input tariff  rate calculations, 
which is at a more aggregated level, our measurement for input tariffs would not be 
biased by a single firm’s own input choices. 
2A.2 Industry-level Effective Rate of Protection (IERP) 
 
We further also construct effective rate of  protection (ERP) to evaluate the trade reform 
in China. Two forces drive this additional measurement. First, if  the tariff  structure 
across industries experiences a huge change, the disciplining effect of  decreasing tariffs 
on final goods may be offset by decreasing input tariffs. Second, given the high 
correlation between output and input tariff  rates at the 3-digit industry level (as seen in 
Table 2 of  section 2.1), rather than include both measures in the same equation, we use 
the 3-digit industry level ERP to account for both types of  protection.  
Following Corden (1966), we therefore measure IERP to capture the net effect of  
tariff  reductions on outputs and intermediate inputs, 



j
ij
jtjt
jt
tariffinputtariffoutput
IERP
 2002,1
 
where  2002,ij  are the input-value shares of  industry i in the production of  total 
                                                             
152 We generate two concordance tables, IO2002-HS1996 and IO2002-HS2002. The former 
covers 6,886 HS 6-digit products within 122 sectors and the latter covers 7,031 HS 6-digit products 
within 122 sectors.  
153 Some IO sectors do not report the HS 6-digit outputs and hence their output tariff  rates are 
missing. This is because that those 122 IO sectors include all the industries, not only manufacturing 
industries but also service industries, such service industries do not produce products and hence they 
would not induce tariffs. Therefore, it is reasonable that we treat those missing ISIC output tariffs as 
zero.    
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outputs in industry j, also derived from the input-output table of  China in 2002. It is 
noted that the weights  2002,ij  to measure IERP are different from the weights sij 2002,  
to measure input tariffs in section A.1. The former is the share of  inputs from industry i 
in the total input costs occurred in the production of  total outputs in industry j, and the 
latter is the share of  inputs from industry i in the total value of  outputs in industry j. 
Hence, )
2002,
1( 
j
ij  can be expressed as: 
outputtotal
addedvaluetotal
outputtotal
inputtotaloutputtotal
outputtotal
inputtotal
jt
jt
jt
jtjt
jt
jt
j
ij



 12002,1   
which is equivalent to the share of  value-added in the value of  outputs in industry j.  
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Appendix 3A Data Exclusion 
Since our research aims to investigate the determinants of  switching among different 
exporters, additional exclusions from our merged unbalanced panel data are needed. 
Based on the definition of  processing exporters as defined in section 3.1.1, we first 
exclude the firms who have processing exports but no processing imports at period t, 
which include 4,936 observations and are around 0.48% (4,936/1,026,728≈0.00481) of  
our unbalanced merged sample, and the firms who have processing imports but no 
processing exports at period t, which include 7,363 observations and are around 0.72% 
(7,363/1,026,728≈ 0.00717) of  our unbalanced merged sample in period t, and 
consequently we have 1,014,429 observations in current panel. Then, to satisfy our 
motivation to investigate firm switching among different export types, we exclude the 
firms without any exports and such non-exporting firms include pure domestic-oriented 
firms (group 1 in Table 1) and pure importing firms (group 3 in Table 1). Therefore, 
869,762 observations are excluded, whilst among these the former accounts for 98% 
(852,437 observations) of  them and the latter only accounts for 1.99% (17,325 
observations). After such two additional exclusion rules, we are left with 144,667 
observations. Finally, based on the assumption used for calculating firm output tariffs as 
mentioned in section .1.1 we need to drop those firms with zero domestic sales (pure 
exporting firms) and firms with zero exports (pure domestic-sale firms) to avoid either 
of  them bias our empirical tests. Since we have already dropped pure domestic-sale firms 
as a last step, we only need to further drop pure exporting firms. According to the 
distribution of  export shares, we define pure exporting firms to be those firms whose 
export share exceeds that of  the 90th percentile within our current sample, and hence, we 
have 14,760 observations, around 10.2% (14,760/144,667≈0.1020), belonging to pure 
exporting firms in total.154 As a result, there are 129,907 observations and 55,217 unique 
firms left for our main estimations.  
                                                             
154 Note that we only have firms with exports in our sample now and hence, their export shares 
are always greater than zero. As mentioned in footnote 7, due to the different accounting principles, 
even an actual pure exporter could not always 100% match the value of  its total sales with the value 
of  its total exports in period t in fact. Hence, we rely on the distribution of  export shares to classify 
whether a firm is a pure exporting firm or not and we believe that taking those firms whose export 
shares drop in the range of  top 10th percentile as pure exporting firms is credible and makes sense. 
Most importantly, the 90th percentile export share is equal to 0.9030679 and the 89th percentile export 
share is 0.8881256, so we decide to use the value of  0.9 as the cut-off, which is stated in footnote 23 
as well, and define firms with their export shares greater than 0.9 to be pure exporting firms.   
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Appendix Tables 
Table 1A.1. Number of Firms in the Industrial Firms Dataset 
Year  Number of firms Number of valid variables 
2000                      162,885  105 
2001                      171,256  97 
2002                      181,557  94 
2003                      196,222  80 
2004                      269,792  91 
2005                      271,835  95 
2006                      301,961  107 
Total obs.                     1,555,508  77* 
Notes: * indicates the number of valid variables that appear in each year of our sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1A.2. Number of Firms in the Trade Transaction Dataset 
Year  Number of trading firms Number of valid variables 
2000                    82,064  37 
2001                    89,660  37 
2002                   104,245  29 
2003                   124,299  29 
2004                   153,779  29 
2005                   179,665  29 
2006                   208,418  28 
2005r                   239,220  29 
2006r                   284,218  28 
Total obs.n                    942,130  28* 
Notes: n indicates total observations only include non-repeated firms. r indicates the repeated firms would 
appear as firms which hold the same ID but have different information (e.g. firm name/telephone 
number/contact person/postcode). * indicates the number of valid variables that appear for each year in 
the sample. 
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Table 1A.3. Number of Matched Firms 
Matching Method I--by exact firm name 
 Province  
 
Postcode  
 Inconsistency Inconsistency 
Year  0 1   0 1 Total 
2000 19,498 143 
 
16,034 3,607 19,641 
2001 23,596 138 
 
19,238 4,496 23,734 
2002 27,056 7 
 
22,350 4,713 27,063 
2003 31,536 13 
 
26,600 4,949 31,549 
2004 49,647 18 
 
39,107 10,558 49,665 
2005r 55,915 9 
 
43,479 12,445 55,924 
2006r 80,660 17 
 
65,742 14,935 80,677 
Total obs. 287,908 345   232,550 55,703 288,253 
Notes: r indicates the repeated firms would appear as firms which hold the same ID but have different 
information (e.g. firm name/telephone number/contact person/postcode). Here 1 denotes inconsistency 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
Table 1A.4. Number of Matched Firms 
Matching Method IIA--by the last 7-digit telephone number combined with contact person 
 Province  
 
Postcode  
 Inconsistency Inconsistency 
Year  0 1   0 1 Total 
2000 7,917 41 
 
6,645 1,313 7,958 
2001 8,664 40 
 
7,211 1,493 8,704 
2002 8,426 10 
 
6,992 1,444 8,436 
2003 7,393 10 
 
6,048 1,355 7,403 
2004 12,681 52 
 
10,267 2,466 12,733 
2005r 13,745 49 
 
10,939 2,855 13,794 
2006r 15,651 85   12,115 3,621 15,736 
Total obs. 74,477 287   60,217 14,547 74,764 
Notes: r indicates the repeated firms would appear as firms which hold the same ID but have different 
information (e.g. firm name/telephone number/contact person/postcode). Here 1 denotes inconsistency 
and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 1A.5. Number of Matched Firms 
Matching Method IIIA--by the last 7-digit telephone number combined with postcode 
 Province  
 
Postcode  
 Inconsistency Inconsistency 
Year  0 1   0 1 Total 
2000 11,033 39 
 
11,072 0 11,072 
2001 11,352 6 
 
11,388 0 11,358 
2002 10,960 1 
 
10,961 0 10,961 
2003 9,817 2 
 
9,819 0 9,819 
2004 14,830 10 
 
14,840 0 14,840 
2005r 16,085 11 
 
16,096 0 16,096 
2006r 19,226 11   19,237 0 19,237 
Total obs. 93,303 110   93,413 0 93,413 
Notes: r indicates the repeated firms would appear as firms which hold the same ID but have different 
information (e.g. firm name/telephone number/contact person/postcode). Here 1 denotes inconsistency 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
Table 1A.6. Number Of Matched Firms 
M1+M2a+M3a-Repeated Firms 
 
Province 
Inconsistency 
Consistency 
Rate 
Postcode Inconsistency Consistency 
Rate 
Year  0 1 0         1  
2000  25,163  167 99.34% 21,179      4,151  83.61% 
2001  29,031  160 99.45% 24,105      5,086  82.58% 
2002  32,074  18 99.94% 26,844      5,248  83.65% 
2003  35,974  23 99.94% 30,542      5,455  84.85% 
2004 55,687  75 99.87% 44,400  11,362  79.62% 
2005  56,478  63 99.89% 44,028     12,513  77.87% 
2006 66,466  98 99.85% 55,102     11,462  82.78% 
Total obs.  300,873     604  99.80% 246,200    55,277  81.66% 
Notes: Here 1 denotes inconsistency and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 1A.7. Comparison of Final Matched Firms 
Year 
Our 
work 
Upward 
(2013) 
Comparison Rate 
(Ours-Upward/Upward) 
Yu   (2015) 
Comparison Rate 
(Ours-Yu/Yu) 
      
 
⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ ⑸ 
2000 25,330 23,740 6.70% 21,425 18.23% 
2001 29,191 27,829 4.89% 24,959 16.96% 
2002 32,092 32,782 -2.10% 28,759 11.59% 
2003 35,997 38,802 -7.23% 33,901 6.18% 
2004 55,762 56,078 -0.56% 49,891 11.77% 
2005 56,541 56,864 -0.57% 49,891 13.33% 
2006 66,564 61,628 8.01% 49,680 33.99% 
Total obs.  301,477 297,723 1.26% 258,506 16.62% 
 
 
 
Table 1A.8. Identification of Trading Agent 
No. Chinese Name English Name 
1 进出口 Import and Export 
2 经贸 Business and Economics 
3 贸易 Trade 
4 科贸 Technology and Trade  
5 服务 Service 
6 投资 Investment 
7 经发 Economic Development 
8 经济发展 Economic Development 
9 运储 Transportation and Storage 
10 储运 Storage and Transportation  
11 仓储 Storage 
12 运输 Transportation  
13 物资 Materials 
14 资运 Materials and Transportation  
15 代理 Agency/ Agent 
16 进口 Import 
17 出口 Export 
18 物流 Logistics 
19 合作 Corporation/ International Cooperation 
20 外贸 Foreign Trade/ International Business 
21 商社 Trading Enterprise/ Trading Co. ltd 
22 供销 Supply and Marketing/ Supply and Sales 
23 外经 Foreign Trade/ Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
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Table 1A.9. Number of Trading Agents in the Matched Sample 
Year Number of firms 
2000 145 
2001 175 
2002 157 
2003 175 
2004 265 
2005 287 
2006 364 
Total obs. 1,568 
 
 
 
Table 1A.10. Types of Chinese Processing Trade 
No. Code Trade Type 
1 12 International aid 
2 13 Compensation trade 
3 14 Processing with assembly 
4 15 Processing with imported materials 
5 16 Goods on consignment 
6 19 Border trade  
7 22 Contracting projects 
8 23 Goods on lease 
9 27 Outward processing 
10 30 Barter trade 
11 33 Warehousing trade  
12 34 Entrepot trade by bonded area 
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Table 1A.11. Ranking of Output Tariffs for IO Sectors (%) 
IO Code Mean Output Tariffs Ranking IO Code Mean Output Tariffs Ranking 
16 33.45  1 62 11.28  36 
20 32.85  2 31 11.06  37 
13 30.57  3 25 10.84  38 
67 23.88  4 71 10.63  39 
21 23.39  5 63 10.40  40 
78 21.30  6 42 10.32  41 
28 20.43  7 52 10.03  42 
72 20.36  8 65 9.81  43 
15 19.95  9 32 9.51  44 
19 19.83  10 73 9.46  45 
51 19.75  11 33 9.32  46 
27 18.98  12 46 9.27  47 
74 18.51  13 61 9.19  48 
17 18.21  14 41 8.74  49 
68 18.13  15 40 8.69  50 
83 17.95  16 76 8.29  51 
29 17.28  17 64 8.08  52 
44 16.28  18 30 7.46  53 
26 16.08  19 69 7.37  54 
34 15.38  20 39 7.32  55 
18 15.36  21 56 7.04  56 
35 15.17  22 45 6.72  57 
50 15.06  23 38 6.66  58 
47 14.58  24 55 6.40  59 
23 14.39  25 49 6.35  60 
24 14.14  26 36 6.10  61 
53 14.04  27 77 5.71  62 
70 13.27  28 37 5.69  63 
14 13.04  29 59 5.58  64 
60 12.32  30 58 4.32  65 
81 12.06  31 75 4.18  66 
48 11.91  32 66 4.02  67 
43 11.50  33 54 3.14  68 
80 11.45  34 57 2.71  69 
79 11.37  35       
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Table 1A.12. Reductions in Trade Protection and Pre-reform Industrial Characteristics (2001) 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Change in 
Protection 
Ln(Wage) Ln(Output)  Ln(Labour) 
Ln(Added-
Value) 
Ln(Total 
Profit) 
Ln(Revenue) 
Skill 
Intensity 
 
⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ ⑸ ⑹ ⑺ 
Panel A: Change in Output Tariff (4-digit) 
 
-0.003* 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.009 0.000 
 
(0.002) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.000) 
R2 0.738 0.606 0.602 0.600 0.575 0.606 0.848 
Observatio
ns 
408 408 408 408 408 408 408 
Panel B: Change in Output Tariff (3-digit) 
 
-0.004 0.002 0.029 0.000 -0.011 -0.001 0.001 
 
(0.007) (0.038) (0.033) (0.039) (0.047) (0.038) (0.001) 
R2 0.727 0.352 0.484 0.367 0.375 0.344 0.747 
Observatio
ns 
69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
Panel C: Change in Input Tariff (3-digit) 
 
-0.020 -0.039 0.060 -0.040 -0.091 -0.043 -0.005 
 
(0.017) (0.069) (0.058) (0.067) (0.081) (0.071) (0.003) 
R2 0.736 0.356 0.481 0.371 0.389 0.348 0.752 
Observatio
ns 
69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
Panel D: Change in Industry ERP (3-digit) 
 
-0.000 -0.002 0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 
 
(0.003) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.001) 
R2 0.725 0.352 0.476 0.367 0.374 0.344 0.749 
Observatio
ns 
69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; significant at *10%; **5%; ***1%. All regressions include 
industry fixed effects and 3-digit industry FEs are controlled in panel A whilst 2-digit industry FEs are controlled in the 
rest panels. The regressions are weighted by the square root of the number of firms within each industry. 
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Table 1A.13. Reductions in Trade Protection and Pre-reform Industrial Characteristics (2002) 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Change in 
Proteciton 
Ln(Wage) Ln(Output)  Ln(Labour) 
Ln(Added-
Value) 
Ln(Total 
Profit) 
Ln(Revenue) 
Skill 
Intensity 
  ⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ ⑸ ⑹ ⑺ 
Panel A: Change in Output Tariff (4-digit) 
 
-0.004 -0.026 -0.024 -0.023 -0.029 -0.026 0.000 
 
(0.005) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) (0.031) (0.001) 
R2 0.738 0.610 0.599 0.606 0.589 0.611 0.840 
Observatio
ns 
409 409 409 409 409 409 409 
Panel B: Change in Output Tariff (3-digit) 
 
-0.015 0.005 0.061 0.006 -0.041 0.001 0.000 
 
(0.016) (0.087) (0.076) (0.092) (0.113) (0.088) (0.003) 
R2 0.683 0.349 0.489 0.363 0.358 0.343 0.742 
Observatio
ns 
69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
Panel C: Change in Input Tariff (3-digit) 
 
-0.079** -0.149 0.042 -0.166 -0.315 -0.154 -0.006 
 
(0.036) (0.154) (0.134) (0.146) (0.190) (0.160) (0.006) 
R2 0.706 0.361 0.477 0.377 0.394 0.355 0.743 
Observatio
ns 
69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
Panel D: Change in Industry ERP (3-digit) 
 
-0.002 -0.002 0.017 0.001 -0.011 -0.004 0.000 
 
(0.005) (0.029) (0.026) (0.030) (0.036) (0.029) (0.001) 
R2 0.676 0.349 0.483 0.363 0.356 0.343 0.742 
Observatio
ns 
69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; significant at *10%; **5%; ***1%. All regressions include 
industry fixed effects and 3-digit industry FEs are controlled in panel A whilst 2-digit industry FEs are controlled in the 
rest panels. The regressions are weighted by the square root of the number of firms within each industry. 
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Table 1A.14. Estimation for Theoretical Assumptions (Full) 
Dependent Variable: ln(wage) k,j,t ln(wage) k,j,t ln(wage) k,j,t ln(wage) k,j,t ln(wage) k,j,t 
  ⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ ⑸ 
Ln(Total profit) k,j,t 0.071***     
 
(0.001) 
    
Ln(Operating profit) k,j,t  
0.073*** 
   
  
(0.001) 
   
FXX k,j,t 
  
0.114*** 0.092*** 0.097*** 
 
  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
FMM k,j,t 
  
0.580*** 0.521*** 0.505*** 
 
  
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
FXM k,j,t 
  
0.478*** 0.419*** 0.413*** 
 
  
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
LnK k,j,t    
0.038*** 0.036*** 
    
(0.001) (0.001) 
Skill intensity j,t     
1.162*** 
     
(0.020) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.186  0.183  0.172  0.180  0.188  
Observations 953,609 893,920 953,609 953,609 953,609 
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; significant at *10%; **5%; 
***1%. Industry fixed effects are controlled at the 2-digit industry level.  
 
 
Table 1A.15. Estimation for Theoretical Assumptions (Full) 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Ln(Labour)k,j,t Ln(Labour)k,j,t Ln(Valu-added)k,j,t Ln(Value-added)k,j,t TFPdlk,j,t TFPdlk,j,t 
  ⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ ⑸ ⑹ 
FXX k,j,t 0.492*** 0.491*** 0.448*** 0.166*** 0.269*** 0.134*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
FMM k,j,t 0.489*** 0.493*** 1.236*** 0.445*** 0.862*** 0.469*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) 
FXM k,j,t 0.802*** 0.804*** 1.229*** 0.458*** 0.812*** 0.434*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) 
LnK k,j,t    
0.491*** 
 
0.238*** 
    
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
Skill intensity j,t  
-0.261*** 
 
0.860*** 
 
0.987*** 
  
(0.050) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.043) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.078  0.078  0.081  0.436  0.074  0.198  
Observations 953,609 953,609 945,433 945,433 945,433 945,433 
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; significant at *10%; **5%; 
***1%. Industry fixed effects are controlled at the 2-digit industry level.  
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Table 1A.16. Baseline Regressions for Tariffs and Wages (Full) 
Dependent Variable: 
ln(wage) k,j,t 
OT OT × 
Exporter 
IT  IT × 
Importer 
Both Trade 
shares 
Identify FXM firms  
Dummies  Shares 
  ⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ ⑸ ⑹ ⑺ ⑻ 
Output tariff j,t-1 -0.117*** -0.125***   -0.099*** -0.097*** -0.100*** -0.097*** 
 (0.020) (0.020)   (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
OT j,t-1× FX 
(ExportShare)k,j,t 
 0.093**   0.086** 0.303***   
  (0.037)   (0.038) (0.115)   
OT j,t-1× FXX 
(ExportShare)k,j,t 
      0.059 0.233* 
       (0.043) (0.131) 
OT j,t-1× FXM 
(ExportShare)k,j,t 
      0.147** 0.467*** 
       (0.057) (0.155) 
Input tariff j,t-1   -0.472*** -0.477*** -0.375*** -0.371*** -0.373*** -0.371*** 
   (0.078) (0.079) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) 
IT j,t-1× FM 
(ImportShare)k,j,t 
   0.093 0.053 -0.258   
    (0.117) (0.119) (0.647)   
IT j,t-1× FMM 
(ImportShare)k,j,t 
      0.086 -0.420 
       (0.172) (0.865) 
IT j,t-1× FMX 
(ImportShare)k,j,t 
      -0.046 -0.127 
       (0.157) (0.856) 
FX (ExportShare)k,j,t 0.004 -0.008 0.004 0.004 -0.007 -0.046**   
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.018)   
FXX (ExportShare)k,j,t 
     
 -0.004 -0.042** 
 
     
 (0.007) (0.021) 
FXM (ExportShare)k,j,t       -0.004 -0.054** 
       (0.012) (0.024) 
FM (ImportShare)k,j,t 0.006 0.006 0.006 -0.001 0.002 0.057 
 
 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) (0.057) 
 
 
FMM (ImportShare)k,j,t       -0.001 0.073 
       (0.016) (0.080) 
FMX_ImportShare k,j,t        0.041 
        (0.071) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.117 
Observations 579,501 579,501 579,501 579,501 579,501 579,501 579,501 579,501 
Joint Significance tests for coefficients on tariffs and interaction terms 
OT for exporter   -0.031     -0.013 0.207* 
 
 
    (0.039)      (0.039)  (0.114) 
 
 
OT for exporter-importer          0.047   0.371** 
       (0.057)    (0.155) 
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; significant at *10%; **5%; ***1%. Industry fixed 
effects are controlled at the 2-digit industry level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 235 
 
 
 
Table 1A.17. Baseline Regressions for ERP and Wages (Full) 
Dependent Variable: ln(wage) k,j,t ERP ERP × global engagement 
dummies 
Trade shares 
  ⑴ ⑵ ⑶ 
ERP j,t-1 -0.072*** -0.077*** -0.073*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
ERP j,t-1× FXX (ExportShare)k,j,t  0.019 0.037 
  (0.027) (0.080) 
ERP j,t-1× FMM (ImportShare)k,j,t  0.016 -0.062 
  (0.040) (0.179) 
ERP j,t-1× FXM k,j,t  0.113***  
  (0.034)  
ERP j,t-1× FXM_ExportShare k,j,t   0.273*** 
   (0.094) 
ERP j,t-1× FXM_ImportShare k,j,t   -0.173 
   (0.195) 
FXX (ExportShare)k,j,t 0.004 0.001 -0.017 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.018) 
FMM (ImportShare)k,j,t 0.006 0.004 0.044 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.039) 
FXM k,j,t 0.009* -0.007  
 (0.005) (0.007)  
FXM_ExportSshare k,j,t   -0.040** 
   (0.020) 
FXM_ImportShare k,j,t   0.056 
   (0.041) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Location FE Yes Yes Yes 
Location-year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.117 0.117 0.117 
Observations 579,501 579,501 579,501 
Joint Significance tests for coefficients on ERP and interaction terms 
ERP for exporter- importer   0.036 0.026 
     (0.034)  (0.206) 
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; significant at *10%; **5%; 
***1%. Industry fixed effects are controlled at the 2-digit industry level.  
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Table 1A.18. Regressions for Tariffs and Wages - supplementary controls (post-WTO) 
Dependent Variable: ln(wage) k,j,t Output and Input Tariffs  Industry ERP 
 Owner indicators Owner shares Size  Productivity  Owner indicators Owner shares Size  Productivity 
  ⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷   ⑸ ⑹ ⑺ ⑻ 
Output tariff j,t-1 -0.119*** -0.119*** -0.125*** -0.116***      
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)      
OT j,t-1× FX k,j,t 0.084** 0.084** 0.083** 0.082**      
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040)      
Input tariff j,t-1 -0.369*** -0.370*** -0.357*** -0.413***      
 (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.087)      
IT j,t-1× FM k,j,t 0.193 0.199 -0.053 -0.081      
 (0.137) (0.137) (0.135) (0.133)      
FX k,j,t -0.008 -0.008 0.009 0.005      
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)      
FM k,j,t -0.009 -0.009 0.019* 0.014      
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)      
ERP ,j.t-1      -0.085*** -0.085*** -0.101*** -0.095*** 
      (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
ERP j,t-1× FXX k,j,t      0.025 0.025 0.031 0.033 
      (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) 
ERP j,t-1× FMM k,j,t      0.023 0.024 -0.012 -0.012 
      (0.048) (0.048) (0.046) (0.047) 
ERP j,t-1× FXM k,j,t      0.130*** 0.131*** 0.120*** 0.110*** 
      (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) 
FXX k,j,t      -0.002 -0.002 0.014** 0.009 
      (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
FMM k,j,t      0.002 0.002 0.017* 0.007 
      (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
FXM k,j,t      -0.012 -0.012 0.015** 0.007 
            (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
 
(Continued) 
 
 
  237 / 256 
 
 
Table 1A.18. Continued 
Dependent Variable: ln(wage) k,j,t Output and Input Tariffs  Industry ERP 
 Owner indicators Owner shares Size  Productivity  Owner indicators Owner shares Size  Productivity 
  ⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷   ⑸ ⑹ ⑺ ⑻ 
SOE indicator k,j,t 0.013     0.013    
 
(0.010)     (0.010)    
Foreign indicator k,j,t 0.021**     0.021**    
 
(0.009)     (0.009)    
Govt share k,j,t   -0.004 0.007 0.008   -0.004 0.006 0.008 
 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)   (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Foreign share k,j,t  0.039*** 0.049*** 0.042***   0.039*** 0.049*** 0.042*** 
 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)   (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
HMT share k,j,t  0.029*** 0.040*** 0.035***   0.030*** 0.040*** 0.036*** 
 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)   (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Ln(Labour) k,j,t   -0.215*** -0.145***    -0.215*** -0.145*** 
 
  (0.004) (0.003)    (0.004) (0.003) 
Ln(VA per worker) k,j,t    0.126***     0.126*** 
 
   (0.002)     (0.002) 
Joint Significance tests for coefficients on trade protections and interaction terms 
OT for exporter  -0.035 -0.035   -0.043  -0.034      
 (0.043) (0.043)  (0.042)  (0.041)      
ERP for exporter-importer       0.045  0.046 0.019 0.015 
            (0.036)  (0.036) 0.036 (0.035) 
Observations 516,799 516,799 516,799 513,449   516,799 516,799 516,799 513,449 
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; significant at *10%; **5%; ***1%. 2-digit industry FE, year FE, location FE and location-year FE are controlled. Adjusted R2 are all above 
0.111 and to save space, we do not report them here.    
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Table 1A.19. Regressions for Tariffs and Wages - additional controls (Full) 
Dependent Variable: 
ln(wage) k,j,t 
Ownership Size Productivity 
Drop 
switchers 
Balanced Trade 
shares 
  ⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ ⑸ ⑹ 
Output tariff j,t-1 -0.099*** -0.097*** -0.096*** -0.114*** -0.121*** -0.117*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.026) (0.033) (0.032) 
OT j,t-1× FX (ExportShare)k,j,t 0.086** 0.087** 0.092** 0.091** 0.091 0.309 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.044) (0.058) (0.199) 
Input tariff j,t-1 -0.374*** -0.352*** -0.405*** -0.586*** -0.439*** -0.430*** 
 (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.102) (0.119) (0.119) 
IT j,t-1× FM (ImportShare)k,j,t 0.057 0.055 0.059 0.052 0.177 0.190 
 (0.118) (0.118) (0.117) (0.129) (0.176) (1.050) 
FX (ExportShare)k,j,t -0.007 -0.011* -0.015*** -0.018** -0.020** -0.063* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.033) 
FM (ImportShare)k,j,t 0.002 -0.002 -0.007 -0.007 -0.012 -0.066 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.093) 
SOE dummy k,j,t -0.008 -0.010* -0.009 -0.010 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
Foreign dummy k,j,t 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.021** 0.030*** 0.024 0.023 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) 
HMT dummy k,j,t 0.021*** 0.019** 0.016** 0.018** 0.035** 0.035** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) 
LnK k,j,t  0.035*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 
 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
TFPdl k,j,t   0.098*** 0.102*** 0.097*** 0.097*** 
   
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.117 0.120 0.136 0.136 0.186 0.186 
Observations 579,501 579,501 575,800 485,392 139,300 139,300 
Joint Significance tests for coefficients on tariffs and interaction terms 
OT for exporter  -0.012    -0.010 -0.004 -0.023    
  (0.039)    (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.047)   
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; significant at *10%; **5%; 
***1%. Industry fixed effects are controlled at the 2-digit industry level.  
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Table 1A.20. Regressions for ERP and Wages - additional controls (Full) 
Dependent Variable:  
ln(wage) k,j,t 
Ownership Size Productivity 
Drop 
switchers 
Balanced Trade 
shares 
  ⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ ⑸ ⑹ 
ERP j,t-1 -0.077*** -0.074*** -0.072*** -0.084*** -0.055*** -0.051*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.020) -0.005 
ERP j,t-1× FXX (ExportShare)k,j,t 0.019 0.020 0.025 0.023 0.011 (0.148) 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.032) (0.045) (0.124) 
ERP j,t-1× FMM (ImportShare)k,j,t 0.017 0.016 0.026 0.023 0.026 0.179 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.046) (0.061) (0.322) 
ERP j,t-1× FXM k,j,t 0.114*** 0.113*** 0.108*** 0.102*** 0.113**  
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.037) (0.050)  
ERP j,t-1× FXM_ExportShare k,j,t      0.196 
      (0.171) 
ERP j,t-1× FXM_ImportShare k,j,t      -0.034 
      (0.344) 
FXX (ExportShare)k,j,t 0.001 -0.003 -0.008 -0.011 -0.009 -0.029 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.035) 
FMM (ImportShare)k,j,t 0.004 -0.001 -0.008 -0.010 0.006 -0.072 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.061) 
FXM k,j,t -0.008 -0.014** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.027**  
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011)  
FXM_ExportSshare k,j,t      -0.045 
      (0.037) 
FXM_ImportShare k,j,t      -0.054 
      (0.071) 
SOE dummy k,j,t -0.008 -0.011* -0.009 -0.010 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
Foreign dummy k,j,t 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.021** 0.031*** 0.024 0.024 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) 
HMT dummy k,j,t 0.021*** 0.019** 0.017** 0.018** 0.036** 0.035** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) 
LnK k,j,t  0.035*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 
 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
TFPdl k,j,t   0.098*** 0.102*** 0.097*** 0.097*** 
 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.117 0.120 0.136 0.136 0.186 0.186 
Observations 579,501 579,501 575,800 485,392 139,300 139,300 
Joint Significance tests for coefficients on tariffs and interaction terms 
ERP for exporter-importer  0.037 0.040  0.036 0.017 0.059  
  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.033)  (0.038) (0.051)  
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; significant at *10%; **5%; 
***1%. Industry fixed effects are controlled at the 2-digit industry level.  
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Table 1A.21. Regressions for Tariffs and Wages - Heterogeneous Choices (Full) 
Dependent Variable:  
ln(wage) k,j,t 
Always 
trade 
Trade in 
2002 
Trade at 
entry 
 Drop 
switchers 
Trade 
shares 
Identify exit 
  ⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ ⑸ ⑹ 
Output tariff j,t-1 -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.097*** -0.094*** -0.092*** -0.081*** 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.023) (0.020) (0.023) 
OT j,t-1× FX (ExportShare)k,j,t 0.277*** 0.090 0.169** 0.346*** 0.441** 0.094** 
 (0.093) (0.069) (0.077) (0.124) (0.199) (0.043) 
Input tariff j,t-1 -0.400*** -0.419*** -0.407*** -0.416*** -0.407*** -0.261*** 
 (0.079) (0.080) (0.080) (0.090) (0.079) (0.088) 
IT j,t-1× FM (ImportShare)k,j,t -0.287 0.277 0.051 -0.339 0.473 -0.106 
 (0.278) (0.171) (0.181) (0.393) (0.778) (0.129) 
FX (ExportShare)k,j,t -0.004 -0.004 -0.004  -0.010 -0.019** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.011) (0.007) 
FM (ExportShare)k,j,t -0.003 -0.004 -0.002  0.013 0.010 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.024) (0.012) 
SOE dummy k,j,t -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 -0.009 -0.013* 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Foreign dummy k,j,t 0.021** 0.021** 0.021** 0.022* 0.021** 0.008 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) 
HMT dummy k,j,t 0.016** 0.016** 0.016** 0.015 0.016** 0.010 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) 
LnK k,j,t 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
TFPdl k,j,t 0.098*** 0.098*** 0.098*** 0.099*** 0.098*** 0.096*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Exit k,j,t      -0.013*** 
 
     (0.003) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.132 0.136 0.095 
Observations 575,800 575,800 575,800 485,552 575,800 428,792 
Joint Significance tests for coefficients on tariffs and interaction terms 
OT for exporter  0.183**  -0.004   0.072 0.251** 0.349*  0.013 
  (0.092) (0.068)   (0.076)  (0.122) (0.197) (0.045) 
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; significant at *10%; **5%; 
***1%. Industry fixed effects are controlled at the 2-digit industry level.  
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Table 1A.22. Regressions for ERP and Wages - exiting firms (Full) 
Dependent Variable: 
ln(wage) k,j,t 
Post-WTO  Balanced 
 
Exit 
ERP × 
Exit  
ERP × 
Types  
 
Exit 
ERP × Exit  ERP × 
Types  
  ⑴ ⑵ ⑶   ⑷ ⑸ ⑹ 
ERP j,t-1 -0.053*** -0.048*** -0.053***  -0.036* -0.033 -0.036* 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)  (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) 
ERP j,t-1× FXX k,j,t 0.023  0.017  -0.016  -0.015 
 (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.046)  (0.046) 
ERP j,t-1× FMM k,j,t 0.010  0.007  0.054  0.054 
 (0.047)  (0.048)  (0.064)  (0.064) 
ERP j,t-1× FXM k,j,t 0.094**  0.086**  0.085  0.083 
 (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.052)  (0.052) 
ERP j,t-1× Exit k,j,t  0.005    0.032  
  (0.016)    (0.059)  
ERP j,t-1× FXX k,j,t × 
Exit k,j,t 
  0.100*    -0.152 
   (0.057)    (0.139) 
ERP j,t-1× FMM k,j,t × 
Exit k,j,t 
  0.062    -0.284 
   (0.094)    (0.626) 
ERP j,t-1× FXM k,j,t × 
Exit k,j,t 
  0.175**    0.202 
   (0.076)    (0.180) 
ERP j,t-1× DOM k,j,t × 
Exit k,j,t 
  -0.001    0.037 
   (0.016)    (0.061) 
FXX k,j,t -0.012* -0.008* -0.013*  -0.001 -0.003 -0.000 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)  (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) 
FMM k,j,t -0.008 -0.006 -0.008  -0.004 0.005 -0.004 
 (0.012) (0.008) (0.012)  (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) 
FXM k,j,t -0.019** -0.004 -0.019**  -0.018 -0.005 -0.018 
 
(0.009) (0.006) (0.009)  (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) 
Exit k,j,t -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.015***  -0.017* -0.021* -0.020* 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)   (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) 
SOE dummy k,j,t -0.013* -0.013* -0.013*  -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Foreign dummy k,j,t 0.009 0.009 0.009  0.014 0.013 0.013 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
HMT dummy k,j,t 0.010 0.010 0.010  0.030* 0.030* 0.030* 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
LnK k,j,t 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.034***  0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
TFPdl k,j,t 0.096*** 0.096*** 0.096***  0.092*** 0.092*** 0.092*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Adjusted R2 0.095 0.095 0.095  0.130 0.130 0.130 
Observations 428,792 428,792 428,792   131,313 131,313 131,313 
Joint Significance tests for coefficients on tariffs and interaction terms 
ERP for 
exporter-importer 
 0.041    0.156   0.049    0.213 
(0.038)    (0.100)  (0.052)   (0.201)  
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; significant at *10%; **5%; 
***1%. 2-digit industry FE, year FE, location FE and location-year FE are controlled.  
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Table 1A.23. Channels (Full) 
Regressand: ln(wage) k,j,t 
Change in 
labordemand 
Import scope Change in labordemand Import scope 
⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ 
Output tariff j,t-1 -0.085*** -0.085***   
 (0.023) (0.023)   
OT j,t-1× FX k,j,t 0.107** 0.108**   
 (0.043) (0.043)   
Input tariff j,t-1 -0.190** -0.190**   
 (0.086) (0.086)   
IT j,t-1× FM k,j,t -0.062 -0.056   
 (0.127) (0.127)   
ERP j,t-1   -0.051*** -0.051*** 
   (0.014) (0.014) 
ERP j,t-1× FXX k,j,t   0.031 0.032 
   (0.031) (0.031) 
ERP j,t-1× FMM k,j,t   0.014 0.014 
   (0.045) (0.045) 
ERP j,t-1× FXM k,j,t   0.103*** 0.104*** 
   (0.038) (0.038) 
Ln(Import scope) k,j,t  0.010**  0.010** 
 
 (0.004)  (0.004) 
D1. Ln(Labour) k,j,t -0.188*** -0.188*** -0.188*** -0.188*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Exit k,j,t -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
SOE dummy k,j,t -0.014** -0.014** -0.015** -0.015** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Foreign dummy k,j,t 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.010 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
HMT dummy k,j,t 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
 
 
 
 
(Continued) 
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Table 1A.23. Continued 
Regressand: ln(wage) k,j,t 
Change in 
labordemand 
Import scope Change in labordemand Import scope 
⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ 
LnK k,j,t 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
TFPdl k,j,t 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
FX k,j,t -0.022*** -0.022***   
 (0.007) (0.007)   
FM k,j,t 0.007 -0.001   
 (0.012) (0.012)   
FXX k,j,t   -0.015** -0.016** 
   (0.007) (0.007) 
FMM k,j,t   -0.008 -0.016 
   (0.011) (0.012) 
FXM k,j,t   -0.020** -0.029*** 
 
  (0.009) (0.009) 
Joint Significance tests for coefficients on tariffs and interaction terms 
OT for exporter  0.022 0.023     
  (0.044)    (0.044)   
ERP for exporter-importer   0.052   0.053 
      0.039  (0.038) 
Observations 516,799 516,799 516,799 513,449 
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; significant at *10%; **5%; 
***1%. 2-digit industry FE, year FE, location FE and location-year FE are controlled. Adjusted R2 are equal to 0.132 
and to save space, we do not report them here.    
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Table 1A.24. Summary of Chinese Two-digit Industry 
Industry Code Industry Name 
13 Manuf. agricultural products 
14 Manuf. food products 
15 Manuf. drink products 
17 Manuf. textile products 
18 Manuf. apparel , footwear etc. 
19 Manuf. leather products, fur etc. 
20 Manuf. wood and wood products 
21 Furniture manufacturing 
22 Manuf. paper, paper products 
23 Printing and re-production media  
24 Manuf. cultural & entertainment products  
25 Processing crude oil, nuclear fuel 
26 Manuf. chemical raw materials 
27 Manuf. pharmaceuticals 
28 Manuf. chemical fibres 
29 Manuf. rubber products 
30 Manuf. plastic products 
31 Manuf. non-metal products 
32 Manuf. ferrous metal casting 
33 Manuf. non-ferrous metal casting 
34 Manuf. metal products 
35 Manuf. universal equipment  
36 Manuf. special equipment  
37 Manuf. transportation equipment  
39 Manuf. electric machines, appliances 
40 Manuf. electronic equipment  
41 Manuf. instruments, appliances 
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Table 2A.1. Regressions for ERP and Wages (post-WTO) 
Dependent Variable: ln(wage) 
k,j,t 
Industry level  Firm level 
ERP ERP 
× 
Dum
my 
ERP
× 
Inten
sity 
 ERP ERP 
× 
Dum
my 
ERP
× 
Inten
sity 
 ERP
_2 
ERP
_2 × 
Dum
my 
ERP_
2 × 
Inten
sity 
  ⑴ ⑵ ⑶   ⑷ ⑸ ⑹   ⑺ ⑻ ⑼ 
ERP ,j.t-1 0.043
*** 
0.038
** 
0.043
** 
 -0.00
0 
-0.00
0 
-0.00
0 
    
 (0.01
4) 
(0.01
8) 
(0.01
7) 
 (0.00
0) 
(0.00
0) 
(0.00
0) 
    
ERP j,t-1× Processing Dummy 
(Intensity)k,j,t 
 0.011 -0.00
1 
  -0.00
0 
-0.00
0 
    
  (0.02
7) 
(0.03
0) 
  (0.00
0) 
(0.00
0) 
    
ERP_2 ,j.t-1 
  
      -0.00
0 
-0.00
0 
-0.00
0 
 
  
      (0.00
0) 
(0.00
0) 
(0.00
0) 
ERP_2 j,t-1× Processing 
Dummy (Intensity)k,j,t 
         0.000 0.000 
          (0.00
0) 
(0.00
0) 
PI k,j,t -0.00
8 
-0.00
9 
-0.00
0 
 -0.00
8 
-0.00
8 
0.000  -0.00
8 
-0.00
8 
-0.00
0 
 (0.00
7) 
(0.00
7) 
(0.00
8) 
 (0.00
7) 
(0.00
7) 
(0.00
8) 
 (0.00
7) 
(0.00
7) 
(0.00
8) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Location FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Location-year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.120 0.120 0.120  0.120 0.120 0.120  0.120 0.120 0.120 
Observations 115,1
79 
115,1
79 
115,1
79 
  115,1
79 
115,1
79 
115,1
79 
  115,1
79 
115,1
79 
115,1
79 
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; significant at *10%; **5%; 
***1%. Industry fixed effects are controlled at the 3-digit industry level.  
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Table 2A.2. Preliminary Regressions for ERP and Wages (post-WTO)  
Dependent Variable: ln(wage) k,j,t Industry ERP Firm ERP Firm ERP_2 
  ⑴ ⑵ ⑶ 
Industry ERP ,j.t-1 -0.005 
  
 (0.032) 
  
Industry ERP j,t-1× Predicted Processing Intensity k,j,t -0.035 
  
 (0.063) 
  
Firm ERP k,j,t-1 
 
-0.000 
 
 
 
(0.000) 
 
Firm ERP k,j,t-1× Predicted Processing Intensity k,j,t 
 
0.000 
 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
Firm ERP_2 k,j,t-1 
  
0.000 
 
  
(0.000) 
Firm ERP_2 k,j,t-1× Predicted Processing Intensity k,j,t 
  
-0.000 
   
(0.001) 
Predicted Processing Intensity k,j,t 0.050*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Location FE Yes Yes Yes 
Location-year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.121 0.121 0.121 
Observations 115,179 115,179 115,179 
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** at 5% and 
*** at 1%. All regressions use adjusted processing intensity predicted by Heckman two-stage selection model and firm 
output and input tariffs are lagged by one period. Industry fixed effects are controlled at the 3-digit industry level.  
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Table 2A.3. Regressions for Firm ERP and Wages with Additional Controls (Post-WTO) 
Dependent Variable: ln(wage) k,j,t 
With 
ownership 
With 
productivity 
With 
size  
With 
leverage 
With 
debt 
ratio 
  ⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ ⑸ 
Firm ERP k,j,t-1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm ERP k,j,t-1× Predicted Processing Intensity k,j,t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Predicted Processing Intensity k,j,t 0.042*** 0.029*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.049*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) 
TFPdl k,j,t 
 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 
 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ln K k,j,t   0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Leverage k,j,t-1    0.000  
 
   (0.002)  
Total debt ratio k,j,t-1     
-0.025*** 
     
(0.008) 
SOE k,j,t -0.009 -0.00558 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
 
(0.013) (0.0134) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Foreign owned k,j,t 0.022** 0.0215** 0.020* 0.020* 0.021** 
 
(0.011) (0.0105) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
HMT owned k,j,t 0.018* 0.0173 0.016 0.016 0.017 
 
(0.011) (0.0106) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.121 0.131 0.133 0.133 0.133 
Observations 115,179 114,230 114,230 114,230 114,230 
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** at 5% and 
*** at 1%. All regressions use adjusted processing intensity predicted by Heckman two-stage selection model. Industry 
fixed effects are controlled at the 3-digit industry level.  
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Table 2A.4. Regressions for Firm ERP_2 and Wages with Additional Controls (Post-WTO) 
Dependent Variable: ln(wage) k,j,t 
With 
ownership 
With 
productivity 
With 
size  
With 
leverage 
With debt 
ratio 
  ⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ ⑸ 
Firm ERP_2 k,j,t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Firm ERP_2 k,j,t-1× Predicted 
Processing Intensity k,j,t 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Predicted Processing Intensity k,j,t 0.042*** 0.029*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.049*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) 
TFPdl k,j,t 
 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 
 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ln K k,j,t   0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Leverage k,j,t-1    0.000  
 
   (0.002)  
Total debt ratio k,j,t-1     -0.025*** 
 
    (0.008) 
SOE k,j,t -0.009 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Foreign owned k,j,t 0.022** 0.022** 0.020* 0.020* 0.021** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
HMT owned k,j,t 0.018* 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.017 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.121 0.131 0.133 0.133 0.133 
Observations 115,179 114,230 114,230 114,230 114,230 
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** at 5% and 
*** at 1%. All regressions use adjusted processing intensity predicted by Heckman two-stage selection model. Industry 
fixed effects are controlled at the 3-digit industry level.  
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Table 2A.5. Channels (Post-WTO) 
Dependent Variable:  ln(total profit) k,j,t 
 
ln(wage) k,j,t 
 
With Multi-products 
 
With firm R&D  
ERP  ERP_2 
 
ERP  ERP_2 
 
ERP  ERP_2 
  ⑴ ⑵ 
 
⑶ ⑷ 
 
⑸ ⑹ 
Firm ERP k,j,t-1 -0.001 
  
-0.000 
  
-0.000 
 
 
(0.001) 
  
(0.000) 
  
(0.000) 
 Firm ERP k,j,t-1× Predicted 
Processing Intensityk,j,t 
0.001 
  
0.000 
  
-0.000 
 (0.001) 
  
(0.001) 
  
(0.001) 
 Firm ERP_2 k,j,t-1 
 
-0.000 
  
0.000 
  
-0.000 
  
(0.001) 
  
(0.000) 
  
(0.000) 
Firm ERP_2k,j,t-1× Predicted 
Processing Intensityk,j,t  
0.000 
  
-0.000 
  
-0.000 
 
(0.001) 
  
(0.001) 
  
(0.001) 
Predicted Processing Intensity k,j,t -0.137*** -0.137*** 
 
0.049*** 0.049*** 
 
0.043*** 0.043*** 
 
(0.027) (0.027) 
 
(0.010) (0.010) 
 
(0.011) (0.011) 
Ln (Export scope) k,j,t 
   
-0.002 -0.002 
   
    
(0.003) (0.003) 
   Ln (Ordinary import scope) k,j,t 
  
-0.003 -0.003 
   
    
(0.003) (0.003) 
   Ln (R_D) k,j,t 
      
-0.000 -0.000 
       
(0.001) (0.001) 
TFPdl k,j,t 0.506*** 0.506*** 
 
0.071*** 0.071*** 
 
0.071*** 0.071*** 
 
(0.010) (0.010) 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Ln K k,j,t 0.275*** 0.275*** 
 
0.033*** 0.033*** 
 
0.035*** 0.035*** 
 
(0.010) (0.010) 
 
(0.004) (0.004) 
 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Total debt ratio k,j,t-1 0.276*** 0.276*** 
 
-0.025*** -0.025*** 
 
-0.015* -0.015* 
 
(0.021) (0.021) 
 
(0.008) (0.008) 
 
(0.009) (0.009) 
SOE k,j,t -0.105** -0.105** 
 
-0.007 -0.007 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
(0.041) (0.041) 
 
(0.013) (0.013) 
 
(0.016) (0.016) 
Foreign owned k,j,t 0.013 0.013 
 
0.021* 0.021* 
 
0.012 0.012 
 
(0.025) (0.025) 
 
(0.011) (0.011) 
 
(0.011) (0.011) 
HMT owned k,j,t 0.032 0.032 
 
0.017 0.017 
 
0.013 0.013 
 
(0.025) (0.025) 
 
(0.011) (0.011) 
 
(0.011) (0.011) 
Adjusted R2 0.145 0.145 
 
0.133 0.133 
 
0.127 0.127 
Observations 114,230 114,230   114,230 114,230   100,840 100,840 
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** at 5% and 
*** at 1%. All regressions use adjusted processing intensity predicted by Heckman two-stage selection model. 
Three-digit industry FE, year FE, location FE and location-year FE are controlled.  
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Table 3A.1. Percentage of Exporters according to Share of Exports in Outputs 
 
Percentage of Exporters 
Export Share 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 All 
below 10% 61.36  56.77  50.12  45.70  40.01  38.92  40.09  43.65  
10% - 20% 11.70  12.76  13.44  13.48  13.73  13.81  13.37  13.42  
20% - 30% 6.24  7.16  8.22  9.28  9.41  9.28  9.50  8.96  
30% - 40% 4.65  5.59  5.76  6.28  6.99  7.38  7.27  6.73  
40% - 50% 3.22  3.74  4.58  5.46  5.57  6.07  5.89  5.41  
50% - 60% 2.91  3.83  4.27  4.25  4.58  5.13  4.90  4.58  
60% - 70% 2.30  2.70  2.86  3.61  4.50  4.65  4.61  4.07  
70% - 80% 2.15  2.42  3.08  3.58  4.15  4.35  4.25  3.83  
80% - 90% 2.15  2.38  3.14  3.32  4.18  4.44  4.36  3.86  
above 90% 3.31  2.65  4.54  5.06  6.87  5.99  5.76  5.48  
Observations 4,470 5,667 7,494 9,983 15,698 17,761 22,774 83,847 
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Table 3A.2. Firm Wages and Export Switching  
Dependent Variable: 
D1.ln(wage) k,j,t 
PE   OE   ME 
Tariffs Tariff 
Interactions 
 Tariffs Tariff 
Interactions 
 Tariffs Tariff 
Interactions 
⑴ ⑵   ⑶ ⑷   ⑸ ⑹ 
D1.ERP ,j.t-1 -0.003** -0.003***  -0.000*** -0.000***  0.001** 0.001** 
 
(0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
D1.ERP k,j,t-1× 
PE_to_OE 
 0.162       
 
 (0.336)       
D1.ERP k,j,t-1× 
PE_to_ME 
 -0.024       
 
 (0.078)       
D1.ERP k,j,t-1× 
OE_to_PE 
    -0.438***    
 
    (0.111)    
D1.ERP k,j,t-1× 
OE_to_ME 
    0.001    
 
    (0.001)    
D1.ERP k,j,t-1× 
ME_to_PE 
       -0.117* 
 
       (0.060) 
D1.ERP k,j,t-1× 
ME_to_OE 
       0.025** 
 
       (0.010) 
PE_to_OE 0.147 0.135       
 
(0.149) (0.171)       
PE_to_ME 0.008 0.007       
 
(0.070) (0.070)       
OE_to_PE    -0.263*** -0.355***    
 
   (0.076) (0.054)    
OE_to_ME    -0.016 -0.017    
 
   (0.042) (0.042)    
ME_to_PE       -0.000 0.002 
 
      (0.105) (0.104) 
ME_to_OE       -0.141*** -0.140*** 
 
      (0.054) (0.054) 
Observations 3,557 3,557   20,006 20,006   10,168 10,168 
Notes:  Firm-level robust standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses; significant at *10%; **5%; 
***1%. Year fixed effects, location fixed effects and location-year fixed effects are controlled in all regressions.  
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Table 3A.3. Determinants of Export Switching 
 
Only Tariffs 
 
With Controls 
Dependent Variable: Switcher k,j,t 
PE→OE PE→ME OE→PE OE→ME ME→PE ME→OE  PE→OE PE→ME OE→PE OE→ME ME→PE ME→OE 
⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ ⑸ ⑹   ⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ ⑸ ⑹ 
D1.Output tariff ,j.t-1 2.156 -9.264*** 4.564 -5.357*** -7.763*** -8.861***  2.783 -9.364*** 4.368 -5.571*** -7.817*** -8.955*** 
 
(8.217) (1.242) (9.026) (1.128) (1.461) (1.095)  (8.317) (1.286) (9.997) (1.142) (1.494) (1.097) 
D1.Input tariff ,j.t-1 -5.184** 2.975 3.348 -3.935*** 10.750*** -3.439***  -5.210** 2.919 3.767 -4.051*** 10.76*** -3.735*** 
 
(2.531) (2.996) (12.710) (1.263) (2.916) (1.200)  (2.587) (3.067) -13.77 (1.275) (2.998) (1.232) 
D1.TFPdl k,j,t 
  
 
    -0.418 0.030 0.599*** 0.126** 0.084 0.171*** 
 
  
 
    (0.289) -0.079 (0.109) -0.051 (0.080) -0.063 
D1.Ln K k,j,t     
   -0.312 -0.160* 0.497 0.230*** -0.107 -0.059 
 
  
  
   (0.209) -0.088 (0.395) -0.055 (0.124) -0.072 
D1.SOE k,j,t        -2.550*** 0.188 0.173*** -0.097 -0.613 0.675** 
 
       (0.765) (0.262) (0.0445) (0.204) (0.399) (0.268) 
D1.Foreign owned k,j,t        0.419 0.303 -0.562 0.170 -0.378 0.354* 
 
       (0.571) (0.242) (0.364) (0.177) (0.342) (0.213) 
D1.HMT owned k,j,t        0.844 -0.060 0.505 0.151 0.046 0.270 
 
       (0.886) (0.268) (0.441) (0.183) (0.301) (0.220) 
R2 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007  0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
Observations 59,771 59,771 59,771 59,771 59,771 59,771   59,008 59,008 59,008 59,008 59,008 59,008 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported in parentheses; significant at *10%; **5%; ***1%. Location-year fixed effects are controlled in all regressions.  
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Appendix Figures  
Figure 2A.1. Tariff  Changes in Percentage of  HS Products (pre-WTO) 
 
 
Figure 2A.2. Tariff  Changes in Percentage of  HS Products (post-WTO) 
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Figure 2A.3. Change in Output Tariffs Relative to Initial Levels (2002), post-WTO (3-digit 
Industry) 
 
 
Figure 2A.4. Change in Output Tariffs Relative to Initial Levels, 2000-2006 (4-digit Industry) 
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Figure 2A.5. Change in Output Tariffs Relative to Initial Levels, pre-WTO (4-digit Industry) 
 
 
Figure 2A.6. Change in Output Tariffs Relative to Initial Levels (2001), post-WTO (4-digit 
Industry) 
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Figure 2A.7. Change in Output Tariffs Relative to Initial Levels (2002), post-WTO (4-digit 
Industry) 
 
 
 
-6
0
-4
0
-2
0
0
0 20 40 60
2002 Output Tariff (%)
Fitted Slope=-0.26 Fixed Slope=-1
4
-Y
e
a
r 
C
h
a
n
g
e
 i
n
 O
u
tp
u
t 
T
a
ri
ff
 (
%
)
